Burns v. Hawaii

• Decision Date: 06 April 2023
• Docket Number: Civ. 23-00143 JMS-KJM
• Parties: NICHOLAS DONALD BURNS, #A5003928, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF HAWAII, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

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NICHOLAS DONALD BURNS, #A5003928, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF HAWAII, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 23-00143 JMS-KJM

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

April 6, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT, ECF NO. 1, WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND

J Michael Seabright United States District Judge

Before the court is a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”), ECF No. 1, filed by pro se Plaintiff Nicholas Donald Burns (“Burns”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] Burns alleges that Defendants^[2] violated his constitutional rights by failing to follow agency guidelines while setting his minimum term of imprisonment (Count I), by denying him additional time to prepare for trial (Count II), by denying his two requests to “fire” his court-appointed counsel (Count III), by revoking his bail (Count IV), and by arresting him pursuant to a previously executed warrant (Count V). Id. at PageId.5-PageID.9. After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the court DISMISSES the Complaint with partial leave granted to amend. If Burns wants this action to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before May 8 2023. In the alternative, Burns may inform the court in writing on or before May 8, 2023, that he would like to dismiss voluntarily this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[3]

Burns signed the Complaint on March 15, 2023, and the court received and filed the Complaint on March 22, 2023. ECF No. 1. The court granted Burns' Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by a Prisoner, ECF No. 2, on March 23, 2023, ECF No. 3.

In Count I, Burns alleges that the Hawaii Paroling Authority (“HPA”) failed to follow its own guidelines while setting his minimum term of imprisonment.^[4] ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. According to Burns, the HPA did not consider all the enumerated criteria in setting his minimum term, and it failed to provide him with “adverse material.” Id.

In Count II, Burns alleges that Judge Fujino denied him additional time to prepare for trial. Id. at PageID.6. Because of this, Burns asserts, he was denied a fair trial. Id. In Count III, Burns alleges that Judge Fujino also violated his constitutional rights by denying two requests to “fire” his court-appointed counsel. Id. at PageID.7. In Count IV, Burns alleges that Judge Fujino violated his constitutional rights by revoking his bail. Id. at PageID.8.

In Count V, Burns alleges that he was arrested on June 17, 2022. At some point during the arrest, a Hawaii Police Department officer referred to a “warrant for [p]robation [r]evocation.” Id. at PageID.9. When Burns asked to see a copy of the warrant, he was given “Bench Warrant #C312005140.” Id. The warrant was dated June 3, 2020. Id. According to Burns, that warrant had already been executed. Id. When Burns explained this to Sergeant Secobia, he ignored Burns. Id. Burns spent a weekend in jail and posted $2,500 in bail to secure his release. Id.

Burns seeks the creation of “an oversight committee that reviews [the HPA's] decisions and guarantees [that] they follow the guidelines established by [the] legislature.” Id. at PageID.10. Burns also seeks unspecified damages for his various claims. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment

Burns names four Defendants in the Complaint including two state officials Judge Fujino and Hyun and the State of Hawaii. ECF No. PageID.1-PageID.2. Burns names Judge Fujino and Hyun in both their individual and official capacities. Id.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Nor does it bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003).

Regarding the State of Hawaii, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of relief sought,” absent unequivocal consent by the state. Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). It is well settled that “Hawaii has not unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity,” Thompson v. Paleka, 2017 WL 5309608, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 13, 2017); and Congress has not overridden that immunity for civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will, 491 U.S. at 66. Thus, to the extent Burns seeks from the State of Hawaii damages and the creation of an “oversight committee” to review the decisions of the HPA, see ECF No. 1 at PageID.10, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 832 n.17 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We . . . agree with the district court that the State of Hawaii is entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” (citation omitted)).

To the extent Burns seeks damages from Judge Fujino and Hyun in their official capacities, any such claims are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment and DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.” (citation omitted)). For the reasons set forth in the following sections, Burns' claims for money damages against Judge Fujino and Hyun in their individual capacities also must be dismissed.

B. Judicial Immunity

In Counts II, III, and IV, Burns asserts various claims against Judge Fujino. Id. at PageID.6-PageID.8.

“It is well settled that judges are generally immune from suit for money damages.”^[5] Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 900 (2022). “[J]udicial immunity ensures that challenges to judicial rulings are funneled through more efficient channels for review like the appellate process.” Id. at 971. “Judicial immunity also serves the goal of judicial independence.” Id. “Subjecting judges to liability for the grievances of litigants would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although judicial immunity applies only to judicial acts not to administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may sometimes perform courts have a “broad conception of what constitutes a judicial act.” Id. Thus, a judicial act does not stop being a judicial act “even if the judge acted with malice or corruption of motive.” Id. at 972 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.”).

Here Burns alleges that Judge Fujino denied him additional preparation time before proceeding with jury selection, denied his two requests to “fire” his court-appointed counsel, and wrongfully revoked his bail. ECF No. 1 at PageID.6-PageID.8. Plainly, all of Burns' claims against Judge Funjino are based on judicial acts. Burns' claims do not relate to any administrative, legislative, or executive function performed by Judge Fujino. See Francis v. United States, 2008 WL 4447703, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (concluding that jury selection, among other things, was a judicial act), aff'd, 376...