Burton v. City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 20 November 1956
• Citation: 144 Conn. 80,127 A.2d 251
• Parties: Charles M. BURTON et al. v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 251

127 A.2d 251

144 Conn. 80

Charles M. BURTON et al. v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 20, 1956.

Frederick U. Conard, Jr., Hartford, with whom was Richard M. Feingold, Hartford, for plaintiffs.

Elihu H. Berman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Hartford, with whom was George J. Ritter, Corp. Counsel, Hartford, for defendants.

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

INGLIS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs in this action are owners of properties in Hartford which are used for dwelling purposes and constitute controlled housing accommodations. The plaintiffs are, of course, taxpayers. They instituted the action against the city, its treasurer and its temporary city housing rent commissioner, praying a declaratory judgment determining whether 'An Ordinance concerning Controlled Housing Accommodations,' enacted March 26, 1956, by the court of common council of Hartford, is valid in whole or in part. The plaintiffs also prayed for injunctive relief. The case has been reserved for the advice of this court.

The provisions of the ordinance, so far as they are material to the questions propounded in the reservation, may be summarized as follows: The ordinance recites in its opening paragraphs that a housing emergency exists in the city of Hartford as a result of the second world war, the Korean emergency, and the effects thereof, and that since state rent controls will expire on March 31, 1956, it is necessary, in order to preserve the public peace, health, safety, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, that rent and eviction controls be adopted by the court of common council as a temporary expedient in the exercise of its police power.

Part A of the ordinance provides that '[n]o person shall bring any action of summary process to recover possession of any land, building, any apartment in any building * * * except (a) for nonpayment of rent; (b) for nuisance; (c) when the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the immediate use * * * by himself or members of his immediate family * * *; (d) when the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the immediate purpose of remodeling substantially * * * in a manner which cannot practicably be done with the tenant in possession * * *; (e) when the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the immediate purpose of demolishing the building * * *; (f) when the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the immediate purpose of converting a housing accommodation to a business use * * *; (g) when the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession * * * for the immediate purpose of withdrawing such premises from the rental market; (h) when the tenant is violating a substantial obligation of his tenancy other than the obligation to surrender possession * * *; (i) when the tenant is using or permitting the housing accommodation to be used for an immoral or an illegal purpose; or when occupancy by the tenant is illegal * * *; (j) when the tenant has unreasonably refused the landlord access to the housing accommodation for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by law * * *; and (k) when the tenant's lease or other rental agreement has expired * * * and at the time of termination the occupants of the housing accommodation are subtenants or other persons who occupied under a rental agreement with the tenant, and no part of the accommodation is occupied by the tenant as his dwelling.'

Part B-1 of the ordinance is entitled 'Definitions.' In it 'controlled housing accommodation' is defined as 'all housing accommodations except the following,' and then follows a list of nine exceptions. Two of those exceptions are '(g) housing accommodations in one family houses which are or become vacant on or after the effective date of this ordinance' and '(h) housing accommodations in two- and three-family houses which are or become vacant on or after the effective date of this ordinance, provided the landlord resides in a housing accommodation in said house.'

Part B-2 provides for the appointment of a temporary city housing rent commissioner and sets forth his duties. Among other things he is authorized, 'from time to time, to make such regulations and orders, consistent with the provisions of this ordinance, as he may deem necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes and carry out the provisions of this ordinance.'

Part B-3 directs that during the effective period of the ordinance no person shall demand, accept or receive rent for any controlled housing accommodation in excess of that allowed under the expiring state law, except that in cases of hardship the rent commissioner may authorize an increase in rent and except that a landlord may increase rents by 15 per cent where there is no agreement between him and his tenant to the contrary. A paragraph under B-3 denominated (IV) authorizes the commissioner by regulation or order to 'regulate or prohibit * * * practices relating to recovery of possession, in connection with any controlled housing accommodations, which in his judgment are equivalent to or likely to result in rent increases inconsistent with the purposes of this ordinance.'

Part B-5 relates to the enforcement of the ordinance and provides that any person who wilfully violates any provision of it or any order or regulation of the commissioner shall be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both, but that no prosecution shall be started except upon written complaint of the commissioner.

Part C, headed 'Separability,' is of importance in the decision of the case. It reads: 'Rent controls and eviction controls are each, in and of themselves, hereby declared to be essential to the preservation of the public peace, health, safety, comfort and welfare; if part A of this ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid, the validity of part B thereof and the applicability of same to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby, and if any provision of this ordinance or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid the validity of the remainder thereof and the applicability of same to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.'

Part D directs that the ordinance shall take effect upon the termination of state rent controls and shall terminate on March 31, 1957, or upon a determination by the council that the emergency has ceased to exist, whichever is sooner.

The questions reserved for the advice of this court are eight in number and are set forth in the footnote. ¹ It should be noted that questions 1 and 2 are predicated upon an assumption that a housing emergency existed when the ordinance in question was enacted. Ordinarily, we do not consider questions reserved unless they are such as in the opinion of the court will be reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case. Practice Book, § 469. On their face, the questions here reserved are not calculated to elicit answers which will necessarily be involved in the ultimate decision of the case. In the form in which the questions are propounded, answers to them would be of assistance to the trial court only in the event that it developed as a matter of fact that a housing emergency did exist. In the view we take of the case, however, as will later appear, the result reached would be the same whether a housing emergency existed or not. We, therefore, will answer the questions.

Whether the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part depends, among other considerations, upon whether the charter of the city of Hartford grants to the court of common council the power to enact it. The charter provides: 'The city shall have power to adopt ordinances not in conflict with the general statutes or the provisions of this charter, for the preservation of the public peace, health, safety, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, and to provide penalties for the violation thereof enforceable in the city and police court but not exceeding a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than thirty day or both.' Hartford Charter, § 12 (1949); 25 Spec.Laws, p. 38, § 4.

We will assume without deciding that the effect of the phrase 'for the preservation of the public peace, health, safety, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants' is to grant to the city the power to enact ordinances that are within the police power. Temporary rent and eviction control legislation is clearly an exercise of that power. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865. By the terms of the charter, however, the power of the city to adopt ordinances is limited to the enactment of those 'not in conflict with the general statutes'. Chapter 411 of the General Statutes, which is now again in full effect since the expiration of the state rent control law on March 31, 1956, Cum.Sup.1955, §§ 2965d, 2966d, authorizes a landlord, upon the termination of his tenant's lease, to evict the tenant by summary process. See Cum.Sup.1955, § 3217d. Part A of the ordinance in question prohibits a landlord from resorting to summary process to regain possession of controlled housing accommodations...