Bass v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 02 December 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:09–cv–549–CWR–FKB.
• Citation: 878 F.Supp.2d 701
• Parties: Johnny A. BASS, Sr., David H. Campbell, Wilbert P. Gardner, Harold Ades and Robert Hines, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

878 F.Supp.2d 701

Johnny A. BASS, Sr., David H. Campbell, Wilbert P. Gardner, Harold Ades and Robert Hines, Plaintiffs

v.CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:09–cv–549–CWR–FKB.

United States District Court,

S.D. Mississippi,

Jackson Division.

Dec. 2, 2011.

Louis H. Watson, Jr., Robert Nicholas Norris, Louis H. Watson, Jr., PA, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiffs.

Lara E. Gill, Pieter Teeuwissen, Pieter Teeuwissen, PLLC, Claire Barker Hawkins, City of Jackson, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CARLTON W. REEVES, District Judge.

Before the Court are the parties' dueling motions for summary judgment filed together with their exhibits spanning hundreds of pages, their rebuttals and supporting memoranda. Having considered the arguments of counsel, the court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which necessitate that the issues be tried before a jury. Therefore, the Court finds that the motions are hereby DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Johnny A. Bass, Sr. (“Bass”), David H. Campbell (“Campbell”), Wilbert P. Gardner (“Gardner”), Harold Ades (“Ades”) and Robert Hines (“Hines”), are current or former District Fire Chiefs with the Jackson Fire Department (hereinafter “JFD”). They initiated this action in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the City of Jackson, Mississippi (hereinafter “CoJ”), alleging that they did not receive the requisite overtime wages to which they were entitled when they worked in excess of forty hours for a work week as required by the Fail Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (“FLSA”). The CoJ timely removed this action to this Court.¹

After the close of discovery, on March 18, 2011, CoJ filed its Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 133] and Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 134]. That same day, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability [Docket No. 135] and supporting Memorandum [Docket No. 136]. On April 1, 2011, CoJ filed its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability [Docket No. 137] while the Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to City's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum [Docket Nos. 138, 139]. On April 15, 2011, Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability and CoJ's Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Response to COJ's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos. 144 and 143] were filed. These matters are now ripe for adjudication.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Though motions for summary judgment are filed frequently, not every case is suitable for such disposition. Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Abarca v. Metro. Transit Authority, 404 F.3d 938, 940 (5th Cir.2005).

When confronted with these motions, this Court focuses on “genuine” issues of “material” facts. An issue is genuine “if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, together with an inference in such party's favor that the evidence allows would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the party.” Zisman v. Mason, 2008 WL 879726, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Mar. 30, 2008) (citing Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir.1987)). A fact is material if it is one which might effect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When filing a motion for summary judgment, “the moving party is not required to negate the elements of the nonmoving party's case.” Lawrence v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.1999). Moreover, the movant “need not prove a negative when it moves for summary judgment on an issue that the [respondent] must prove at trial. It need only point to an absence of proof on [the non-movant's] part.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the movant shows the court that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the resisting party to show why summary judgment is not proper. Id. As explained further by Judge Russell in Walker v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc.:

The non-movant is then obligated to present competent evidence setting forth specific facts to illustrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.... The resisting party may not create a genuine dispute simply by alleging that a dispute exists ... ‘When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue is for trial....’

707 F.Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.Miss.1988) (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Pointing to and setting forth these specific facts is the responsibility of the non-movant, and the court has no duty whatsoever to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir.2006). See also Fuentes v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S. Postal Service, 282 Fed.Appx. 296, 300 (5th Cir.2008), citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998) (not only must the non-movant point to specific facts, he must articulatethe precise manner in which that evidence support his claim). “ ‘Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Davis v. Louisville Municipal School District, 2010 WL 290956, *2 (N.D.Miss. Jan. 15, 2010) (quoting Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir.2002)).

This Court is ever mindful that although a useful device, summary judgment “must be employed cautiously because it is a final adjudication on the merits.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir.1989); Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.1991). The jury has the responsibility to assess the probative value of the evidence. As a consequence, a court must step back and not make any credibility determinations, and it must not weigh evidence or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant. Strong v. The Dept. of Army, 414 F.Supp.2d 625, 628 (S.D.Miss.2005). See also Man Roland, Inc. v. Kreitz Motor Express, Inc., 438 F.3d 476, 478 (5th Cir.2006) (explaining that a court cannot weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses when considering a motion for summary judgment).

B. The Fair Labor Standards Act

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) generally requires certain employers to pay overtime compensation to certain employees who work more than forty hours per workweek. In particular, the FLSA prohibits employers from employing a person

who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.

29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

The FLSA, however, does not come without certain exemptions. For example, Section 207(k) of the FLSA provides a partial exemption from the 40–hour–week threshold for employees engaged in “fire protection activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2009). Similarly, individuals “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” may be completely exempt from overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(2004). The CoJ raises both of these exemptions with respect to these Plaintiffs and demands that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1. The shifting burdens under the FLSA

The employer has the burden to prove an employee is exempt under the FLSA. Monroe Firefighters Association v. City of Monroe, 600 F.Supp.2d 790, 803–804 (W.D.La.2009). That burden has been described as a “high burden,” see, Burns v. Blackhawk Mgt. Corp., 494 F.Supp.2d 427 (S.D.Miss.2007), citing Mutch v. PGA Tour, Inc., 2006 WL 510068 *4 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 02, 2006), with the employer having to prove that the employee “fit[s] ‘plainly and unmistakably within the exemption terms.’ ” Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Exemptions, moreover, are to be construed narrowly against the employer. Blackhawk Management Corp., 494 F.Supp.2d 427, 430 (S.D.Miss.2007). See also Wirtz v. Jernigan, 405 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.1968) (FLSA “is to be interpreted liberally with exceptions narrowly construedagainst those seeking to assert them.”).

While the employer is strapped with certain burdens, so too are employees. An employee must demonstrate that he was employed during the time for which compensation is sought and that he indeed performed work for which he alleges he was not compensated. Escobedo v. Dynasty Insulation, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d 638, 647 (W.D.Tex.2010). In doing so, there needs to be a showing that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge that the employee was working overtime. Von Friewalde v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 339 Fed.Appx. 448, 455 (5th Cir.2009). “Constructive knowledge exists if [,] by ‘exercising reasonable diligence [,]’ an employer would become aware that an employee is working...