Burns-Toole v. Byrne
| Decision Date | 19 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | BURNS-TOOL,D,No. 93-2202,93-2202 |
| Citation | 11 F.3d 1270 |
| Parties | Peggy L.D.S., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roger P. BYRNE, D.D.S. and Ronald H. Shamblin, D.D.S., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Joseph R. Willie, II, Houston, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.
Sarah L. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
In this case we address allegations by an applicant for a dental license that she suffered religious discrimination in the course of the testing process. Because we can find no evidence upon which such allegations might properly be based, we affirm the district court's dismissal of her claims and grant of summary judgment.
The plaintiff/appellant, Dr. Peggy Burns-Toole, is an African-American, Seventh-Day Adventist. She is a graduate of the School of Dentistry at Meharry Medical College in Tennessee and has been licensed to practice dentistry in Illinois since 1986. At the time of the incidents at issue, the defendants/appellees, Dr. Roger Byrne and Dr. Ronald Shamblin were appointed members of the Texas State Board of Dental Examiners ("T.S.B.D.E.").
Dr. Burns-Toole moved from Illinois to Texas and applied to take the August 1990 state dental examination. The test was to be given on Thursday, August 23 through Saturday, August 25, 1990. Burns-Toole filed a written request for an examination variance because any work by her on the evening of the 24th and the day of the 25th conflicted with the tenets of her religion. The board granted her request. She took the remaining portions of the examination on Wednesday, August 22, 1990.
Dr. Shamblin graded a portion of her examination taken on one of the regularly scheduled days. He knew her only as "Applicant # 7" and had no access to information on her religious background.
During the examination, Dr. Burns-Toole's equipment malfunctioned. Although she lost time, she was given additional time at the end of the test as compensation. Whether the equipment malfunction affected her or not, Dr. Shamblin concluded that Dr. Burns-Toole's performance on the "gold onlay casting section" of the examination was inadequate. He conferred with two other examiners who concurred with his assessment. The three examiners decided that she had failed the test. 1
During the evening of the second day of the examination, Dr. Burns-Toole met with Dr. Zeb Poindexter, a member of a statewide professional association of African-American dentists. The T.S.B.D.E. had granted Dr. Poindexter permission to monitor the progress of African-American applicants and the conduct of T.S.B.D.E. members in the light of the high failure rates of African-American examinees.
Dr. Burns-Toole alleges that Dr. Poindexter admonished her about seeking the variance out of concern that it would call attention to her. Worse, Dr. Poindexter allegedly relayed to her that Dr. Shamblin, one of the examiners who failed her, had stated: "Who did she think she is," with regard to her request for a special accommodation. Dr. Burns-Toole also contends that Dr. Shamblin said to her directly, "You're going to be here next year," an apparent reference to her impending failure which would require her to re-take the test.
Dr. Burns-Toole applied to take the examination again on May 28-30, 1992. This time she sought no variance or special accommodation. A panel of three examiners found her radiograph deficient and, again, she failed. 2 Defendant Byrne, in his capacity as President of T.S.B.D.E., notified Dr. Burns-Toole of her failure. Dr. Byrne had no other interaction with Dr. Burns-Toole regarding the issues presented today. Moreover, he was, at all times, unaware of her religious beliefs.
Had Dr. Burns-Toole taken the examination and failed a third time, she would have been barred from ever taking the test again in Texas. Instead, she brought suit against Drs. Byrne and Shamblin, in their individual and official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, and 1986 for religious discrimination and for conspiracy to deprive her of her right to practice her religion freely. She also brought claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
The district court granted the defendants' motion and entered a final judgment. With respect to her Sec. 1983 claim, the district court held that Dr. Burns-Toole had failed to present any factual allegations sufficient to overcome the defendants' qualified immunity. 3 The district court dismissed her Sec. 1985 claim on the grounds that Sec. 1985 applies only to allegations of racial animus. Because a Sec. 1985 claim is a prerequisite for a valid Sec. 1986 claim, the judge dismissed the latter as well. Last, he dismissed Dr. Burns-Toole's request to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over her pendent state law claims even though the federal claims were dismissed. The district court then denied her motion to reconsider the order granting summary judgment. This appeal followed.
After consideration of the plaintiff's arguments, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed her claims and granted the defendants summary judgment. We need not reach a number of the legal points to which she ascribes error because the facts upon which she bases her claims are so wanting as to leave little doubt that the district court was correct.
We review the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims and grant of summary judgment de novo. 4 As to summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) test applied by the district court, without reference to the district court's ultimate conclusion. 5 A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 6 Summary judgment should be granted where any essential element of the plaintiff's case is without factual support. 7 Similarly, with respect to a motion to dismiss, appellate review is the same as that applied on the trial level. If the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claims that would entitle her to relief, dismissal is proper. 8
The points of error that the plaintiff attributes to the district court are based primarily on sophisticated legal issues. Although these questions have an undeniable academic appeal, we need not address them here. Instead, the disposition of this case turns on the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence that demonstrates that she has been the victim of religious discrimination. 9
The heart of Dr. Burns-Toole's case is 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. An action brought under Sec. 1983 against a state actor in his individual capacity, however, is subject to the defense of qualified immunity. The district court dismissed the Sec. 1983 claim because of the plaintiff's failure to plead facts with adequate particularity sufficient to overcome that immunity as concerns Drs. Byrne and Shamblin.
The cloaking of state actors with a qualified immunity is grounded in the belief that a government cannot operate efficiently if its employees and agents are subjected to the costly and time-consuming rigors of trial and discovery. 10 Instead, state actors should be able to act freely, within the bounds prescribed by law, but without the fear of consequences. The absence of this immunity would, as Judge Learned Hand has said, "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." 11
The burden is on the plaintiff to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. 12 To do so, the plaintiff must show that the defendants' conduct was not objectively reasonable and, further, that the defendants violated clearly established law. 13
Moreover, the plaintiff must plead specific facts with a level of particularity so that they would, if proved, warrant the relief she seeks. 14 We have previously explained the plaintiff's obligation:
In cases against government officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff's complaints state with factual detail and particularity the bases for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity. 15
In other words, Dr. Burns-Toole cannot prevail with mere conclusory statements evidencing only a personal belief that the defendants were motivated by an impermissible animus.
The district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. Dr. Burns-Toole founds her allegations of religious discrimination on one statement, a statement which does nothing to support her legal claims. The statement, relayed by Dr. Poindexter to her, allegedly was made by Dr. Shamblin, one of the examiners who failed her. According to Dr. Poindexter, Dr. Shamblin had stated, "Who did she think she is," with regard to her request for a special accommodation. 16
This remark might reflect a hostility towards those who request special accommodations. It even may reflect a hostility towards the plaintiff as an individual. The statement is not, however, probative of whether the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination on the basis of her religion. She has presented nothing that could lead to this conclusion.
Moreover, Dr. Burns-Toole has failed to tie this statement to any adverse action taken by Shamblin, Byrne, or the T.S.B.D.E., let alone any action that was motivated by a discriminatory animus. Implicit in her claim is that Dr. Shamblin failed her because of her request for a special accommodation. Yet, she has not countered Dr. Shamblin's assertion that he was unaware of her...
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