Burns v. Blackhawk Management Corp., Civil Action No. 4:05CV192TSL-LRA.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:05CV192TSL-LRA. |
| Citation | 494 F.Supp.2d 427 |
| Parties | Fred BURNS, Plaintiff v. BLACKHAWK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Durwood Earnest Mcguffee, Jr., McGuffee Law Firm, Brandon, MS, for Plaintiff.
Paula Graves Ardelean, Alison Tasma Vance, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Fred Burns filed this lawsuit on December 27, 2005 against his former employer, Blackhawk Management Corporation (Blackhawk), to recover damages for alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) overtime and anti-retaliation provisions, and alleged wrongful discharge and tortious interference with an employment contract. Blackhawk has moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. In response to Blackhawk's motion, plaintiff has conceded his state law claims for wrongful discharge and tortious interference with contract, but he opposes the motion as to his FLSA overtime pay and retaliation claims. Having now considered the memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, submitted by the parties, the court concludes that Blackhawk's motion should be denied as it pertains to plaintiff's claim for overtime compensation, as there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the exact nature of plaintiff's employment duties, but the motion should be granted as to all other claims and issues raised.
In 1999, Blackhawk was contracted by FedSource, Inc. to provide construction services to the federal government on a construction project at the Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi. Blackhawk employed plaintiff Fred Burns as a construction representative and assigned Burns to the NAS project. Burns had worked as a construction representative for various employers for about twenty years and had extensive knowledge, training and experience in various aspects of construction. Generally, Burns' job involved monitoring the work of contractors on the project to ensure the work was properly performed.
According to Blackhawk, although Burns was a salaried employee, the company paid him overtime at his regular wage rate for all hours worked over forty. However, Burns took the position that under the FLSA, he was entitled to time-and-a-half for his overtime hours, and he immediately began to complain that he was not being properly compensated for his overtime hours. In response to Burns' complaints, Blackhawk took the position that he fell under the FLSA's administrative employee exemption and thus refused his demands for additional compensation. Over the years, Burns continued to complain, and did so frequently. In March 2004, he again complained to Blackhawk's president Linda Moorehead, who told him there would be no further discussion concerning his classification or pay. Burns did not stop, however, and continued to complain, not only to Blackhawk, but also to FedSource and to the Navy, sending emails and calling FedSource to complain about what he considered Blackhawk's erroneous classification of him as exempt and his consequent underpayment for overtime. After one such phone call to FedSource, which was reported to her by FedSource, Moorehead terminated Burns' employment. In this action, Burns asserts claims for violation of his right under the FLSA to overtime compensation and for retaliatory discharge in violation of the FLSA.
The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to employees who work more than 40 hours per regular workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1995). Under the FLSA's enforcement provisions, employers which violate the Act may be required to pay uncompensated overtime, together with civil penalties and liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1995). However, the FLSA exempts from its overtime requirements, any salaried employee "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). See Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.2000). "These exemptions are construed narrowly against the employer and the employer has the burden of proving that an employee is exempt." Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Ca., 304 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir.1990)). See also Mutch v. PGA Tour, Inc. 2006 WL 510068, *4 (M.D.Fla.2006) ().
Blackhawk maintains that Burns' claim for overtime compensation fails because the evidence establishes beyond dispute that Burns was an exempt administrative employee under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Burns contends that there are at the very least factual disputes as to the nature of his duties which preclude summary judgment.1
Regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor define administrative employee as an employee whose primary duty consists of office or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general business operations for the employer or the employer's customers, which includes work requiring the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.2(e)(2), 541.2(e)(1). Additional regulations elaborate on these requirements, providing, for example, that "[w]ork related to management or general business operations includes ... quality control ..., legal and regulatory compliance, and similar activities ...," 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b); exemption inapplicable to employees who "simply apply well-established techniques or procedures described in manuals or other sources within closely prescribed limits to determine the correct response to an inquiry or set of circumstances," 29 C.F.R. § 541.604; "[o]rdinary inspection work generally does not meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption," 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(g); "[p]ublic sector inspectors or investigators of various types, such as ... construction ... generally do not meet the duties requirements for administrative exemption ...," 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(j); 29 C.F.R. 541.202(c).
In general, Blackhawk argues that Burns' duties placed him squarely within the administrative exemption. It contends he was paid on a salary basis (an issue about which there is no dispute); that he worked with virtually no supervision or oversight; that his job was essentially one of "quality control" and thus was obviously related to Blackhawk's general business operations; that he relied on his training, knowledge, discretion and independent judgment to determine whether the work complied with the relevant' specifications and industry standards; and that every time he made a decision about the work, he exercised discretion and independent judgment. Burns, on the other hand, insists he did not exercise the kind of discretion and independent judgment contemplated by the regulations and that in fact, he had "no discretion at all," as all his actions were "observing and inspecting construction work and reporting any problems to the project manager to make a decision." As Burns puts it, he "was little more than a glorified tattletale" whose only authority was to inspect and report to the project manager. He could not change anything or address problems he found; he could not accept work or reject work; he merely used his skills in applying well-established techniques, procedures or standards described in manuals and other sources, and if he observed a problem, he could do nothing more than report it to the project manager.
Having considered the parties' arguments and evidence, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that Burns' position was exempt. In the court's opinion, there are factual issues regarding the extent to which plaintiffs duties concerned defendant's general business operations and the extent of Burns' discretion and independent judgment.2 Accordingly, it will deny the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for overtime compensation.3
Turning to plaintiffs retaliation claim, the FLSA makes it unlawful for any person "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). A claim of retaliatory discharge is analyzed under the same shifting burden test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir.1998). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation and must show: (1) participation in a protected activity; (2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1225-26 (5th Cir.1996). Once the employee demonstrates a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the employee's rejection. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The employee then has the opportunity to rebut the employer's explanation and show that the reason given is pretextual. See id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
In its motion, Blackhawk argues that Burns' alleged complaints are insufficient to show he engaged in protected activity because informal...
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