Burroughs v. Shared Hous. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3:15-cv-333-N-BN,3:15-cv-333-N-BN
• Parties: BILLY JOE BURROUGHS, Plaintiff, v. SHARED HOUSING CENTER, ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

BILLY JOE BURROUGHS, Plaintiff, v. SHARED HOUSING CENTER, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 3:15-cv-333-N-BN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

June 17, 2015

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case, in which Plaintiff Billy Joe Burroughs is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge David C. Godbey.

Defendants Shared Housing Center (the "Center"), Maria Machado, and ReShunda Morrow (collectively, "Defendants") have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff has filed a response [Dkt. No. 21] and has requested oral argument, see Dkt. No. 20, and Defendant has filed a reply [Dkt. No. 22].

The undersigned now issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part and that Plaintiff's motion for oral argument should be denied.

Background

On February 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed his pro se complaint against the Center; Defendant Morrow, identified as a case manager; and Defendant Machado, identified as the Center's Executive Director. See Dkt. No. 3. Defendants has filed a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 20.

Burroughs, who is blind, applied to the Center's Homeshare program. The Center is an organization that receives some grant funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). See Dkt. No. 3 at 16. And the Homeshare program matches those in need of housing with individuals who can accommodate a roommate, one who can provide "companionship, assistance with house chores and a sense of security." Id. at 15.

Plaintiff contends that, instead of allowing him to participate in the program and attempting to find him a match, the Center found him ineligible for Homeshare on the basis of his blindness. See id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that his first application was not recorded and that, after he filled out his second application, he was found to be ineligible. See id. at 1-2. Plaintiff contends that, after a third party, Disability Rights Texas, contacted the Center, Defendant Morrow, at the behest of Defendant Machado, said that Plaintiff's participation would "require people to rearrange their homes" and she "couldn't ask them to do that." Id. at 3. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the applications that he filled out contained several questions about physical and mental disabilities. See id. at 5.

Plaintiff asserts that these facts mean that he has been discriminated against,both by the questions that the Center asks in its application and by the determination that Plaintiff was ineligible for the Homeshare program. In support, he cites to a regulation pertaining to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 et seq., (the "FHA"), which makes it unlawful to "make an inquiry to determine whether an applicant for a dwelling ... has a handicap or to make inquiry as to the nature and severity of a handicap of such a person." 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c).

The undersigned now concludes that the Court should grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, the Court should dismiss any claim based on questions in the Homeseekers application and any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the Court should allow to proceed Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims, ostensibly made under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., (the "Rehabilitation Act") and the FHA.

Legal Standards

While Defendants have filed their motion pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6), a "Motion to Dismiss [filed] pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [is] considered under Rule 12(b)(6)." Elmo v. S. Foods Group, L.P., No. 3:05-cv-301-M, 2006 WL 1420777, at *1 n.6 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2006) (collecting cases).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), andmust plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

While, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, "to survive a motion to dismiss[,]" under Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that Plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Zephyr Aviation, LLC v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565, 573 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is generally disfavored in the Fifth Circuit).

A court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). But the pleadings in this context include attachments to the complaint. See Katrina, 495 F.3d at 205; see also Rodriguez v. Rutter, 310 F. App'x 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("It is well established that, in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a district court may not go outside the complaint.")

Further, documents "attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the] claim[s]." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)) (other citations omitted). This exception has been characterized as a limited one - with two required elements. See, e.g., Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (attached documents can be included if they meet both requirements); Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003) (attachments should not have been considered because they were not central). Therefore, only when the attachments to a defendant's motion "were referred to in the complaints and ... are central to the plaintiff's claims" can they be considered by the Court in the Rule 12(b)(6) context. Katrina, 495 F.3d at 205.

Although the Fifth Circuit has not articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff's claims, the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to establish an element of one of the plaintiff's claims. Thus, when a plaintiff's claim is based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting the contract are central to the plaintiff's claim....

However, if a document referenced in the plaintiff's complaint is merely evidence of an element of the plaintiff's claim, then the court may not incorporate it into the complaint.

Kaye v. Lone Star Fund v. (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (analyzing Collins, Scanlan, and Katrina) (citations omitted).

Because the attachments to Defendants' motion to dismiss are not necessary to establish an element of one of Plaintiff's claims, they are not incorporated into his complaint and have not been considered in the undersigned's analysis.

Further, "[b]ecause Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his Complaint with all possible deference." Muthukumar v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas, No. 3:10-cv-115-B, 2010 WL 5287530, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2010) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see Jackson v. Roche, Nos. 7:04-cv-0133-O & 7:02-cv-111-R, 2008 WL 2579677, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2008) ("Because Plaintiff filed his complaint as a pro se litigant, this Court is obligated to construe the complaint liberally." (citations omitted)). But see Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) ("Although the Court and the parties should liberally construe pro se pleadings, such a liberal construction does not require that the Court or a defendant create causes of action where there are none." (footnote omitted)).

While pro se status does not provide "an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets," Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986), it is settled law that "pro se pleadings must be liberally...