Burque v. Naugatuck Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1931 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | BURQUE v. NAUGATUCK LUMBER CO. et al. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County, District of Waterbury; Harry J. Beardsley, Judge.
Action by Hermidas Burque against the Naugatuck Lumber Company as principal, and William D. Crosby as surety, upon bond given in substitution for mechanic's lien. Tried to the court. Judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.
Error and judgment reversed and case remanded, with directions as to the defendant Crosby, and judgment affirmed as to the defendant lumber company.
James P. Sweeney, of Naugatuck, for appellants.
Maurice P. Wrenn, of Waterbury, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.
The principal point presented by the appeal is whether, as the appellants contend, the plaintiff's lien, for which the bond was substituted, was invalid in that it attempted to secure, by a single certificate, the unpaid balance due him for labor performed, under a single contract of employment, upon two buildings, a dwelling house and a five-car garage, both situated on the lot of land described in the certificate.
The mechanics' lien statutes (General Statutes, § 5105 et seq.) are not to be construed with unreasonable strictness, but fairly and reasonably so as to carry out their remedial intent. New Haven Orphan Asylum v. Haggerty Co., 108 Conn. 232, 142 A. 847; Parsons v. Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 748, 749, 120 A. 505; Cronan v. Corbett, 78 Conn. 475, 478, 62 A. 662; Brabazon v. Allen, 41 Conn. 361, 362. This intent is to give one who, by furnishing services or materials under a contract with the owner of land, has added to its value by constructing a building or buildings upon it, a substantial security for his proper remuneration. To carry out this design it is necessary to give the statute such permissible and reasonable construction as may serve to make a mechanic's lien of some value. Waterbury Lumber & Coal Co. v. Asterchinsky, 87 Conn. 316, 320, 87 A. 739, Ann.Cas. 1916B, 613; Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 320, 47 A. 327, 328, 84 Am.St.Rep. 155.
Separate certificates are not required for materials furnished and services rendered by one party, although under several separate contracts, nor for operations under one contract on each of several buildings, upon the same lienable unit of land and buildings. Parsons v. Keeney supra, page 749 of 98 Conn., 120 A. 505.
As to the connection and relation as to use between the dwelling house and the garage here in question, neither the finding nor the evidence which is before us on assignments seeking corrections, specially of the finding, as a fact, that the house and garage were appurtenant to each other, is as full and enlightening as would have been helpful in determining whether these buildings and the lot constitute such a lienable unit. However, the physical situation-both the buildings being erected on a city lot fifty feet front by one hundred feet deep, the garage in the rear of the house and only fifteen to twenty feet distant therefrom-is sufficient in the absence of facts indicating the contrary, to justify a conclusion that each building was not so independent of and unconnected in purpose and use with the other as to preclude their being subjected, together with the lot on which they stand, to a single lien for services rendered upon both. This would manifestly be so were the garage such as to be adapted only to the ordinary convenience and use in connection with the dwelling house. The fact that it is of a size suited not only to this purpose but also to afford accommodations for a few other cars is not, of itself, regarded as sufficient to negative such a community of purpose and use as would warrant inclusion of both buildings in the same certificate of lien. Clearly we have not here such an attempt " to make two entirely separate and independent properties as an entirety holden for materials and services which went into the construction of both" as in Ginsberg v....
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...v. Enders, 118 Conn. 610, 615, 174 A. 169 (1934) (subcontractor mislabeled as contractor and agent); Burque v. Naugatuck Lumber Co., 113 Conn. 350, 353, 155 A. 414 (1931) (defect in description); Peck v. Brush, 89 Conn. 554, 556-57, 94 A. 981 (1915) (inclusion of extra land in certificate);......
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...that the amount secured by the lien, with interest, was $1,263.69, and judgment was entered to that effect. See Burque v. Naugatuck Lumber Co., 113 Conn. 350, 354, 155 A. 414. Aside from claims for the correction of the finding which cannot be granted in any particular which will advantage ......
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