Burris Chemical, Inc. v. Daniel Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1968
• Docket Number: No. 18829,18829
• Citation: 251 S.C. 483,163 S.E.2d 618
• Parties: BURRIS CHEMICAL, INC., Respondent, v. DANIEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 618

163 S.E.2d 618

251 S.C. 483

BURRIS CHEMICAL, INC., Respondent, v. DANIEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 18829.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Oct. 1, 1968.

Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone, Greenville, for appellant.

Jefferies, McLeod, Unger & Fraser, Walterboro, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

The defendant, Daniel Construction Company, contracted with the plaintiff, Burris Chemical, Inc., to build an industrial plant for Burris in York County, South Carolina. Upon completion of the building a dispute arose as to the consideration to be paid by the chemical company and received by the construction company. The chemical company instituted this action in Colleton County, South Carolina, for a declaratory judgment to adjust the rights of the parties.

The commencemnt of the action was by service of the summons and complaint on an employee, R. L. Anderson, at the construction site in Colleton County. The construction company filed a motion to quash the service of process, and filed an objection to jurisdiction. The lower court, by its order, overruled both the motion to quash service and the objection to jurisdiction holding that the service was proper and that the objection to jurisdiction should not be sustained. From such order the construction company appeals.

The record reveals, and the judge of the lower court was justified in finding, that R. L. Anderson was the highest ranking employee on the construction site, and was in charge of fifteen men who were, under his supervision, completing the construction of a factory costing not less than approximately $400,000 nor more than approximately $600,000. It is admitted by this employee that he had authority to make purchases on behalf of the company, though not to exceed $100 in amount, and that he was acting General Superintendent.

The project under construction in Colleton County was being built for the Stevens Company, which bears no relationship to the chemical company in York County.

There was on the premises at the Stevens factory in Colleton a mobile trailer used as an office and other construction equipment owned by the construction company and used during the period of construction.

Section 10--421 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina relating to service of process on a corporation provides: 'If the suit be against a corporation, the summons shall * * * be served by delivering a copy thereof to the * * * agent thereof; Provided, further, that in the case of domestic or foreign corporations, service as affected under the terms of this section shall be effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic or foreign corporation in any county where such domestic or foreign corporation shall own property and transact business * * *.'

It is the contention of the appellant that Anderson was not such an agent, and the construction company did not own property, and did not transact business within the contemplation of this code section.

We are of the opinion that Anderson was such an agent upon whom service binding his principal corporation could be made. The question is not whether the defendant maintained an agent for the purpose of conducting its corporate business in Colleton County so as to constitute it a resident of Colleton County on that basis alone for venue purposes (e.g., Peoples v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964)); the question is whether the employee was an agent for purposes of service within the meaning of Section 10--421.

The principal object of service of process is to give notice to the defendant corporation of the proceedings against it. Service upon a common laborer would normally be insufficient because such would not likely give notice to the corporation. It cannot be logically argued that the superintendent in charge of all of the remaining employees at a project of this magnitude is not such a representative of the corporation as contemplated by the legislature to apprise the corporation that an action had been commenced. The lower court was justified in finding that the person served was such an agent of the construction company. The service could reasonably be expected to result in prompt notice to the corporation with adequate opportunity to defend. This court will not reverse that finding unless unsupported by evidence or obviously influenced by error of law. See, e.g., Bass v. American Products Export and Import Corporation, 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594, 30 A.L.R. 168 (1923).

The next issue for determination is whether the construction company was transacting business in Colleton County at the time of the service of the complaint on May 18, 1967. The order appealed from states that counsel for the construction company conceded that it was doing business in Colleton County. However, inasmuch as an exception raises the contention that it was not transacting business we will briefly rule on the issue. It is sufficient to say that the exception is without merit since the construction company had not completed this project and still admittedly had sixteen employees on the job. The cases relied on by the construction company indicate that occasional or casual...