Burtch v. Zeuch
| Citation | 202 N.W. 542,200 Iowa 49 |
| Decision Date | 17 March 1925 |
| Docket Number | 36414 |
| Parties | ROY BURTCH, Petitioner, v. HERMAN F. ZEUCH, Judge, et al., Respondents |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
REHEARING DENIED JUNE 25, 1925.
Certiorari to Des Moines Municipal Court.--H. F. ZEUCH, Judge.
ORIGINAL proceedings in certiorari to test the validity of an order made by respondents adjudging the petitioner guilty of contempt. The opinion sufficiently states the facts. The petition is dismissed, the writ discharged, and the order entered by the defendant judge is--Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Theodore F. Mantz, for petitioner.
Ben J Gibson, Attorney-general, Vernon R. Seeburger, County Attorney, Russell Jordan, Assistant County Attorney, and Ralph Powers, Special Prosecutor, for respondents.
DE GRAFF, J.
The action giving rise to the proceedings in certiorari in this case is predicated on Section 12541, Code of 1924. The material part thereof reads:
The petitioner herein, as defendant in the court below, was accused, on information, of contempt of court, in that he unlawfully, willfully, and illegally resisted an order or process issued by the municipal court of Des Moines, to wit: a search warrant for intoxicating liquors. The specific charge is that he did willfully and knowingly dump certain intoxicating liquors about to be seized under a search warrant, into a sink on the premises designated in the search warrant.
Burtch was cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, by reason of his acts and conduct as alleged in the information. Upon arrest, he filed an appearance bond, and subsequently entered his plea of not guilty. Trial was had, and the court adjudged him guilty, imposing a fine of $ 50 and costs. Thereafter, petition in certiorari was filed in this court, and writ issued.
The facts disclose that, on the 11th day of March, 1924, one T. R. Pettit of Des Moines signed and swore to an information before H. H. Sawyer, one of the judges of the municipal court of Des Moines, to have issued a search warrant for intoxicating liquors. On the same day, a warrant issued, and was placed in the hands of a Des Moines police officer, who went to 606 Mulberry Street, Des Moines, Iowa, which was the place designated in the warrant, for the purpose of service. As the officers entered the place, one of them called out: "Officer with a search warrant." On this announcement, the petitioner, Burtch, who happened to be in the place, but whose connection or relation thereto is not disclosed, dumped or poured a certain amount of alcohol into the sink, and broke the container, before the officers could get to him. It is also shown that the sink and the broken container had the odor of alcohol, and that a number of empty whisky bottles were in the place.
Upon the conclusion of the State's testimony, the defendant interposed a motion "that the information for contempt herein be dismissed." No evidence was introduced on behalf of the defendant. This motion challenges the power of the court to adjudge him guilty of contempt: (1) That the act of the defendant as charged in the information does not constitute contempt, within the purview of the statutory definition; (2) that the information and search warrant introduced by the State over the objection of the defendant were invalid, in that they were not in conformity to the provisions of our state Constitution and our statutes governing search warrant. In effect, the motion constituted a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the alleged contempt. The questions presented on the fact side bearing directly on the acts and conduct of the defendant are: (1) Did the accused have knowledge of the officers' attempt to execute the search warrant in question? (2) Did he commit the acts charged in defiance of the terms of the search warrant? (3) Did the State establish these propositions by the quantum of proof required in a contempt proceeding?
I. To warrant a conviction, the guilt of the accused must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. Sawyer v. Hutchinson, 149 Iowa 93, 127 N.W. 1089; Russell v. Anderson, 141 Iowa 533, 120 N.W. 89. Clearly, Burtch had knowledge, at the time of the commission of the act charged, that the officers were about to search the premises in which, at that time, he happened to be. He personally knew some of the officers. It is also shown without dispute that Burtch dumped and attempted to destroy the evidence of intoxicating liquor which was in the place subject to search. The facts and circumstances establish the corpus delicti beyond question. Furthermore, the purpose and intent of Burtch in doing what he did are quite evident. His act was willful, and constituted an illegal resistance to the service of process, within the purview of the statutory definition. An unlawful interference or an attempt to interfere with the proper execution of legal process is an obstruction of the due administration of justice, and constitutes contempt. The power of a court to punish for contempt extends to all persons who interfere with the proper exercise of its judicial functions, including officers of a court, parties litigant, or strangers. 13 Corpus Juris 32, Section 43 et seq.
The act of Burtch was an attempt to make futile a process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore constituted a criminal constructive contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court. On this phase of the case the propositions urged by the petitioner are without merit.
II. As heretofore indicated, the motion of defendant to dismiss the contempt proceeding not only questioned the sufficiency of the evidence bearing directly on the specific acts and conduct of the defendant, but also challenged the validity of the information and search warrant introduced in evidence. To constitute a contempt predicated on the illegal resistance to an order or process of the court, within the meaning of the statute, the order or process must have issued, in the first instance, in conformity to law. There can be no contempt based on a process which is wholly void. It is to be observed that the information and search warrant are simply items of evidence in the contempt case, and are subject to the ordinary and usual rules governing the admission of evidence. Therefore, unless it may be said that these documents were prima facie competent when offered by plaintiff, the objections of the defendant should have been sustained.
The pertinent and controlling question is: Was the search warrant in question a void process? The challenge made by the petitioner to the information and warrant is in these particulars: (1) That the search warrant was not issued upon probable cause, as defined in Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Iowa, for the reason that the information upon which the warrant was based, contains no facts set forth therein or attached thereto, so that the magistrate could conclude therefrom whether the same constituted probable cause; (2) that the search warrant did...
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