Burns v. State
| Decision Date | 16 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-33,90-33 |
| Citation | 303 Ark. 64,793 S.W.2d 779 |
| Parties | , 13 A.L.R.5th 1117 Larry BURNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John C. Wisner, No. Little Rock, for appellant.
R.B. Freidlander Sol. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
This case involves Act 715 of 1981, which is codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 12-29-501 to -507 (1987) and known as the State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act.
On March 27, 1981, the appellant, Larry Burns, was convicted of 1) theft of property and sentenced to ten years in the Arkansas Department of Correction, 2) breaking or entering misdemeanor theft of property and sentenced to seven years in the Arkansas Department of Correction to run concurrently, and 3) theft of property and sentenced to five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction to run consecutively.
In November 1986, Burns received an inheritance from his father; the State subsequently filed suit pursuant to Act 715 to recover Burns's estate deposited in his account at the Tucker Unit in the amount of $6,870.43. The trial court awarded the State a judgment in the amount of $55,888.76 as reimbursement costs for Burns's care.
On appeal, Burns alleges four points of error: 1) the trial court's judgment of $55,888.76 was excessive and not supported by the evidence or by law, 2) Act 715 of 1981 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder in that the State's confiscation of his estate of inheritance results in a corruption of the blood, 3) Act 715 of [303 Ark. 66] 1981 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law in that the forfeiture of his estate is a punishment legislatively added after his incarceration, and 4) he was singled out for prosecution under Act 715 of 1981 and was consequently deprived of due process and equal protection of the law.
We agree that the judgment of $55,888.76 was in error and correct the judgment to reflect the actual amount of Burns's estate on account at the Tucker Unit, noted at the time of his trial as $5,850.58.
We will discuss Burns's points of error in reverse order and begin with his contention that he was singled out for prosecution under Act 715 and was consequently deprived of due process and equal protection of the law. We note that the record is barren of any proof that Burns was "singled out" and have stated that we will not attempt to respond to an argument lacking entirely in specificity. Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989).
Additionally, the act is facially neutral and, as codified, provides in pertinent part as follows:
The Attorney General shall investigate or cause to be investigated all such reports furnished by the Department of Correction, for the purpose of securing reimbursement for the expenses of the State of Arkansas for the cost of care of the prisoners.
Whenever it shall be found that any person has been admitted to a penal facility of the Department of Correction as a prisoner, the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney of the county from which the person was so sentenced shall, if the person or prisoner possesses any estate or shall thereafter while he shall remain in the institution become possessed thereof, petition the circuit court ... that the estate may be subjected to the payment to the state of the expenses paid and to be paid by it on behalf of the person as a prisoner.
Consequently, the State's pursuit of reimbursement of the costs of Burns's care under the Code provisions is not violative of Burns's due process or equal protection rights.
Burns next argues that Act 715 is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. Burns was convicted on March 27, 1981; Act 715 went into effect on June 23, 1981. In support of his argument, Burns contends that the act adds a new punishment to his conviction, in the form of a forfeiture of his estate, by reaching back in time to punish acts that occurred before the enactment of the law.
In Peeler v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 649 (8th Cir.1986), the court analyzed an ex post facto law as follows:
An ex post facto law is one which reaches back in time to punish acts which occurred before enactment of the law. A penal statute may also be an ex post facto enactment if it adds a new punishment to the one that was in effect when the crime was committed. The appellant contends that § 402(x)(1) as applied to him is such a law, since its sanctions are triggered by the past commission of a felony, and its effect is the forfeiture of a benefit formerly received. However, even if what the appellant says is a true characterization of the statute, we may not hold that it imposes ex post facto penalties unless the law was enacted for a punitive purpose. If the law in question is focused on the past crime, then it is likely intended as a punishment, while if the focus is upon the benefit from which the person is barred, it is not, even though the impact on the individual may be harsh.
(Citations omitted.)
In Peeler, the court held that a federal statute that suspended social security disability benefits for incarcerated felons was not an ex post facto law, since there was a rational connection between the provision and a nonpunitive goal regulating the distribution of disability benefits. In that case, people in prison have their subsistence needs taken care of by the imprisoning jurisdiction; for such reason, it was entirely rational for Congress to suspend federal disability payments to prisoners.
In this case, too, there is a rational connection between the act provisions and the nonpunitive goal of reimbursement to the State for care and custody expenses from state prison inmates. Act 715 is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law as it is not focused on the crimes committed by Burns, nor is it additional punishment.
Burns also alleges that Act 715 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder in that the State's confiscation of his estate of inheritance results in a "corruption of the blood."
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