Burrell v. Meads

Decision Date10 April 1991
Docket NumberNo. 92S03-9104-CV-287,92S03-9104-CV-287
Citation569 N.E.2d 637
PartiesThomas Matthew BURRELL, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Kenneth A. MEADS, Appellee (Defendant Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This appeal raises the question of what duty an Indiana landowner or occupier owes to his social guests to protect them from physical harm while they are on his premises. We hold that the duty is to exercise reasonable care.

In this case, Thomas Burrell, the guest, and Kenneth Meads, the landowner, had been friends for years. The two men had helped each other perform a variety of tasks, and neither had ever compensated the other for his services.

On April 9, 1986, Burrell worked on his car in Meads' garage. As Burrell was preparing to leave, Meads told him that he intended to install a drop ceiling in the garage later that day. Burrell agreed to return and help with the installation after running some errands. He returned that evening and began to install the ceiling with Meads and two other friends.

After part of the ceiling had been installed, Meads determined that it was necessary to remove some items which were stored on top of the garage rafters, including vinyl siding, pieces of plywood, a wooden sign, and a large map mounted on fiberboard with a wooden frame. According to his deposition, Meads said, "Someone has to go up there and hand that stuff down." Deposition of Kenneth A. Meads at 55. Burrell climbed up, squatted on a rafter, and began to hand the things down. After removing almost all of the items, Burrell moved off the rafter and knelt on the large map. Moments later, he fell through the map (which he had assumed was mounted on plywood) and crashed to the floor, breaking his pelvis in three places.

Burrell sued Meads for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Meads. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that Burrell, a social guest, was a licensee at the time of his injury and that Meads owed him only the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or acting in a way to increase his peril. Because Burrell did not claim that Meads' conduct was willful or wanton, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals suggested that alteration of our premises liability law might be appropriate but that any change should come from the Supreme Court. Burrell v. Meads (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 115. The Court of Appeals was certainly correct in positing that it is proper for common law judges to re-examine existing rules:

That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance upon the old rule.

Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 A. 883, 891 (1915) (Wheeler, J., concurring in result). Burrell asks this Court to treat social guests as invitees rather than licensees and to impose upon landowners and occupiers a duty of reasonable care for the protection of their guests' safety. We grant transfer.

I. Status and Duties: Current Indiana Premises Liability Law

To address Burrell's arguments in context, we first examine the evolution and the current condition of premises liability law. During the last two centuries, English and American common law courts have categorized a person entering the land of another as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 Law.Q.Rev. 182 (1953). Following this scheme, Indiana courts have long said that the entrant's status on the land determines the duty that the landowner (or occupier) owes to him. See, e.g., Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Means (1914), 59 Ind.App. 383, 391-93, 104 N.E. 785, 788, overruled on other grounds, Fort Wayne Nat'l Bank v. Doctor (1971), 149 Ind.App. 365, 374, 272 N.E.2d 876, 882; Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co. (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1142, 1145.

Our case law also outlines the duties landowners owe to each of the three status groups. First, a landowner owes a trespasser the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly (intentionally) injuring him after discovering his presence. See Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Scoville (1961), 132 Ind.App. 521, 524, 175 N.E.2d 711, 713.

Second, an Indiana landowner owes a licensee the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or acting in a manner to increase his peril. Barbre, 400 N.E.2d at 1146. The landowner also has a duty to warn a licensee of any latent danger on the premises of which the landowner has knowledge. Wright v. International Harvester Co. (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 837, 839. 1

Third, a landowner owes the highest duty to an invitee: a duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection while he is on the landowner's premises. Hammond v. Allegretti (1974), 262 Ind. 82, 311 N.E.2d 821. The best definition of this duty comes from the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 343 (1965):

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

This Court has used the definition in Sec. 343 in resolving premises liability cases. Hammond, 262 Ind. at 85, 311 N.E.2d at 824; Douglass v. Irvin (1990), Ind., 549 N.E.2d 368, 370.

While the duty owed to visitors in each of these categories has been a matter of settled law, Indiana appellate courts have had a more difficult time determining whether a trial court or jury properly defined the status of a given plaintiff. We have tended to rely on a few maxims for this task. Licensees and trespassers are those who enter premises for their own convenience, curiosity, or entertainment. See Gaboury v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc. (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (both groups come for their own convenience); Barbre, 400 N.E.2d at 1146 (licensees come for their own convenience, curiosity or entertainment). Both groups take the premises as they find them. Gaboury, 446 N.E.2d at 1314. Unlike trespassers, however, licensees have a license to use the land. In other words, licensees are privileged to enter or remain on the land by virtue of the owner's or occupier's permission or sufferance. Scoville, 132 Ind.App. at 525, 175 N.E.2d at 713; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 330 comment c (possessor's consent).

A brief foray into history makes it apparent that the distinction between licensees and invitees has become increasingly difficult to draw under current Indiana law. In the 1800's and very early 1900's, Indiana courts followed an "invitation test" 2 to separate invitees from licensees:

When a person has a license to go upon the grounds or the enclosure of another, he takes the premises as he finds them, and accepts whatever perils he incurs in the use of such license. But when the owner or occupant, by enticement, allurement, or inducement, whether express or implied, causes another to come upon his lands, he then assumes the obligation of providing for the safety and protection of the person so coming, and for any breach of duty in that respect such owner or occupant becomes liable for any injury which may result to the person so caused to come onto his lands. The enticement, allurement, or inducement, as the case may be, must be the equivalent of an express or implied invitation. Mere acquiescence in the use of one's land by another is not sufficient. Such an implied invitation may be inferred from some act or line of conduct, or from some designation or dedication.

Indiana, Bloomington & W. Ry. v. Barnhart (1888), 115 Ind. 399, 408, 16 N.E. 121, 125, quoted in Baltimore & O. S.W. R.R. v. Slaughter (1906), 167 Ind. 330, 335-36, 79 N.E. 186, 188. It is clear from this passage that the focus of the invitation test was on the invitation itself. The theory supporting the invitation test has been that if a landowner induces another person to enter his land by arrangement of the land or other conduct amounting to an express or reasonably implied invitation, then the landowner leads the entrant to believe that the land has been prepared for his safety. 3 Consequently, the landowner must be held to a reasonable duty of care.

Around 1914, Indiana courts moved away from the invitation test toward an "economic benefit test" 4 in determining who was an invitee:

A licensee by invitation [invitee] is a person who goes upon the lands of another with the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant, either to transact business with such owner, or occupant, or to do some act which is of advantage to him (the owner or occupant) or of mutual advantage to both licensee and the owner or occupant of the premises. An invitation is implied from such a mutual interest.

Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Means, 59 Ind.App. at 394, 104 N.E. at 789. The theory underlying the economic benefit test has been described in the following fashion:

The economic benefit theory proceeds on the assumption that...

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