Burton v. City of Franklin
| Decision Date | 23 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | 1:11-cv-00267-JMS-TAB |
| Parties | THOMAS W. BURTON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF FRANKLIN, MAYOR FRED L. PARIS, INDIVIDUALLY, and Franklin Police Chief Stan Lynn, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [dkt. 33], which the Court grants for the reasons that follow.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose only a notice-pleading requirement for complaints. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8. Thus, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [plaintiff] need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (alteration omitted)) (per curiam). Nonetheless, "a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled." Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (synthesizing Erickson and Twombly). In that circumstance, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper. A motion filed under that rule asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). For the purposes of that rule, the Court will ignore legally conclusory allegations.Id. at 1945-50 . The Court will, however, give the complaint the benefit of reasonable inferences from all non-conclusory allegations.1 See id.
On February 21, 2009, a confidential informant wearing concealed audio and video equipment entered the home of Plaintiff Thomas Burton at the request of two Franklin Police Department detectives to make a controlled drug buy. [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 11.] When she entered the home, the informant possessed unopened packages of Sudafed. [Id. at ¶ 12.] When she left Mr. Burton's home at 6:00 a.m. the next day, she did not have the Sudafed and instead delivered two packages of methamphetamine to the detectives. [Id. at ¶ 13.] The detectives took possession of the methamphetamine but did not test the substance, weigh it, or deliver it to the property room of the police department. [Id. at ¶ 14.]
The next day, the detectives again gave the informant Sudafed and dropped her off at Mr. Burton's home. [Id. at ¶ 16.] The informant entered the home with Sudafed and left shortly thereafter without it. [Id. at ¶ 17.]
The Complaint goes on to assert that "[b]ased upon false information provided by [the detectives], a search warrant was issued on February 22, 2009 for Mr. Burton's residence." [Id. at ¶ 15.]
At approximately 10:30 p.m., the two detectives, Police Chief Stan Lynn, and members of the Johnson County Prosecutor's Office executed a search warrant at Mr. Burton's residence. During the search, Mr. Burton was arrested. [Id.]
Mr. Burton was charged with one count of manufacturing and one count of delivery of more than three grams of methamphetamine, both Class A felonies. [Id. at ¶ 19.] Mr. Burton was held in the Johnson County Jail on a bond of $100,000. [Id. at ¶ 20.] Unable to post the bond, Mr. Burton remained incarcerated. [Id. at ¶ 22.]
On March 3, 2009, the drugs were delivered to the police department property room, but were not tested or weighed. [Id. at ¶ 21.] On November 12, 2009, the drugs were sent to the Indiana State Police laboratory for testing and weighing for the first time. [Id. at ¶ 23.] The State Police reported that the drugs had a total weight of 2.23 grams, 0.77 grams less than the minimum threshold for an A felony. [Id. at ¶ 24.]
On April 19, 2010, the prosecuting attorney reduced both charges against Mr. Burton to Class B felonies, due to the weight of the drugs. [Id. at ¶ 25.] Two months after the charges were reduced to Class B felonies, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, a bond reduction to $20,000. [Id. at ¶ 25.] Plaintiff immediately posted bond and was released. [Id. at ¶ 26.]
In early 2010, one of the detectives involved in Mr. Burton's investigation and arrest became the subject of a police investigation related to alleged illegal and inappropriate conduct, including official misconduct, drinking on duty, ghost employment, providing alcohol to minors and fondling police informants, for which he has been criminally charged. [Id. at ¶ 27.]
On May 13, 2010, the informant filed a civil lawsuit against the two detectives involved in Mr. Burton's case, alleging exhibitionism, fondling, battery with a sex toy, uninvited sexual touching and gender-based harassment, some of which occurred during the investigation of Mr. Burton. [Id. at ¶ 29.] In early 2011, on the State's motion, charges against Mr. Burton and approximately fifty unrelated defendants were dismissed. [Id. at ¶ 30.]
In February 2011, Mr. Burton filed § 1983 claims against the City of Franklin, Mayor Fred Paris, Police Chief Stan Lynn, Detective Bryan Burton, and Detective Ryan Mears, alleging constitutional deprivations under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment. [Dkt. 1.] The two detectives filed independent motions to dismiss in May 2011. [Dkts. 20; 23.] Mr. Burton did not respond to the motions to dismiss, and the Court granted the motions in July 2011. [Dkt. 28.] See Burton v. Franklin, No. 1:11-cv-00267-JMS-TAB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78161 (S. D. Ind. 2011) ().
On August 8, 2011, Mayor Paris, Chief Lynn, and the City of Franklin also moved to dismiss Mr. Burton's claims. [Dkt. 33.] That same day, Mr. Burton's counsel moved to withdraw his representation. [Dkt. 36.] In September, Mr. Burton requested an extension of time to obtain new counsel and respond to the motion, and the Court granted his request. [Dkts. 43; 44.] The time to respond has now passed, and Mr. Burton has failed to respond to the Defendants' motion.
Mr. Burton brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rightselsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In this case, Mr. Burton alleges that the Defendants' conduct violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Dkt. 1 at 7 ¶ 34.]
Section 1983 requires not only that a plaintiff (1) had a constitutionally protected right and (2) that he was deprived of that right in violation of the Constitution, but also (3) that the defendant intentionally caused that deprivation and (4) the defendant acted under color of state law. McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, liability under § 1983 can be based only on a finding that conduct causing a constitutional deprivation occurred at the defendant's direction or with his knowledge and consent. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). In other words, the official sued "must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye...." Id.
In his Complaint, Mr. Burton makes no factual allegations regarding Mayor Paris or his personal participation in any alleged constitutional deprivation. The only portion of Mr. Burton's Complaint that specifically mentions Mayor Paris is the section entitled in which Mr. Burton lists Mayor Paris along with the other prior and current defendants in the formulaic recital of causes of action, asserting that Mayor Paris "should have known of the unconstitutional propensities of [the detectives]," and therefore acted with "reckless disregard of, and with deliberate indifference to" Mr. Burton's constitutional rights. [Dkt. 1 at 6-7 ¶ 32-35.]
Personal participation is required as a predicate to any § 1983 claim. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). To be liable for the conduct of a subordinate, a supervisor must be personally involved in the conduct. Id. Here, Mr. Burton alleges no factsindicating any direct involvement on the part of Mayor Paris. By not pleading any facts in his Complaint regarding Mayor Paris' involvement in this action, Mr. Burton has failed to state a § 1983 claim against him. Id. All of Mr. Burton's § 1983 claims against Mayor Paris are therefore dismissed.
Mr. Burton alleges that his rights were violated, in part, under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, protects citizens against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Although Mr. Burton does not specify in his Complaint the search or seizure he is challenging, and he does not dispute that the substance recovered from the informant was methamphetamine, the Court will address both the propriety of the search warrant executed at Mr. Burton's home and the validity of his arrest following that search.
A. Wrongful Search
Mr. Burton's Complaint raises only a single-line challenge to the validity of the search warrant: "Based upon false information provided by [the detectives], a search warrant was issued on February 22, 2009 for Mr. Burton's residence." [Dkt....
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