Burns v. Adler
Decision Date | 28 March 2017 |
Docket Number | SC19561,SC19560 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | BURNS v. ADLER |
ROBINSON, J., with whom ESPINOSA, J., joins, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision in the first certified appeal, SC 19560, to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff contractor, James E. Burns, Jr., on the ground that the conduct of the defendant homeowner, David Y. Adler,1 did not fall within the bad faith exception to the statutory bar on the enforcement of contracts that do not comply with the requirements set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 20-429.2 See Burns v. Adler, 158 Conn. App. 766, 806, 120 A.3d 555 (2015). Specifically, I disagree with the majority's conclusions, set forth in part II of its opinion, that: (1) the bad faith exception is applicable only when a homeowner enters into an agreement with, or accepts services from, a home improvement contractor knowing that, under the Home Improvement Act (act), General Statutes § 20-418 et seq., the defective contract provides them with an " 'escape hatch' " from payment; and (2) the defendant's repudiation of the contract was the product of a good faith dispute over the goods and services provided by the plaintiff.3 Instead, I would hold that the bad faith exception, as articulated in Habetz v. Condon, 224 Conn. 231, 237-40, 618 A.2d 501 (1992), applies when a homeowner has acted in a manner inconsistent with the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the course of his relationship with a contractor, as the trial court properly found to have occurred in the present case. As a result of this conclusion, I would reach the second certified appeal, SC 19561,4 and conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for the foreclosure of his mechanic's lien pursuant to General Statutes § 52-249 (a).5 Burns v. Adler, supra, 808. Because I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, I respectfully dissent.
I begin by noting my agreement with the background facts and procedural history set forth in the majority opinion. I also agree in limited part with the majority's statement of the standard of review. Specifically, I agree that the issue of whether the plaintiff can invoke the bad faith exception in this case presents a question of law over which our review is plenary, albeit only to the extent that the defendant's claims on appeal require this court to define the contours of that doctrine. See, e.g., Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 308-309, 777 A.2d 670 (2001) ( ); see also Walpole Woodwork- ers, Inc. v. Manning, 307 Conn. 582, 588, 57 A.3d 730 (2012) (). With respect, however, to the application of the bad faith exception, I disagree with the majority's statement of the standard of review to the extent it conflicts with the well established principle that "[w]hether a party has acted in bad faith is a question of fact, subject to review only for clear error." Renaissance Management Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 281 Conn. 227, 240, 915 A.2d 290 (2007); see MacMillan v. Higgins, 76 Conn. App. 261, 271-73, 822 A.2d 246, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 907, 826 A.2d 177 (2003); see also Habetz v. Condon, supra, 224 Conn. 237 n.11. This reflects the fact that a finding of bad faith turns on subordinate considerations such as the relevant actor's motives and intent, which often may only be inferred from circumstantial evidence.6 See, e.g., Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 250, 618 A.2d 506 (1992).
I begin with the majority's analysis of the defendant's claims on appeal, which, notwithstanding footnote 16 of the majority opinion, may be misconstrued as embracing an unduly narrow approach to the bad faith exception. In particular, I wish to emphasize my disagreement with the defendant's position, founded largely on this court's decision in Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, 224 Conn. 240, that the bad faith exception is applicable only to cases wherein the homeowner entered into an agreement or accepted services from a contractor knowing that the act gave the homeowner an "escape hatch" from payment because the contract was defective under § 20-429 (a). I do not read our articulation of the bad faith exception in Habetz as so narrowly circumscribed.
At the outset, I briefly discuss the statutory scheme governing home improvement contract disputes and the history of the bad faith exception in Habetz. "Section 20-429 (a) provides that no home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against a homeowner unless it contains certain enumerated criteria. The aim of the [act] is to promote understanding on the part of consumers with respect to the terms of home improvement contracts and their right to cancel such contracts so as to allow them to make informed decisions when purchasing home improvement services. . . .
(Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, supra, 307 Conn. 586-87; see also footnote 2 of this dissenting opinion.
In formally adopting the bad faith exception,7 this court emphasized in Habetz that its 8 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Habetz v. Condon, supra, 224 Conn. 237-38. The court emphasized that the (Citations omitted.) Id., 238. Acknowledging that this conclusion potentially "frustrate[s]" the purpose of the act, the court emphasized that the bad faith doctrine is "founded on public policy and contain[s] a strong strain of estoppel," and is intended to Id., 239-40.
Applying the bad faith exception in Habetz, this court upheld the judgment of the trial court with respect to a contractor's counterclaim for unpaid sums, despite the fact that the contract violated § 20-429 (a) by lacking a notice of cancellation provision—a defect that the trial court had deemed "minor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 233-35. Although this court did not engage in a detailed discussion of what had constituted bad faith on the part of the homeowner,9 it observed that the homeowner did not pay for numerous requested extras memorialized in change orders during the construction of an addition to his home, along with a portion of the balance remaining on the original contract, and that the homeowner had refused "repeated requests" by the contractor to sign the change orders with respect to the extras. Id., 233-34.
Rather than confine the bad faith exception to a limited array of homeowner conduct involving the knowing acceptance of services under a noncompliant agreement, I believe ...
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