Burt v. City of Idaho Falls

• Decision Date: 07 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13806,13806
• Citation: 105 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1075
• Parties: John I. BURT, on behalf of himself and all other residents and property owners in the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho similarly situated, Appellants, v. The CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, Idaho, and the City Council of said city, said council consisting of Thomas V. Campbell, Mayor, Charles L. Clark, Melvin L. Erickson, James R. Freeman, Paul L. Hovey, Sam S. Sakaguchi and Ralph M. Wood, Councilmen, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1075

665 P.2d 1075

105 Idaho 65

John I. BURT, on behalf of himself and all other residents and property owners in the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho similarly situated, Appellants, v. The CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, Idaho, and the City Council of said city, said council consisting of Thomas V. Campbell, Mayor, Charles L. Clark, Melvin L. Erickson, James R. Freeman, Paul L. Hovey, Sam S. Sakaguchi and Ralph M. Wood, Councilmen, Respondents.

No. 13806.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 7, 1983.

C. Timothy Hopkins and Larry Lee Goins of Hopkins, French, Crockett & Springer, Idaho Falls, for appellants.

Arthur L. Smith of Albaugh, Smith, Pike, Smith & Anderson, Idaho Falls, for respondents.

David L. Metcalf of Langroise, Sullivan & Smylie, Boise, for intervenors/respondents.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This controversy involves the annexation of approximately 68.78 acres of land by the city of Idaho Falls. The annexation was requested by several owners of the land. The City Planning and Zoning Commission and the City Council conducted hearings and other required procedures preliminary to annexation, zoning and amendment of its Comprehensive Plan. The annexed land was then zoned C-1 (commercial) by the city. The land had been previously zoned by the county as R-1 (single-family residential).

The appellant, John I. Burt, claims to be a resident of Idaho Falls whose dwelling is located within approximately one block of the annexed land. Burt also contends that he is a proper representative of more than 800 other residents and property owners of the city who have been adversely affected by the city's actions. Seeking review of the city's actions, Burt on his own behalf as well as that of others filed a Notice of Appeal and Petition for Review in the district court under I.C. §§ 67-6521, 67-5215 and I.R.C.P. 83(c).

Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the appeal procedure was improper and that the district court was without jurisdiction. After briefing and oral argument, the district court filed its memorandum decision and order dismissing the appeal and petition on the ground that the controversy was not ripe for judicial review--no decision granting or denying a land use permit was involved. ¹ Relying upon Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), Burt moved to vacate that order. After further briefing and oral argument, the district court filed its final memorandum decision and order denying the motion on the ground that the action complained of was "legislative" and was not "quasi-judicial" in nature. Burt appeals from this last order.

To reach a proper resolution of this appeal, the question to be answered is whether the district court erred in characterizing as "legislative" the activity of the City of Idaho Falls in the annexation, amendment of its comprehensive plan, and zoning of the annexed land. We hold that the trial court properly characterized the questioned activity as legislative and therefore not subject to direct judicial review. ² I.R.C.P. 83(c) provides in part that "[w]here provided by statute, any final decision of any administrative or governmental agency, body or board may be appealed to the district court." (Emphasis added.) To determine if the appellant, Burt, has an avenue of appeal from the decision of the city council requires an examination of the provisions of the "Local Planning Act of 1975," Title 67, Ch. 65, I.C., and a determination of whether the questioned activity is legislative or quasi-judicial. Burt contends that pursuant to I.C. § 67-6521 that he was entitled to bring an appeal to the district court. We disagree.

The annexation ordinance was silent as to the zoning of the annexed land; therefore, it came into the city as unzoned land. ³ Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 599, 448 P.2d 209, 213 (1968) ("the county zoning ordinance ceased to apply once the land in question was removed from the county's jurisdiction by annexation. The land was from that time subject to the city's jurisdiction"); cf. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 244, 506 P.2d 470, 471 (1973) (annexation ordinance adopted county zoning ordinance for annexed area by reference). The annexed land was not rezoned by the city but initially zoned. See Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, supra.

"[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action." Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947, 949 (1980); Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941).

In Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, supra, we were faced with determining the procedural due process requirements necessary to support a rezoning decision. In that case the applicants for the rezoning appealed to the district court from a denial of their application. We held that the action of the Board of Commissioners in acting upon a rezoning request was quasi-judicial in nature. Legislative activity by a zoning entity is differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the result--legislative activity produces a rule or policy which has application to an open class whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts specific individuals, interests or situations. ⁴ Cooper, supra 101 Idaho at 410, 614 P.2d at 950. Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by "its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate remedy can be had at the polls." Id.

Applying the test adopted in Cooper, we hold that in the annexation of land, the subsequent amendment of the comprehensive plan and the zoning of the annexed land, I.C. § 67-6525, the city council acted in a legislative manner, see Cooper, supra; Dawson, supra; Harrell, supra; see also City of Louisville v. District Court In and For County of Boulder, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo.1975); Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan.1978), and that such actions are not subject to direct judicial review. See, e.g., Dawson, supra.

Costs awarded to defendants-respondents.

Attorney fees denied.

Affirmed.

SHEPARD, J., and WALTERS, J. Pro Tem, concur.

BAKES, Justice, dissenting:

The majority errs in two respects. First, the majority holds that the city council's actions in annexing and changing the zoning of the parcel of land in question, and in amending the comprehensive plan, were legislative rather than quasi-judicial in nature. Second, the majority holds that "such [legislative] actions are not subject to direct judicial review." Ante at 1078. Both holdings are inconsistent with the standards recently adopted and applied by this Court in Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980).

The question presented is couched by the majority as "whether the district court erred in characterizing as 'legislative' the activity of the City of Idaho Falls," in relation to the parcel of property involved in this appeal. A starting point for our review of this question, as well as the question of whether legislative actions of a local zoning authority are subject to "direct judicial review," is Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs of Ada County, supra.

In Cooper, two individuals had applied for a rezone of a 99-acre parcel of property owned by a third party on which they held an option to purchase. The Ada County Board of Commissioners denied their requested zone change, and on appeal the district court determined that the board's denial of the requested zone change was a legislative action. Thus, the district court applied the restrained level of review then applicable to essentially all zoning decisions of local zoning bodies, i.e., whether the board had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. See Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970). Finding no such abuse, the district court affirmed the board of commissioners' denial of the requested rezone.

On appeal to this Court, we quoted at length from the Oregon case of Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (Or.1973), and adopted the rule stated therein and urged by the appellants which distinguishes between legislative and quasi-judicial actions of local zoning bodies " 'Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test....

" ' "Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interests, or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial." [Comment, Zoning Amendments--The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 Ohio St.L.J. 130, 137 (1972).]....' 507 P.2d at 26, 27." 101 Idaho 407, 410, 614 P.2d 947, 950.

In Cooper we held that the application for rezoning of the 99-acre parcel called for quasi-judicial action. Since the appellants in Cooper had not been afforded the...