Burrell v. Tipton Cnty. Election Comm'n

Decision Date27 September 2022
Docket Number2:22-cv-02631-JTF-atc
PartiesTHOMAS BURRELL, Plaintiff, v. TIPTON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

THOMAS BURRELL, Plaintiff,
v.

TIPTON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.
Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-02631-JTF-atc

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

September 27, 2022


ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas Burrell's Motion For Temporary Restraining Order, filed on September 20, 2022. (ECF No. 2.) Defendant Mark Goins filed a Response to the Motion on September 23, 2022. (ECF No. 15.) All other defendants joined Goins's Response in a separate Response filed on September 26, 2022. (ECF No 18.) A hearing on the motion was held the same day on September 26, 2022. (ECF No. 19.) For the below reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves Burrell's application to be placed on the ballot in the upcoming mayoral election for the town of Mason, Tennessee. Mason's town charter provides that “no person shall be eligible for the office of Mayor or Alderman unless they are a qualified voter and have been a bona fide resident of the Town for six (6) months proceeding the election.” (ECF No. 2-1, 3.) Burrell alleges that he re-established residency in Mason in May 2022. (ECF No. 1, 4.) Evidence provided at the hearing demonstrated that Burrell signed a lease for a piece of property in Mason

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on May 4, 2022, but that he did not begin living on the property until at least June 2022.[1] (see also ECF No. 2-5, 1.) Specifically, Burrell moved a trailer onto the property sometime in June 2022 that he alleges he lives in full time. The house located on the property is still not occupied due to remodeling, but Burrell established water service for the property on May 6, 2022, and electricity service on August 23, 2022. Burrell stated that adjacent to the residence are two (2) additional buildings, of which one is used as a business office. Other than his presence at the property, Burrell stated that he worked at another office in Mason and maintained farming operations in Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama. (ECF No. 1, 4.)

On June 20, 2022, Burrell filed a Petition as a candidate for Mayor of Mason. (Id.) On August 22, 2022, Cindy Pinner, the Administrator of Elections for the Tipton County Election Commission, sent Burrell a letter that stated the Commission would be “holding a meeting to review and determine [his] qualifications to have [his] name placed on the November 8, 2022 Town of Mason ballot for Mayor” and that they would be specifically looking at whether he met the residency qualifications. (ECF No. 2-2, 1.) The letter noted that “a candidate for Mayor must have lived in the Town for six months before the election.” (Id.) The meeting was set for August 31, 2022, at 3:00 p.m. (Id.) At the hearing, Defendants' counsel stated that Burrell attended this meeting with his own counsel, and afterwards was given until September 9, 2022 to provide any additional evidence supporting his residency in Mason. On September 9, 2022, the Commission met again and determined that Burrell did not satisfy the residency requirements in the charter and later sent him a letter memorializing this decision. (ECF No. 2-3, 1.) This letter stated that the decision was made in Burrell's presence. (Id.) Burrell contends that he then sent a letter to the

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Commission asking them to not print any ballots due to issues he had with how the decision was made and procedural concerns he had regarding public notice of the meetings, the minutes and vote breakdown of the meeting.

At the hearing before this Court, Defendants' counsel stated that due to the Commission's decision, Burrell was never placed on the ballot. She explained that once a Commission approves a candidate after assessing their qualifications, a sample ballot must be sent to the State Election Commission to be reviewed, approved, and sent back to the county in order to print any necessary physical ballots and correctly program voting machines. Counsel also stated that some ballots for the relevant election have already been printed and mailed to overseas and military voters, due to the statutory requirement under the Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act that ballots be mailed no later than 45 days before an election.

Burrell filed the present case on September 20, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) That same day, he filed the present Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2.) In the Motion, Burrell argues that the six-month residency requirement is unconstitutional, that the Commission's decision violated his right to vote, and that the Commission violated multiple provisions of the Tennessee Open Meetings Act in reaching its decision and through its conduct after the hearings. For relief, Burrell requests that the Court declare the residency requirement unconstitutional, “enjoin Defendants . . . from removing the name of Thomas Burrell as a candidate[,]” declare the Commission's proceedings on August 31 and September 9, 2022 “void as violation of the Tennessee Meetings Act[,]” “consolidate the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction with the trial on the merits,” and grant any further relief that may be just and equitable. (ECF No. 1, 16.) Defendant Mark Goins filed a Response on September 23, 2022, which all other defendants joined on September 26, 2022. (ECF Nos. 15, 18.) In this response, the Defendants argue that

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Burrell has not stated a claim under federal law, and that his claims under the Tennessee Open Meetings Act are consequently not properly before the Court. A hearing was held on September 26, which included limited testimony on the issue of Burrell's residency as well as legal argument regarding the Court's jurisdiction.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order “is an extraordinary remedy ‘designed to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.'” Thomas v. Schroer, 116 F.Supp.3d 869, 874 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (quoting Tennessee Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009)). There are four factors that a district court should consider when evaluating a request for a temporary restraining order: “(1) whether the moving party demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without the order; (3) whether the order would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the order.” Beckerich v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 563 F.Supp.3d 633, 638 (E.D. Ky. 2021) (citing Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't., 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002)). “The four considerations applicable to [temporary restraining orders] are factors to be balanced and not prerequisites that must be satisfied.” American Imaging Servs., Inc. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992). Where the government is the defendant, the final two considerations merge. Albino-Martinez v. Adducci, 454 F.Supp.3d 642, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Strong Likelihood of Success on the Merits

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Burrell makes three identifiable claims, two brought as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under federal law and one under state law. Burrell's motion does not advance an argument on the likelihood of success prong, although his complaint and counsel's argument at the hearing did cite law and facts intended to support the merits of his claims.[2] First, he argues that the six-month residency requirement to run for mayor in the Mason town charter is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, due to it infringing on his right to travel. Second, he argues that the Commission's decision to deny his candidacy violates his right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Third, he argues that the Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act through defective notice, improper minutes keeping, and refusing to provide him with a vote breakdown or explanation of the decision to deny his ballot application.

a. Is the six-month residency requirement unconstitutional?

Burrell's complaint contends that the six-month residency requirement to run for Mayor of Mason is unconstitutional. In support, Burrell cites only one Sixth Circuit case, Green v. McKeon, which found that residency requirements are subject to strict scrutiny by courts and that a two year residency requirement was too broad a means to achieve the relevant Commission's stated objective of requiring each candidate “to become familiar with the local form of government and the problems peculiar to the municipality.” 468 F.2d 883, 885 (6th Cir. 1972). The Defendants contend that Green is no longer good law and that residency requirements only require a rational basis justification.

The Defendants are partially correct. The Sixth Circuit affirmatively rejected Green in Beil v. City of Akron, decided nine years later. The relevant language from Beil is reproduced below:

The District Court relied upon this Court's decision in Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972). That case,
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