Burns v. Rovaldi
Decision Date | 28 August 1979 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. H-76-19. |
Citation | 477 F. Supp. 270 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Philip H. BURNS v. Robert ROVALDI et al. |
Eugene N. Sosnoff, Sosnoff, Cooper & Whitney, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.
William R. Connon, Thomas N. Sullivan, Sullivan, Lettick & Schoen, Hartford, Conn., for defendants.
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff Philip Burns was a tenured fifth grade teacher in the Plainfield school system until December 17, 1975, when his employment contract was terminated by a vote of the Plainfield Board of Education (the Board). Prior to the action of the Board, he was given specifications of the charges on which the termination was to be considered and a full public hearing before a quorum of the Board. He was represented at that hearing by himself and by his brother as counsel. Instead of taking an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for review of the Board's decision, as provided for by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151(f), he brought this action for a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory and punitive damages, and other equitable relief.
Plaintiff Burns alleges that the Board's termination of his contract was impermissibly based on his exercise of his first amendment rights, and also that the Board's decision violated both procedural and substantive rights of due process guaranteed him by the fourteenth amendment. Upon those allegations he invokes the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), as the basis for jurisdiction in this court. The individual defendants, allegedly acting under color of state law, are sued in their official, as well as individual, capacities. See Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1181 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1970). Thus, since the defendants allegedly deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the "two elements that are necessary for recovery" in an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are present. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The defendants, who are members of the school board, challenge jurisdiction over them on the ground that they were acting only as a Board of Education. Building on that premise, they further contend that a school board is not a "person" amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While that contention once had some support, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court has recently held that its reasoning is not applicable to school boards. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
This case now comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. A motion for a preliminary injunction, previously filed by the plaintiff, was denied after a hearing in January of 1976. A hearing on the motions for summary judgment was held on November 13, 1978. It is to those motions I now turn.
Although there were three separate charges lodged against the plaintiff in the termination hearing before the Board, the principal one was based on conduct in class which directly affected the students. The classroom conduct of the plaintiff which provoked the institution of charges against him first came to the attention of Albert Mizak, the Superintendent of Schools, through letters from parents of fifth graders in Burns' class who wanted Burns fired. This sudden flurry of correspondence to the school authorities from those parents was their response to what Mr. Burns had done as a teacher of their children.
In September of 1975, the plaintiff assigned to his then fifth grade class at the Memorial School a penmanship lesson. As part of that lesson, the students could either practice cursive penmanship by writing the alphabet or write a letter to the plaintiff's then fiancee. As a result of that assignment, each student who wrote to the plaintiff's then fiancee received from her a letter in return. These return letters were directly sent to the plaintiff who, in the classroom, distributed them to his students. Each letter was addressed to a specific student and was enclosed in a sealed envelope.
Among other things, the aforesaid letters, written by the plaintiff's then fiancee and distributed to various students in the plaintiff's fifth grade class contained the following, or similar statements:
1
Pl.'s Exh. C, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction (letter dated October 6, 1975 addressed "Dear Sherry," which was part of the record of the contract termination hearing of Philip Burns as well as part of the record of the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction). See also other letters marked as Pl.'s Exh. K-1, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
It is not surprising that parents of some of the fifth graders who got those letters promptly reacted by calling for the discharge of the plaintiff as a teacher in communications to the Superintendent.
On October 17, 1975, the Superintendent (Mizak) called Burns into his office. When Burns answered "No" to Mizak's inquiry if he knew why he was there, Mizak said, Tr. at 8, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Jan. 26, 1976. He offered to let Mr. Burns resign and gave him a few days to think it over, and also told Burns that he was going to recommend to the school board that his contract to teach be terminated. By letter of October 28, 1975, Mizak wrote to Burns:
Pl.'s Exh. F, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Thereafter, on November 19, 1975, Mizak again wrote to Burns about the letter-writing charge to which (2) above refers:
Pl.'s Exh. G, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
A third charge was added on December 1, 1975:
Pl.'s Exh. H, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction (letter from Mizak to Burns, dated Dec. 1, 1975).
Finally, on December 10, 1975, Mizak again wrote to Burns:
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