Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-2465-B
• Parties: ANGELIA SMITH and KELVIN SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. CVS CAREMARK CORP., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

ANGELIA SMITH and KELVIN SMITH, Plaintiffs,

v.CVS CAREMARK CORP., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-2465-B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SIGNED: May 23, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 38) filed by Defendants on April 2, 2013 and a Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 42) filed by Plaintiffs on April 5, 2013. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion.

I.BACKGROUND

This action is brought under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615 et seq. Pro se Plaintiffs Angelia Smith and Kelvin Smith are suing Angelia's former employer, Defendant Caremark, L.L.C., as well a number of allegedly related entities, Defendants CVS Caremark Corporation, Caremark RX, L.L.C., Caremark PhC, L.L.C., CVS Pharmacy, Inc., CVS Rx Services, Inc., Jane Dick c/o CVS Caremark Corp., and Donna Randle c/o CVS Caremark Corp., for interference, discrimination, and retaliation against Angelia when she sought to care for her husband Kelvin, in violation of the FMLA.

The following contains a brief, summary recitation of the undisputed, material facts: Angeliawas employed by Caremark, L.L.C. as a customer service representative at the customer call center in Richardson, Texas from 2002 to 2010. At some point during her employment, there was a merger between the CVS and Caremark entities. Angelia had received FMLA leave off-and-on beginning in 2003 for reasons undisclosed to the Court. In April 2009, Angelia requested FMLA leave for maternity leave. Defendants¹ approved Angelia's leave through June 24, 2009. Doc. 39, Br. at 6. In November 2009, Angelia again requested intermittent FMLA leave to care for her husband Kelvin due to an illness. On December 16, 2009, she provided Defendants with a medical certification from Kelvin's physician. Id. On December 24, 2009, Defendants granted Angelia's intermittent leave request retroactively to November 15, 2009 through May 15, 2010. Id. On April 13, 2010, Defendants requested additional certification from Kelvin's physician to cover the amount of intermittent leave Angelia was taking, though Plaintiffs dispute that such an additional certification was necessary. Id. Nonetheless, on April 28, 2010, Angelia sent the requested new medical certification. Id. On May 12, 2010, Defendants approved and extended Angelia's intermittent leave through November 15, 2010. Id. In total, Angelia was granted FMLA leave for some time between April and June 2009 and intermittent leave from November 15, 2009 until November 15, 2010. Doc. 32, Am. Compl. at 6, 8. Each of Angelia's requests for leave under the FMLA were ultimately granted in full.

The following facts presented by Defendants are disputed by Plaintiffs: Defendants explainthat from May through June 2010, Angelia's supervisor, Donna Randle, received several complaints against Angelia from supervisors and quality control representatives stating that Angelia had been rude to employees and customers and that she had failed to log out of her phone multiple times, which caused numerous customers' calls to go unanswered for hours. Doc. 39, Br. at 7. Plaintiff had allegedly received several prior formal warnings throughout her years of employment with Defendants related to similar behavior. Id. at 2, 4-5. Defendants allege that, in light of these recurring problems, Defendant Randle and two other managers decided to terminate Angelia's employment. Id. at 7. Angelia was terminated on June 22, 2010. Id. Angelia alleges that she was terminated because of her FMLA leave. Doc. 32, Am. Compl. at 6.

On June 22, 2012, two years after Angelia's termination, Plaintiffs filed an Original Petition in state Court against several of the Defendants. Doc. 1-3, Original Pet. Defendants removed the action to federal court on July 20, 2012. Doc. 1, Notice. The Court ultimately granted in part Plaintiffs' request to amend their pleadings, and the Amended Complaint (doc. 32), filed on February 22, 2013, operates as the live pleading in this case.

On April 2, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 38), seeking judgment on each of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 42) on April 5, 2013, which also appears to serve as a Response to Defendants' Motion.² Both partiesoppose the other party's Motion. Neither party filed replies to the responses within the deadlines for doing so, so the Motions are now ripe for review. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II.LEGAL STANDARDS

The purpose of summary judgment is "to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990). Accordingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The substantive law governing a matter determines which facts are material to a case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The summary judgment movant bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. SmithKline & French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). However, if the non-movant ultimately bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Rather, the summary judgment movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the mere absence of evidence supporting the non-movant's case. Id.

Once the summary judgment movant has met this burden, the non-movant must "go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(per curiam). Factual controversies regardingthe existence of a genuine issue for trial must be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Id. Nevertheless, a non-movant may not simply rely on the Court to sift through the record to find a fact issue, but must instead point to specific evidence in the record and articulate precisely how that evidence supports the challenged claim. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, the evidence the non-movant does provide must raise more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). This evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably base a verdict in the non-movant's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the non-movant is unable to make such a showing, the court must grant summary judgment. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

III.ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment on each of Plaintiffs' claims, and each opposes the other's Motion.³ The Court evaluates the claims and arguments, in turn, below.

A. Plaintiff Kelvin Smith's Standing

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Kelvin Smith does not have standing to pursue an FMLA claim against Defendants because Kelvin was never an employee of any of the Defendants nor had any relationship to Angelia's FMLA claims, other than being the beneficiary of her support. Doc. 38,Mot. at 8-9. The Court agrees that neither Plaintiffs' pleadings nor their briefing demonstrates that Kelvin enjoyed an employee-employer relationship with any of the Defendants or was otherwise involved in Angelia's claims. Indeed, Kelvin admitted that he is not an employee of CVS Caremark. Doc. 40, App. at 90-91 (Resp. to Request for Admissions). The causes of action raised in the Amended Complaint are each based on the employment relationship under the FMLA, so the Court agrees that Kelvin lacks standing to sue. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2), 2617 (defining an eligible employee under the FMLA and describing civil actions available under the FMLA by "employees" and the Secretary); Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, 530 F.3d 368, 372-74 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to award a spouse standing to sue for retaliation based on his wife's FMLA requests). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to Defendants on Kelvin's claims.

B. FMLA Interference Claim

The Amended Complaint appears to raise a claim for FMLA interference. Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), an employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise" any right provided under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Once the right to the benefit is established, the employee is due the benefit, regardless of the intent of the employer. See Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1999). In order to establish a prima facie case of interference under the FMLA, an employee must show (1) she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the employer was subject to the FMLA's requirements; (3) she was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) she gave notice to the employer of her intent to take FMLA leave; and (5) she was denied an entitlement under the FMLA, or the employer failed to respect the employee's FMLA entitlements. See Holland v. Shinseki, No. 3:10-CV-908-B, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6788, at *37-38 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2012). Under the fifth element of the prima facie test, an employee must proveboth that the employer interfered with, restrained, or denied her exercise of FMLA rights, and also that the employee was prejudiced by such violation. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002) ("To prevail under the cause of action set out in § 2617, an employee must prove, as a threshold matter, that the employer violated § 2615 by interfering with, restraining, or denying his or her exercise of FMLA...