Burns v. McNally
| Decision Date | 07 February 1894 |
| Citation | 57 N.W. 908,90 Iowa 432 |
| Parties | L. H. BURNS AND C. F. WEBSTER, Executors, etc., v. M. L. MCNALLY, Mayor, E. C. FARRINGTON et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Howard District Court.--HON. L. O. HATCH, Judge.
APPEAL from the judgment of the district court reducing the amount of plaintiff's assessment on moneys and credits.
Affirmed.
H. T Reed for appellants.
John McCook for appellees.
I.
The material facts in this controversy are: That plaintiffs are the executors of the last will of one J. S. Hastings deceased, who at the time of his death, and for many years prior thereto had been, a resident of the incorporated town of Lime Springs Station, in Howard county, Iowa. Defendants are the mayor, assessor and trustees of said town and the auditor of the county. In 1892 the assessor of said town assessed the estate of said Hastings with five thousand dollars, moneys and credits for that year. Plaintiffs claim said estate had no moneys and credits that year which were assessable in that town. That they appeared before the equalization board to have said assessment canceled, but said board refused to do so, and returned the assessor's books to the county auditor with said assessment unchanged. Plaintiff Burns is a resident of said incorporated town. Plaintiff Webster is a resident of Cresco, in the same county. Plaintiffs, as the executors of said estate, were on January 1, 1892, and ever since have been the joint possessors of moneys and credits of said estate in the sum of about fifteen thousand dollars. That the incorporated towns of Lime Springs Station and Cresco are separate assessment districts in Howard county. That the classification of this kind of property by the board of supervisors of said county for 1892 was on the basis of one third of its value. That most of the funds of said estate consisted of notes and mortgages for money which had been loaned out by Hastings in his lifetime, and by his executors under his will, and by order of court; and all such notes and mortgages were, on and prior to January 1, 1892, kept at Cresco, under the immediate control of said Webster, one of the executors. That at the same time there was about one thousand, one hundred dollars in money belonging to said estate on deposit in a bank at Cresco in the name of said executors. That Burns had in his possession at Lime Springs Station about one hundred and fifty dollars belonging to said estate. That said one thousand, one hundred dollars, and said notes and mortgages, while under the control of both executors, had been taken to Cresco, because Webster, by agreement between him and Burns, was to look after the investment of the funds belonging to the estate, and Burns was to have charge of the real estate of the deceased. That the assessment of five thousand dollars on the estate's moneys and credits was made by the assessor of Lime Springs Station without the knowledge or consent of the executors. That the same estate was assessed for the same year, in the same amount, on the same moneys and credits, in the town of Cresco, except the one hundred and fifty dollars which was in Burns' hands at Lime Springs Station. On appeal to the district court defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that plaintiffs never appeared before the board of equalization of Lime Springs Station to object to the assessment, and that the board never acted on said assessment, and there was nothing to appeal from. The motion was overruled, and the court ordered the assessment reduced to fifty dollars. From this action of the court the appeal is prosecuted.
II. There is but one question of fact in this case upon which the parties are not agreed. It is contended by plaintiffs that they appeared before the board of equalization of the incorporated town of Lime Springs Station at the proper time, and objected to the assessment. Defendants deny that any sufficient objection was ever made. As the right of appeal to the district court is obtained only by an appearance before the board of equalization, and the making of proper objections to the assessment, it is necessary to determine the question thus presented. The statute provides: "The township trustees shall constitute a board of equalization for their respective townships and have power to equalize the assessments of all taxpayers within the same, except in such cities and incorporated towns as elect a township assessor, in which case the city council shall be the board of equalization, and shall perform such duties in substantially the same manner as is required of a township board of equalization, by increasing or diminishing the valuation of any piece of property, or the entire assessment of any taxpayer, as they may deem just and necessary for an equitable distribution of the burden of taxation upon all the property of the township: provided that such boards shall keep a record of their proceedings." Code, section 829. Id., section 831. Plaintiff Burns testified that he went before the board of equalization at their meeting in April. That they asked him what he was going to do about the assessment. He told them he did not know; that it had been assessed in Cresco. That they asked him what it was put in at there, and he told them five thousand dollars. They said they would put it in, and said something about letting the board of supervisors settle it.
"
McNally, for defendants, testified: That Burns came before the equalization board. That the board took no action on the matter. That Burns said he understood they had assessed it in Cresco, but he didn't object to our putting it in, because he thought the board of supervisors would attend to it, so it wouldn't be assessed in two places. He did not ask that the assessment be revised or modified. That the board of equalization knew it was assessed at Cresco, and it would be a double assessment. We supposed the board of supervisors would act on it. It seemed to be the opinion that the board of supervisors were the proper parties to act on it. Our board thought so. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony touching the acts of plaintiffs before the board of equalization.
It will be observed that the law does not limit the right of appeal in such cases from a judgment or order of the board. Nor does it require any particular form of objection to be made by the aggrieved party. He must appear, and if, when he so appears before the board of equalization, he in any form makes his grievance known to the board, it is sufficient to give him his right to appeal from its action if it be unfavorable to him. If his grievance is understood by the board, it matters not as to the manner in which he presents his case. The board is not a court. The statute requires no pleadings or papers to be filed presenting his objection to the assessment. The proceedings are intended to be, and are, in fact, informal. The statute is intended to afford to an aggrieved taxpayer an opportunity to ask and have a correction of an assessment, and no formalities are required as to the manner of bringing the matter before the board. He expressly informed the board that the same property had already been assessed at Cresco; that he did not want to pay taxes twice on the same property. This was well understood by the board, and was a sufficient presentation of his grievance. With these facts before them, it became their duty to act in the matter. It was not plaintiffs' fault if the board neglected to make a record of their application, nor could they, by neglecting to act after the matter had been properly called to their attention, deprive plaintiffs of their right to appeal. Plaintiffs had done all that the law required, they had appeared, had made their grievance known to the board, and they could not be robbed of their right to appeal by a failure of the board to act as the law requires. Their failure to act was, in law, a refusal to grant plaintiffs' request, from which an appeal will lie.
Counsel for appellants rely upon several cases decided by this court. They will be found unlike the case at bar. In Smith v City of Marshalltown, 86 Iowa 516, 53 N.W....
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