Burriss v. Anderson County Bd. of Educ., 26175.
Decision Date | 26 June 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 26175.,26175. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | William Mack BURRISS, E. Lee McPherson, and Anderson County School District Five, Appellants, v. ANDERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Governor of the State of South Carolina, Lieutenant Governor of the State of South Carolina, and Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Respondents. |
Kenneth L. Childs, William F. Halligan, John M. Reagle, and Keith R. Powell, all of Childs & Halligan, P.A., of Columbia, for Appellants.
Michael J. Giese and Seann Gray Tzouvelekas, both of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd, & Mann, of Greenville, for Respondent Anderson County Board of Education.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster and Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondents Governor of the State of South Carolina, Lieutenant Governor of the State of South Carolina, and Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives.
This is a direct appeal from the circuit court's decision in favor of respondents on cross-motions for summary judgment. At issue is whether Anderson County's two-tiered school governance system violates the Equal Protection clause of the federal constitution and the South Carolina Constitution's guarantees of no taxation without representation and uniform taxation within a jurisdiction. Essentially, appellants argue that these violations stem from the Anderson County Board of Education's review authority over the individual districts' budgets. We affirm.
Anderson County has five public school districts each with a popularly elected board of trustees.1 There is also an Anderson County Board of Education ("the County Board") composed of nine members popularly elected by single member districts. Each member of the County Board represents approximately 18,739 Anderson County citizens. Anderson County School District Five ("District Five") represents 42% of the total voting age population (VAP) for the County Board's nine seats. Seats 7 and 8 on the County Board are exclusively elected by citizens in District Five; for Seat 9, 97% of those voting reside in District Five. Citizens in District Five also vote for Seats 4, 5, and 6, representing 31%, 25%, and 28%, respectively, of those voting for these seats. For Seat 1, 99% of those voting reside in Anderson County School District Four.
The annual budget for each school district is developed through an interactive process between the individual districts and the County Board; however, the County Board exercises review and approval authority over each of the school districts' budgets. Ultimately, it is the County Board that sets the school operations tax millage rates for each school district.2
The County Board's budgetary review authority dates at least as far back as 1950. See 1950 S.C. Acts 868, § 38.3 This authority over the budget was referenced again in 1982 when the Legislature provided that:
the Anderson County Board of Education shall be vested with the power to review and approve the budget of the school districts and shall further be vested with the power to review and approve requests by the school districts for any increase or decrease in taxation or millage in keeping with the needs of each school district and the requirements of the . . . Education Finance Act.
1982 S.C. Acts 510, § 9. That same year, another Act authorized an advisory referendum in Anderson County to determine if the electors of the County favored an elected County Board of Education with review authority over the local elected school district boards' budgets. 1982 S.C. Acts 511, § 1. The voters overwhelmingly endorsed the County Board's review authority.4
Nevertheless, the County Board has not often exercised its authority over the individual districts' budgets, but instead has generally approved the budgets submitted by the districts. From 1997-2002, a total of 29 budgets were submitted to the County Board by the five school districts, and the County Board approved 28 of them. However, the County Board did not approve District Five's proposed budget for the 2001-2002 school year. This proposed budget, which had been approved by District Five's Board of Trustees, was in the amount of $63,274,082. The County Board ultimately reduced District Five's 2001-2002 budget by $750,000. Eight of the nine County Board members voted for this reduction.
In addition to its budgetary review function, the County Board also serves other functions. For example, the County operates and finances an Alternative School that is open to any child in Anderson County. The Alternative School is designed to serve students with special needs such as chronic discipline and truancy problems. District Five students attend the County-run Alternative School.
The County Board also administers the following programs: (1) food service programs to Districts One, Two, Three, and Four; (2) mental health counseling to students in Districts One, Two, Three, and Four, as well as the Alternative School; and (3) attendance monitoring and dropout prevention services to students in Districts One, Two, Three, and Four, and the Alternative School. Although these programs are not administered to District Five, it appears from the Record on Appeal this is because the District has opted to provide its own district-run programs.5
Finally, the County Board administers the county-wide equalization tax. This equalization tax, in practice, amounts to a levy of 14.7 mills which is imposed and collected uniformly on the County's assessed value and is then distributed by the County Board to the local districts based upon student average daily membership. According to the County Board's Administrator, the equalization tax is a "county-wide effort to spread the County's wealth in an effort to see that per pupil spending does not vary too dramatically from district to district."6
Other than their involvement with the County Board in the budget process, the five local school districts are generally autonomous in other areas of school governance, such as the hiring and firing of teachers, setting guidelines for student discipline, and creating extracurricular student activities. The school districts perform these functions without interference from, or supervision by, the County Board.
Appellant William Mack Burriss is the chairman of the Anderson County School District Five Board of Trustees, and he resides in District Five. Appellant E. Lee McPherson is the chairman of the Anderson County School District Four Board of Trustees, and he resides in District Four. District Five itself is the third appellant in this case. In 2002, these appellants brought a declaratory action in circuit court against the County Board, as well as the following "State" respondents: the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Appellants and the County Board subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In April 2004, the circuit court granted the County Board's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint as to the County Board and the State respondents. The circuit court found that the statutory scheme giving the County Board review authority over District Five's budget was constitutional. The circuit court further ruled that Anderson County's two-tiered governance system did not violate the South Carolina Constitution's bans against: (1) taxation without representation; and (2) non-uniform taxation. See S.C. Const. Art. X, §§ 5 & 6.
I. Did the circuit court err in finding that the statutory scheme giving the County Board budget review authority over the districts is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution?
II. Did the circuit court err in ruling that the County Board's tax authority over the individual school districts does not violate the South Carolina Constitution's ban against taxation without representation, pursuant to Article X, Section 5?
III. Did the circuit court err in ruling that the County Board's tax authority over the individual school districts does not violate the South Carolina Constitution's ban against non-uniform taxation within a jurisdiction, pursuant to Article X, Section 6?
Appellants argue that Anderson County's two-tiered school governance system creates an "over-inclusive franchise" which dilutes the voting rights of those residing in District Four and Five. Specifically, appellants contend that because the budgets and tax rates for these districts are ultimately determined by the County Board, which contains members who are elected by voters who live outside Districts Four and Five, the strength of their own votes is diluted. Appellants assert that this vote dilution runs afoul of the federal Equal Protection Clause's7 principle of "one person, one vote." We disagree.
This Court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion under the same standard as the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 438-39 (2003).
Under the South Carolina Constitution, the Legislature is charged with "provid[ing] for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State." S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3. The Legislature "has wide discretion in determining how to go about accomplishing [this] duty." Horry County Sch. Dist. v. Horry County, 346 S.C. 621, 632, 552 S.E.2d 737, 743 (2001). Furthermore, "[a]ll statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them valid." Id. at 631, 552 S.E.2d at 742.
Without question, equal protection guarantees "one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S....
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