Burns v. State
| Decision Date | 28 May 1918 |
| Docket Number | 883 |
| Citation | 173 P. 55,25 Wyo. 491 |
| Parties | BURNS v. STATE |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING BY ONE DESIRING TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE.
No petition for rehearing has been filed by a party to this cause, and the time therefor has expired. But within the time provided by the rules for filing a petition for rehearing John J. Spriggs, an attorney of this court, has filed a petition for a rehearing of this cause and a recalling of the decision, representing by his petition that he is defendant in a cause in the District Court in Fremont County, which is being appealed to this court, in which the identical question is at issue that was determined in this cause by the opinion and judgment of this court on May 28, 1918. (See 173 P. 55.) And he requests that a rehearing be granted and that the court hear him as amicus curiae. The petitioner not being a party to the cause, and asking to appear only as amicus curiae, is not entitled to file a petition for rehearing, at least without the consent of the parties. (2 Cyc. 283; 4 C. J. 634; 2 C. J. 1325-1326; 1 R. C. L. 1054; City of Charleston v. Cadle, 167 Ill. 647, 49 N.E. 192; Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 33 N.E. 119, 18 L. R. A. 567.) Assuming that the consent of a party to the cause might authorize the filing of the petition, no such consent is shown. And assuming that the court might grant a rehearing on its own motion, upon the suggestion of error in its decision by one in the position of this petitioner, we would not feel justified in doing so in this cause. The question before the court in this cause was decided after mature consideration and a careful examination of the several statutory provisions involved in such consideration, and the authorities upon the subject. And nothing in this petition for a rehearing has caused us to doubt the correctness of the decision.
We held that the 1901 amendment of the statute authorizing the purchaser at a tax sale of real estate, or his assignee, to serve or publish the required notice to entitle him to a tax deed at any time within two years after the expiration of the period of redemption, in effect extended the time for redemption until the date stated in such notice. There is nothing in the statute as so construed delegating legislative power. The Legislature might have fixed the time for redemption by referring to the time of service of notice upon the owner. (Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Pa. 40; 37 Cyc 1396, 1397, and cases cited.) And by our statute providing for such notice the Legislature might properly have expressly declared that the right to redeem should continue until the date of the expiration of the time for redemption stated in the notice. Although the statute does not expressly so declare, we think it is implied, and that the statute is to be understood and construed as so providing. Such a statute should be liberally construed in the interest of the owner. (37 Cyc. 1395; Cooley on Taxation, 2nd Ed., 532, 536; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial