Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare

• Decision Date: 31 August 1982
• Citation: 387 Mass. 312,439 N.E.2d 778
• Parties: Michael STRATOS v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 778

439 N.E.2d 778

387 Mass. 312

Michael STRATOS v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Hampshire.

Argued May 3, 1982.

Decided Aug. 31, 1982.

Jim Hammerschmith, Northampton, for plaintiff.

Judith S. Yogman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

Both parties appeal from an award, by a Superior Court judge, of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Department of Public Welfare (department) contends that no fee was warranted, and the plaintiff seeks a higher fee. We conclude that the judge was correct in his decision to award an attorney's fee. We remand the case for further consideration by the judge of the proper fee for trial and appellate work by the plaintiff's counsel.

We begin by summarizing the case from which the plaintiff's fee claim arose. The plaintiff, Michael Stratos, applied to the department for aid in the purchase of a washing machine. Under the department's emergency assistance program, funds for washing machines and other appliances were available to eligible applicants in circumstances defined in a regulation issued by the department. ¹ The department denied Stratos's request on the ground that the regulation provided only for replacement assistance to families whose washing machines were beyond repair, and not for initial purchase assistance to families who did not own washing machines. The department later amended this regulation by deleting the provisions relating to washing machines. See 106 Code Mass.Regs. § 309.050(E)(3), 205 Mass.Reg. 9-10 (April 10, 1980).

Stratos filed a complaint in the Superior Court, based on G.L. c. 30A, § 14, ² which provides for judicial review of administrative decisions, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which creates a private cause of action for violations, under color of State law, of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ³ He alleged that the department's decision and the regulation on which it was based violated (1) the requirement of G.L. c. 18, § 2(B)(d ), that the department must provide public welfare assistance "on a fair, just and equitable basis to all people in need"; (2) a Federal regulation under the Social Security Act, 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1981), requiring that State assistance programs "must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups"; and (3) the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He requested that the court reverse the department's decision, order the department to provide funds for the purchase of a washing machine, and declare the regulation invalid. Stratos also requested an attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that in actions based on certain Federal statutes, including § 1983, the court may award a reasonable fee to the prevailing party. ⁴

The Superior Court judge entered judgment for Stratos in two stages. First he issued a partial summary judgment reversing the department's decision, and ordered the department to provide Stratos with a vendor payment in the maximum amount of $236, plus installation charges. The judge reserved, without prejudice, his decision on Stratos's requests for declaratory judgment and for an attorney's fee. After receiving affidavits and memoranda on the question of fees, the judge entered a final judgment, in which he declared that the regulation violated G.L. c. 18, § 2(B)(d ), and 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1), and awarded Stratos an attorney's fee of $675. He did not address Stratos's equal protection claim.

Stratos's fee request at the time final judgment was entered amounted to $1,458. This figure was based on an hourly rate of $50, multiplied by a total of twenty-nine hours and ten minutes. Eleven hours and forty-five minutes had been spent on the merits of the case, and seventeen hours, twenty-five minutes on the question of fees. The judge's computation differed in two respects from Stratos's request. He reduced the number of hours to be compensated, finding that Stratos's counsel reasonably spent a total of twenty-five hours preparing and presenting the case. More significantly, he reduced the hourly rate to $35 for the time spent in court and $25 for time spent out of court. The judge stated that he "[could] not find that fifty dollars an hour [was] an unreasonable charge for such services," but concluded that the award should be based on the rates set in Rule 53(3) of the Rules of the Superior Court for compensation of criminal defense counsel--$35 for in-court time and $25 for out-of-court time. ⁵

Stratos appealed the fee award, arguing that an award under § 1988 must be based on a "market-place standard," and that the judge's reliance on rule 53(3) was error. The department filed a cross-appeal, arguing primarily that Stratos was not entitled to attorneys' fees under § 1988 because the underlying action was not an action to enforce the provisions of § 1983. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. ⁶

1. Applicability of § 1988.

The department contends that Stratos is not entitled to an attorney's fee under § 1988 because his challenge to the department's regulation does not qualify as an action under § 1983. The full reach of § 1983 as a remedy for violation of Federal law is not yet clear. The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 encompasses violations of statutory as well as constitutional provisions, and has rejected the view that statutory § 1983 actions must be based on "civil rights" legislation. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504-2506, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). On the other hand, the Court has recognized that Congress may foreclose actions under § 1983 to enforce particular statutes by providing exclusive, internal remedies for their violation. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2625-2624, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). See generally Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Comment, Statutory Non-Civil Rights Violations of Section 1983 and Awards of Attorneys' Fees after Maine v. Thiboutot, 61 B.U.L.Rev. 1069, 1075-1079 (1981).

The department contends first that Stratos's claim under § 1983 was superfluous, and should be disregarded. The department characterizes Stratos's action as a "routine petition for judicial review" of administrative proceedings, and points out that this remedy was available under State law, through G.L. c. 30A, § 14. It also argues that the declaratory judgment invalidating the regulation was an unnecessary afterthought, appended to the case as a "hook" on which to hang an award of attorneys' fees.

These arguments misconceive the function of § 1983 and § 1988. Section 1983 provides an independent remedy for violation of rights protected by Federal law. If such a right is at issue, the § 1983 remedy is available, even if the State has also provided a means of obtaining relief. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560-2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) (no requirement of exhaustion of State administrative remedies); McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Community Unit School Dist. No. 187, Cahokia, Ill., 373 U.S. 668, 671-673, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435-1436, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 481, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2021, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Section 1988 creates an incentive to vindicate federally protected rights. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). The fee incentive is equally useful and necessary whether the right in question is secured by Federal law alone, or by State law as well. Therefore, the fact that a plaintiff claiming relief under § 1983 could have obtained relief solely by means of a State remedy--even a "routine" one--does not foreclose a fee award. Id. at 132 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. at 2576 n. 15. Draper v. Town Clerk of Greenfield, 384 Mass. 444, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2016, 2026, 425 N.E.2d 333.

The department also argues that Stratos did not make out a violation of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States, and therefore had no cause of action under § 1983. More specifically, the department contends that the § 1983 remedy does not extend to violations of Federal regulations, and that Stratos's constitutional claim was without merit. We need not determine whether regulations under the Social Security Act are Federal "laws" within the meaning of § 1983, because we believe that Stratos alleged a substantial constitutional claim, sufficient to support a § 1983 action.

Complaints brought under § 1983 may often allege both a violation of Federal constitutional provisions, which provide a basis for action under § 1983, and a violation of State law, which, standing alone, would not support an action under § 1983. In such a case, the plaintiff need not obtain a final, favorable determination of his constitutional claims in order to claim an attorney's fee under § 1988. It is enough that the constitutional claims are "substantial," and arise from the same nucleus of facts on which the State law claims are based. Maher v. Gagne, supra 448 U.S. at 128 n. 10, 132 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. at 2574 n. 10, 2576 n. 15. Draper v. Town Clerk of Greenfield, supra, --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2026, 425 N.E.2d 333. H.R.Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n. 7 (1976).

The rule is a compromise between accurate application of § 1983 and § 1988, and traditional policy of refraining from unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions. The applicable definition of a "substantial"...