Burns v. Sewell
| Decision Date | 15 February 1892 |
| Citation | 48 Minn. 425 |
| Parties | WM. H. BURNS <I>et al.</I> <I>vs.</I> GEORGE SEWELL <I>et al.</I> |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by plaintiffs, William H. Burns and Willis R. Shaw, from an order of the district court of Ramsey county, Kelly, J., made September 19, 1891, refusing a new trial.
The defendant Thomas Tyrer was the owner of a lot in West St. Paul, and on April 21, 1890, made a contract with defendant Charles B. Lawton regarding it, whereby Lawton agreed to construct a dwelling house thereon. Lawton made a contract May 1, 1890, with the defendant George Sewell, to furnish the lumber and material and do the carpenter work. Sewell purchased the lumber from plaintiffs, and ordered it from time to time between May 9 and July 29, 1890. Plaintiffs delivered it on the lot as it was needed in the construction of the house. All of it was ordered and delivered prior to July 9th, except two items, viz., 600 feet siding at $15 per M., and 2 pieces third clear at $41 per M., $10.65. These items were ordered by Sewell and delivered on the lot by plaintiffs on July 29, 1890; but Sewell took them elsewhere, and they were not used in the construction of the house. The lien statement was for $387.29, and was filed on October 25, 1890.
This action was commenced December 13, 1890, and was tried in September, 1891. Findings were filed directing judgment that plaintiffs were not entitled to a lien upon the house or lot, for the reason that the lien statement was not filed within 90 days from the time when the last of the materials which actually entered into the construction of the house were furnished. The contention that the lien law was not constitutionally enacted was overruled.
J. M. Hawthorne, for appellants.
Louis M. Hastings, for respondents.
Action to enforce a mechanic's lien under Laws 1889, ch. 200. The appellants object that, under the constitutional provisions with respect to the passage and approval of bills that chapter did not become a law. It originated in and passed the house, and going to the senate was amended and passed, and returned to the house, where, as amended, it was passed April 19th. April 22d it was reported enrolled, and sent to the governor. April 23d the legislature adjourned. April 24th the governor approved it. The objection is that, the bill not having passed during the last three days of the session, the governor had no constitutional power to approve it, and, its return to the house being prevented by the adjournment, it failed to become a law. In the ordinary course of enacting and approving laws, as prescribed in the constitution, article four, (4,) section eleven, (11,) after passing both houses a bill is to be presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign and deposit it in the office of the secretary of state, and notify the house where it originated. It is then a law. If he do not approve, he is to return it, with his objections, to the house where it originated. Then if, upon a reconsideration, it is approved by a two-thirds vote of each house, it becomes a law, notwithstanding the governor's objections. But as the governor might, by omitting to return the bill, deprive the houses of the opportunity to reconsider and pass it over his objections, the section referred to provides: "If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by adjournment within that time, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law." Under a provision similar to the foregoing in the constitution of New York, it has been held that the adjournment of the legislature within the three days does not prevent a bill becoming a law, if it be signed by the governor, and that the only effect of such adjournment is to prevent it becoming a law merely by failure of the governor to return it, (People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24, 21 N. Y. 517;) and also a like provision in the constitution of Illinois, (Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S. 423.) This is upon a proper rule of construction. The part of the sentence following the word "unless" relates to and qualifies the preceding part of the sentence, and does not affect the power and duty of the governor to sign the bill if it meets his approval. Immediately following the above-quoted part of the section is: "The governor may approve, sign, and file in the office of the secretary of state, within three days after the adjournment of the legislature, any act passed during the last three days of the session, and the same shall become a law." This does not confer on the governor power to approve bills after the adjournment, for he would have it without the clause, but it is a limitation upon his power, restricting its exercise to the period of three days after the legislature shall adjourn. What in this clause is the meaning of the word "passed?" Ordinarily a bill is said to have passed one of the houses when the final vote in its favor in that house has been taken and announced. Is that the...
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Territory Hawai`i v. Seong
...The word “furnish” as used in a mechanic's lien statute has been construed to mean the sale and delivery of the material. Burns v. Sewell, 48 Minn. 425, 531, 532. To “furnish,” in its ordinary acceptation, means to supply, to provide for use, which necessarily contemplates a delivery of the......
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Burns v. Sweet
... ... Burns and others against George Sewell and others to enforce a mechanic's lien. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. Reversed. J. M. Hawthorne, for appellants. Louis M. Hastings, for respondents. GILFILLAN, C. J.Action to enforce a mechanic's lien under Laws 1889, c. 200. The appellants object that, under the constitutional ... ...