Burris v. Davis, Civil 3661

Decision Date08 July 1935
Docket NumberCivil 3661
Citation46 P.2d 1084,46 Ariz. 127
PartiesGLENN BURRIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM W. DAVIS, Justice of the Peace of Scottsdale Precinct, Maricopa County, Arizona, Appellee
CourtArizona Supreme Court

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Wm. G. Hall, Judge. Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions.

Mr. L C. McNabb, for Appellant.

Mr John L. Sullivan, Attorney General, Mr. Harry Johnson, County Attorney for Maricopa County, and Mr. Mark B. Wilmer, Deputy County Attorney, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, C.J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Maricopa county denying a petition for a writ of mandamus. The facts are nowise in dispute and may be stated as follows:

About the 10th day of June, 1935, one Glenn Burris, hereinafter called appellant, was arrested on the charge of driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He entered a plea of guilty to said charge in the justice court of the Scottsdale justice precinct of Maricopa county, and having waived the statutory time for imposition of sentence was thereupon sentenced to serve ninety days in the county jail of Maricopa county, and was duly committed to said jail. Thereafter he tendered to William W. Davis, the justice of the peace of said justice precinct, hereinafter called appellee, a written notice of appeal and the sum of $300 in cash as a bond on such appeal, but appellee refused to accept the notice of appeal and file it, or to accept the bond or to release the appellant from custody, on the ground that by his plea of guilty he had waived any right of appeal and estopped himself from taking one.

It is agreed between counsel that the only question presented for determination by this court is one of law, to wit, whether when a defendant after being advised of his legal rights voluntarily enters a plea of guilty to a criminal charge before a justice of the peace, of which the said justice of the peace has jurisdiction to try and determine, can the defendant thereafter file a notice of appeal and bond and take an appeal to the superior court from the judgment and sentence rendered upon such plea of guilty?

The question has never been determined by this court and is of some importance. It is the position of appellant that the right of appeal, notwithstanding his plea of guilty, is guaranteed to him by section 24, Article 2, of the Constitution of Arizona, which reads, so far as material, as follows: "Section 24. In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have... the right to appeal in all cases,..." and sections 5153, 5154 and 5156, Revised Code 1928, which read as follows:

"§ 5153. Right given; time limit; effected by notice. The defendant in any criminal action may appeal to the superior court from the final judgment of a justice, police, or recorder's court. Such appeal must be taken within five days after the judgment is rendered, and is taken by filing a notice with the justice of the peace, police magistrate or recorder, stating that the defendant appeals from the judgment to the superior court of the county.

"§ 5154. Bond on appeal. The execution of the judgment shall not be stayed unless the defendant shall execute a bond with sureties, to be filed with and approved and in a sum to be fixed by the officer who rendered the judgment, not exceeding three hundred dollars. The condition of such bond shall be that the defendant shall prosecute his appeal with effect, and that he will pay any fine and surrender himself in execution of any imprisonment that may be imposed by the superior court on such appeal."

"§ 5156. Trial de novo; judgment on appeal. Every such appeal shall be tried de novo in the superior court, and the superior court shall, upon conviction, impose such sentence as it may deem proper, within the limits which might have been imposed by the justice of the peace, police magistrate or recorder, and upon acquittal, shall discharge the defendant and exonerate his bail."

It is the ordinary rule, in the absence of special constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, that a defendant in a criminal case who has pleaded guilty after being fully apprised of his legal rights, may not appeal from a judgment and sentence on such plea, except perhaps upon jurisdictional questions. Stokes v. State, 122 Ark. 56, 182 S.W. 521; State v. Stone, 101 W.Va. 53, 131 S.E. 872; State v. Bergeron, 152 La. 38, 92 So. 726; Browsky v. Perdue, 105 W.Va. 527, 143 S.E. 304; State v. Stafford, 160 Md. 385, 153 A. 77. Indeed, appellant admits this to be true in most states, but contends that by virtue of the constitutional and statutory provisions above set forth the rule in this jurisdiction is different. So far as the constitutional question is concerned, the precedents are not in harmony. We have been cited to the decisions of three states having constitutional provisions practically similar to that of our Constitution above set forth. In the state of Washington, under such a provision, it is held that an appeal will not lie. State v. Haddon, 179 Wash. 669, 38 P.2d 227; State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551. On the other hand, in the states of Utah and Texas a contrary view is taken, the courts holding that under such constitutional provision while an appeal must be taken within such limits and restrictions as to time and procedure as the legislature might prescribe, the constitutional right of appeal applies when defendant has pleaded guilty as well as in other cases. Weaver v. Kimball, 59 Utah 72, 202 P. 9; Ex parte De Loche, 50 Tex. Cr. 525, 100 S.W. 923.

It is also urged by appellant that this court has in at least three different cases entertained an appeal from the superior court where the defendant had entered a plea of guilty in that court and that although the question as to the right of appeal was not raised in any of ...

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19 cases
  • State v. Ball
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1986
    ...or constitutionally deficient. See, e.g., North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976); Burris v. Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 46 P.2d 1084 (1935). On the other hand, in situations in which the inferior court system meets constitutional criteria, a surprising number of decis......
  • State v. Mull
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1959
    ...no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence or the guilt of the defendant can ordinarily be raised.' In Burris v. Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 46 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1935), the defendant entered a plea of guilt to the charge of driving while intoxicated and was thereupon convicted and sentenced ......
  • Town of White Sulphur Springs v. Voise, 9701
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • August 31, 1959
    ...should be overruled. It is so ordered.' Also see: Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196; Burris v. Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 46 P.2d 1084, 1086; State v. Dawn, 41 Idaho 199, 239 P. 279; Weaver v. Kimball, 59 Utah 72, 202 P. Serious consequences attend the conviction ......
  • State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1963
    ...cases; * * *.' This constitutional right of appeal applies when a defendant has pleaded guilty in a municipal court. Burris v. Davis, 46 Ariz. 127, 46 P.2d 1084 (1935). This provision would appear to be equally applicable when the defendant has satisfied a sentence imposed by a municipal co......
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