Burton v. Air Fr. - KLM
| Decision Date | 07 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-01085-IM |
| Parties | LYNNETTEE BURTON, Plaintiff, v. AIR FRANCE - KLM, a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Clayton Huntley Morrison, Law Office of Clayton H. Morrison, LLC, 8625 SW Cascade Ave., Suite 605, Beaverton, Oregon 97008. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Kristin M. Asai, Holland & Knight LLP, 601 SW Second Ave., Ste. 1800, Portland, Oregon 97204; Christopher G. Kelly and Sarah G. Passeri, Holland & Knight LLP, 31 West 52nd Street, New York, New York 10019. Attorneys for Defendant.
This action comes before the Court on Defendant Air France's1 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. ECF 10. Plaintiff sues for personal injuries suffered on board Defendant's flight between Montreal, Canada, and Paris, France. ECF 10 at 2. For the reasonsdiscussed below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, ECF 10, is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.2
Plaintiff purchased her ticket for travel on an Air France flight from Montreal, Canada, to Paris, France, "through an on-line authorized agent, Cheap Flights Fares, LLC, at cheapflightfares.com." ECF 12-2 at 2. Plaintiff asserts that to purchase a ticket for the Air France flight through the Cheap Flight Fares website, she used her "personal electronic device that is registered" to her permanent residence in Oregon, she was required to provide her home address in Oregon, and she used a credit card registered to her home address in Oregon. Id.
Air France is a partner of other carriers, such as Delta Air Lines, which fly to Oregon. See ECF 12-1 at 21-25. Air France is also a member of the SkyTeam alliance, "bringing together 19 airlines and providing access to a global network of more than 14,500 daily flights to more than 1,150 destinations in more than 175 countries." ECF 12-1 at 12. Defendant refers to its arrangements as a "code-share agreement"3 and/or alliance with other carriers, including Delta Air Lines, which fly to Oregon. ECF 15 at 2. However, Air France itself does not operate any flights into or out of Oregon. ECF 11 at 2. It does not maintain any offices in Oregon, is not registered to do business in Oregon, and does not maintain an agent for service of process in Oregon. Id.
Plaintiff was a passenger on Air France Flight No. AF345 on December 21, 2018, with service from Montreal to Paris. ECF 1-1 at ¶ 4. While onboard, "a piece of luggage fell from an overhead bin and struck [P]laintiff." Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff seeks damages for her injuries for a total "not to exceed $88,000.00," and further damages for medical expenses "not to exceed $25,000.00." Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
Plaintiff first sued in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah, alleging that an "accident" within the meaning of the Montreal Convention occurred. ECF 1-1 at ¶ 8. She filed her Complaint on June 3, 2020, Id. at ¶ 11, and Defendant removed the case to this Court on July 6, 2020.4
Rather than answer the Complaint, Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. ECF 10. Defendant argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction, "both generally and specifically," over it, as Id. at 2.
Plaintiff responded in opposition, arguing that the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing incidents aboard certain aircraft and which both parties agree governs this dispute, see ECF 1 at ¶¶ 8-13; ECF 12 at 2, "expand[ed] jurisdiction" of American courts to handle disputes arising under it. ECF 12 at 3. She also argues that Defendant has sufficientminimum contacts to confer on this Court specific personal jurisdiction. Id. Defendant replied, arguing that "the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction over any carrier of a passenger who happens to be a citizen of the United States," but rather that the "Montreal Convention is concerned with subject matter jurisdiction." ECF 15 at 2 (emphasis in original). Defendant also argues that it does not have sufficient minimum contacts to give rise to specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 3-6.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under both the diversity and federal question jurisdictional statutes.
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) exists because the parties, an Oregon domicile and a French corporation organized under the laws of France, are completely diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. ECF 1 at 2.
Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 also exists because Plaintiff's claims arise under a treaty of the United States, the Montreal Convention. See ECF 1-1 at ¶ 8-13. The Montreal Convention covers "all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward." Convention for Int'l Carriage by Air ("Montreal Convention"), S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, *11 (May 28, 1999). The Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for injuries that fall within its scope. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. V. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 (1999); Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 194 Fed. Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2006).
"Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate." Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). "Where, as here, a defendant'smotion to dismiss is based on a written record and no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts." Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). However, "conclusory allegations or 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a claim are not entitled to the presumption of truth." Allen v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 20-CV-02448-BLF, 2020 WL 5517170, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)).
Federal courts in Oregon may exercise personal jurisdiction to the same extent as Oregon state courts under Oregon law. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (). Under Oregon's long-arm statute, Oregon state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction "to the extent permitted by due process." Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Or. R. Civ. P. 4 L (conferring jurisdiction "in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States"); Oregon ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211, 212 (Or. 1982) (); Swank v. Terex Utilities, Inc., 360 P.3d 586, 592-93 (Or. 2015) ().
As such, the analysis of whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant merges into a single question: whether the exercise of such jurisdiction would be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014).
To satisfy the federal Constitution on this point, a nonresident defendant "generally must have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Specific jurisdiction may only exist when the "defendant's suit-related conduct [] create[s] a substantial connection with the forum State." Id. at 284.
The Ninth Circuit uses a three-part test to evaluate whether specific jurisdiction is consistent with constitutional due process:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). The first prong refers to both purposeful direction and purposeful availment. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011). Because this dispute does not concern intentional tortious conduct, this Court will apply the purposeful availment analysis in this case. Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007) (); see also ECF 1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 8 (...
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