Burrell v. Norton
| Decision Date | 02 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. H-148. |
| Citation | 381 F. Supp. 339 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Rosetta BURRELL, Plaintiff, Valestine McNatt, Intervener, v. Nicholas NORTON, Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut. |
Joseph D. Garrison, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.
James M. Higgins, Asst. Atty. Gen., East Hartford, Conn., Lorna M. Dwyer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendant.
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this action plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of § 5030(6) of the Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1, which pertains to emergency assistance to welfare recipients in certain "catastrophic" circumstances. A cause of action is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and other relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, but do not seek injunctive relief.1
The intervening plaintiff Valestine McNatt and the defendant Commissioner of Welfare have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Both agree that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; each claims to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The material facts alleged in the intervening plaintiff's complaint are admitted in the defendant's answer. The intervening plaintiff is a welfare recipient and a resident of New Haven. On or about November 19, 1973, she entered the Connecticut Valley Hospital, leaving her apartment in New Haven unoccupied. Soon after she went into the hospital, she spoke on the telephone with a Ms. Morey, a social worker at the State Welfare Department and her mother's welfare caseworker. The intervening plaintiff asked Ms. Morey to arrange to have her furniture, furnishings and clothing placed in storage while she was in the hospital, as authorized by § 5030(5) of the Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1.2 On or about November 30, 1973, Ms. Morey called the intervening plaintiff in the hospital to tell her that all of her furniture, furnishings, and clothing except for three dresses, a bed, a refrigerator and a few other items had been stolen from her apartment. Ms. Morey had discovered this fact when she went to the apartment to make a list of items to be put into storage. In early January 1974, the intervening plaintiff requested of Ms. Morey3 that the State Welfare Department replace her stolen furniture, in accordance with § 5030(6)(g) of the Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1.4 At that time, Ms. Morey informed the intervening plaintiff that the Welfare Department could not supply replacement furniture.
Section 5030(6) of the Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1, authorizes the provision of emergency services to welfare recipients under the circumstances of "a catastrophic event or an eviction." "A catastrophic event" is defined as "a situation that arises suddenly because of a natural disaster of a fire or flood over which the recipient has no control and there is a substantial destruction of food, shelter, clothing or household furnishings." The defendant admits that replacement items were not furnished to the intervening plaintiff because the furniture, furnishings, and clothing had not been destroyed through a "natural" catastrophe, i.e., fire or flood, and that replacement furniture, furnishings, and clothing would have been provided pursuant to § 5030(6) had the loss been due to such "natural" causes. In the words of the complaint, as admitted by the defendant, "The sole reason for the Department's refusal to provide new furniture and furnishings for the plaintiff was that said items had been stolen, rather than destroyed by fire or flood."
The narrow focus of the intervening plaintiff's complaint is that portion of § 5030(6) of the Connecticut Welfare Manual which limits the replacement of furniture, furnishings and clothing to a particular kind of "catastrophic event," i.e., "a natural disaster of a fire or flood." The intervening plaintiff claims that the distinction established by the provision — between losses due to "natural" catastrophe (for which replacement is authorized) and those resulting from other causes (for which replacement is denied) — is arbitrary and unreasonable and not rationally related to any valid purpose of the state welfare program, and therefore in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. She also alleges that the provision creates a conclusive presumption that loss of furniture, furnishings, or clothing by other than "natural" catastrophe occurs only through fault of the welfare recipient, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Situations warranting emergency assistance to welfare recipients are described in § 380.1 of the Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1. The section entitled "Emergency Situations Requiring Urgent Assistance Payments" provides: "Assistance to a recipient to meet immediate and urgent need may be authorized if the emergency results from circumstances beyond the control of the individual." The only requirement for the provision of emergency assistance is that the immediate and urgent need results from circumstances beyond the control of the individual. Indeed, among the listed situations "which meet the criteria of immediate and urgent need" is the following:
5. Emergent need due to hospitalization of the supervising relative, fire, flood or other catastrophic event. (emphasis added)
The emergency assistance provisions are thus intended for all welfare recipients who suffer grievous loss through no fault of their own: § 380.1 clearly indicates that the circumstances for which emergency assistance is warranted are not limited to fire or flood.
With the exception of the single provision challenged herein, § 5030(6) of the Welfare Manual furthers this broad intention to provide emergency assistance to welfare recipients when great misfortune strikes without warning. Thus a catastrophic event within the meaning of the section is one which "arises suddenly," one "over which the recipient has no control and there is substantial destruction of food, shelter, clothing or household furnishings." To assist the recipient in coping with the severe hardship resulting from such occurrences, the section prescribes procedures for obtaining emergency housing5 and authorizes all of the following: temporary accommodation in a hotel or motel until emergency housing can be secured;6 replacement of linens, cooking utensils and dishes destroyed by the catastrophe;7 rental payments for emergency housing;8 payment for restaurant meals if the emergency housing lacks cooking facilities;9 replacement of essential clothing,10 and replacement of furniture, furnishings, and appliances.11
Within the context of the Welfare Manual's overall scheme of comprehensive provision of emergency assistance to welfare recipients in circumstances of disastrous loss, the denial of assistance by § 5030(6) to recipients who suffer such loss other than by fire or flood is an arbitrary exclusion from the class of those in desperate need of one category of recipient. By the defendant's own admission, two recipients may suffer identical losses of furniture, furnishings and clothing, yet under § 5030(6) the recipient who suffered the loss by reason of fire or flood may have the items replaced, but the recipient who was the victim of thieves or vandals may not.12 The regulation clearly does not comport with the intention of the state welfare program to provide assistance "to meet immediate and urgent need . . . if the emergency results from circumstances beyond the control of the individual." Connecticut Welfare Manual, Volume 1, § 380.1. Nor does § 5030(6) make any sense in terms of practical considerations and hard reality. Certainly it is irrelevant to the recipient herself whether her loss was sustained by theft or vandalism, on the one hand, or fire or flood, on the other: in either case she is faced with the same desperate circumstances as a result of her catastrophic loss. The instant case well illustrates this conundrum. It is undisputed that the intervening plaintiff suffered the loss of virtually all her possessions while she was in the hospital. The sole reason for the Welfare Department's refusal to replace the items was that they had been stolen, rather than destroyed by fire or flood. By conditioning emergency assistance on the occurrence of a particular type of catastrophe, rather than on the existence of immediate and ascertainable need by the recipient, § 5030(6) effectively discriminates against a class of recipients legitimately in need and ignores the basic purpose of the emergency assistance program. It is simply irrational to consider the intervening plaintiff less in need of emergency assistance because she was not the victim of a "natural" disaster, but, rather, one perpetrated by men. When one considers that the intervening plaintiff would have qualified for replacement furniture under § 5030(6) if the intruders had set fire to her apartment rather than simply carting her belongings away, the arbitrariness of the provision becomes manifest. Moreover, by specifying the sole and explicit circumstances in which emergency assistance is authorized, § 5030(6) locks needy recipients like the intervening plaintiff into the class of those not entitled to relief and prevents them from demonstrating the legitimacy of their claims.
The defendant takes the broad position at the outset that it is within the Welfare Department's discretion to determine how to allocate its limited resources; he maintains that the intervening plaintiff "is receiving her basic welfare payments and is merely quibbling over their level." While it is true that Welfare Department officials have broad discretion in effecting their "difficult responsibility of allocating limited public...
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