Burns Contracting, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank Mortg. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-1046,Case No. 1:15-cv-1050,Case No. 1:15-cv-1045,Case No. 1:15-cv-1106,Case No. 1:15-cv-1052,Case No. 1:15-cv-1049,Case No. 1:15-cv-1047,Case No. 1:15-cv-1051,Case No. 1:15-cv-1048,Case No. 1:15-cv-1107 |
| Parties | In re: BURNS CONTRACTING, INC. et al., IRON CROSS, LLC et al., BROWNSTONE PROPERTIES, L.L.C. et al., MICKENS GROUP et al., PREMIUM PROPERTIES UNLIMITED, LLC et al., PRECIOUS CREATION, INC. et al., JESSE STRICKLAND et al., REFLECTIONS, LLC et al., J. TAYLOR ELECTRIC, INC. et al., JEFF A. MOYER, Plaintiffs, v. MERCANTILE BANK MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
There are 10 cognate cases pending before this Court, and each Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discriminatory lending practices in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691e. The matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' third-amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
The Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2901, is a federal statute that encourages banks to provide services and make loans to residents in all segments of the population, with an emphasis on lending to low-income neighbors. In response to the CRA, Mercantile Bank adopted a community reinvestment strategy, and created a CRA committee. As a result of deliberate efforts through the CRA committee, the bank provided business loans to each Plaintiff.
Pat Julien, a loan officer at Mercantile Bank, approved Plaintiffs' loans and managed each relationship. In 2006, Ms. Julien stopped working at Mercantile Bank. After Ms. Julien left, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants began to treat them differently. From 2007 through 2009, Defendants made adverse lending actions, called loans, and foreclosed on collateral for late payments and tax liens. Plaintiff alleges that these reasons were mere pretext, and that Defendants were engaging in discriminatory lending practices. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants tightened their policies to eliminate black business borrowers. Plaintiffs refer to emails sent among Mercantile Bank employees as displaying discriminatory intent and racial animus.
Each of the 10 cognate cases allege violations of the ECOA. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to plead the necessary elements of a plausible discrimination claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may assert "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" as an affirmative defense. "[T]o survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], the complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." In re Travel Agent Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing such a motion, the Court must "accept all of plaintiff's factual allegations as true and determine whether any set of facts consistent with the allegations would entitle the plaintiff to relief." G.M. Eng'rs & Assoc., Inc. v. W. Bloomfield Twp., 922 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1990). As a general rule, however, the Court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice." In re Travel Agent, 583 F.3d at 903.
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). The pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Claims arising under the ECOA and its regulations are subject to a two-year statute of limitations if the claim accrued before July 21, 2010. Haug v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 871, 878 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (). Absent an express statement by Congress that an expansion of the limitations period should apply retroactively, courts following the Supreme Court's holding in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994), have uniformly concluded that "newly enacted legislation that lengthens a statute of limitations does not apply retroactively to revive a claim that had expired under the prior limitations period." Id. (citing In re ADC Telecomms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 409 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2005); Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., LLC, Secs. Litig. v. Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 409-10 (2d Cir. 2004); Chenault v. U.S. Postal Serv., 37 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1994)). Further, the ECOA's "focus is upon the time of discriminatory actions, not at the time at which the consequences of the action became painful." Mays v. Buckeye Elec. Co-op Inc., 277 F.3d 873, 879 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, any ECOA claim accruing before July 21, 2010 is subject to the two-year limitations period that was in effect under 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claim accrued in 2008, and the suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. To determine the accrual date,the Court will look to the specific ECOA and regulatory violations that Plaintiffs allege caused their injuries. See Mays, 277 F.3d at 879-80. Plaintiffs allege claims of intentional racial discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. Plaintiffs' expert analyzed statistical data showing that Defendants treated similarly-situated white and black business owners differently between 2008 and 2011. (ECF No. 35, PageID.556-58.) Plaintiffs allege that, in 2006, Defendants decided "not to lend any more money to black people." (Id. at PageID.553.) Plaintiffs also allege adverse actions taken by Defendants in 2007 and 2008, after loan officer Pat Julien left Mercantile Bank.
Defendants argue that, based on the third-amended complaint, Plaintiffs' claim accrued no later than 2008. Plaintiffs argue that the claims accrued by December 31, 2011, at the earliest, but more likely accrued in 2012, when Defendants' intentional plan to shrink commercial lending came to light. (ECF No. 35, PageID.618.) Based on the facts in the complaint, the alleged violations took place from 2007 through 2009.
The ECOA provides that an adverse action means "a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants took adverse action by revoking Plaintiffs' credit and foreclosing on Plaintiffs' collateral from 2007 through 2009.
Plaintiffs argue that the accrual date began when Plaintiffs discovered Defendants' plan to shrink commercial lending. Plaintiffs rely on Jones v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 844 F. Supp. 437, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1994), to assert that courts have applied the notion of discoveryas tolling the statute of limitations, regardless of whether the ECOA expressly mentions such a rule. Id. (). But the court in Jones was not interpreting the accrual date for the ECOA. Id. ( ). Instead, the court was interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 because those statutes did not provide an explicit statute of limitations. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs' reliance on Jones is misguided.
The Court must determine whether the discovery doctrine applies. Defendants argue that the ECOA does not explicitly mention a discovery rule. Further, the statute effective at that time of the alleged violations barred actions that were filed more than 2 years "after the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). Defendants rely upon the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Mays, "[t]he statute's focus is upon the time of discriminatory actions, not at the time at which the consequences of the action become painful." Mays, 277 F.3d at 879. Defendants argue that, unlike other federal statutes, the ECOA does not mention a discovery rule; instead, the language specifically provides that the action accrues when the violation occurs.
Further, district courts have also concluded that Mays precludes the application of a discovery rule for ECOA claims. See, e.g., Claybrooks v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 969, 977 (M.D. Tenn. 2005) (); Beard v. Dominion Homes Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00137,2007 WL 2137944, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2007) () (citing Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001)). In Claybrooks, the court looked at congressional intent and the ECOA's language to opine that both...
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