Clark County v. City of Las Vegas

• Decision Date: 07 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 8719,8719
• Citation: 550 P.2d 779,92 Nev. 323
• Parties: COUNTY OF CLARK, a legal subdivision and Legislative Commission of the State of Nevada, Appellants, v. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a Municipal Corporation, and George E. Franklin, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 779

550 P.2d 779

92 Nev. 323

COUNTY OF CLARK, a legal subdivision and Legislative

Commission of the State of Nevada, Appellants, v. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a Municipal Corporation, and George E.

Franklin, Respondents.

No. 8719.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

June 7, 1976.

Bruce L. Woodbury, Las Vegas, Frank Daykin, Carson City, for appellants.

Carl E. Lovell, City Atty., John Foley, George E. Franklin, Las Vegas, for respondents.

OPINION

GUNDERSON, Chief Justice.

By Chapter 648, 1975 Statutes of Nevada, our Legislature adopted the 'Metropolitan Cities Incorporation Law' and the 'Urban County Law.' The former is sections 2 through 110.6 of Chapter 648; the latter is sections 111 through 136. ¹ Together, these provisions endeavor to allow the City of Las Vegas and certain conjacent areas of Clark County to achieve a substantial consolidation of governmental functions and services, while Clark County, Las Vegas, and certain smaller cities within the county remain distinct governmental entities.

Soon after Chapter 648's passage, heated public debate arose concerning its constitutionality. Responding to an inquiry restricted to the most obvious constitutional questions presented thereby, Nevada's Attorney General declared it unconstitutional in part. ² Disputes multiplied, and on November 7, the City of Las Vegas filed a complaint against Clark County, purporting to seek a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of selected provisions. ³ On December 8, George E. Franklin, in his capacity as a citizen, voter and taxpayer of Las Vegas and Clark County, filed a separate action for declaratory relief, joining both City and County, and seeking an adjudication that Chapter 648 is totally unconstitutional, and void in its entirety. ⁴ Through a stipulation approved by the district court, the two lawsuits were consolidated, and the Legislative Commission of the State of Nevada was permitted to intervene as an additional defendant. From a judgment declaring the entire Chapter unconstitutional, Clark County and the Legislative Commission have appealed.

The district court determined that Chapter 648, in crucial respects, violated provisions of our state and federal constitutions, and that with unconstitutional sections excised, the legislative intent was thwarted, thereby rendering the entire Chapter void. We affirm the district court's judgment, for the reasons it articulated, and for further reasons.

I. Special Legislation Question

First, the district court found Sections 163-168 of Chapter 648 to be special legislation, violative of Article IV, Sections 20 and 21, of the Nevada Constitution. ⁵ As all members of the Nevada Supreme Court agree, this determination was correct.

Section 163 would divide Clark County into seven commissioner districts, from which a total of eleven commissioners would be elected: eight 'county-city commissioners' and three 'county commissioners.' The composition of each district is specified by reference to the assembly districts established by Chapter 218 of NRS. ⁶ Section 164 concerns elections to be held in Clark County in 1976 and 1978, to elect the eight 'county-city commissioners' and the three 'county commissioners.' Section 165 provides for the creation in Clark County of citizens' advisory councils, two in each of the four two-seat 'county-city commissioner' districts, and one in each of the three one-seat 'county commissioner' districts. Section 166 would create a 'special local government consolidation committee' composed of the present seven members of the Clark County Board of Commissioners (in office on the Act's effective date), and the mayor and four members of the Las Vegas Board of City Commissioners (in office on the first Monday in July, 1975). Section 167 enumerates governmental services and functions to be performed individually or jointly by each entity. Section 168 requires that the labor negotiating representatives of both Las Vegas and Clark County participate jointly in labor negotiations with any employee organizations.

The appellants, while conceding that the sections just mentioned constitute local or special legislation, contend they have only temporary application, and therefore do not offend the constitutional prohibition. A review of the cases cited in support of this proposition is unpersuasive. See: Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947); Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935); State v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 P. 274 (1898); State of Nevada v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876); State of Nevada v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869).

Appellants also urge that Sections 163 through 168 do not violate Nevada's constitution for the reason that emergency circumstances existed, necessitating legislative interference with county government by special legislation, ostensibly because no general laws sufficiently addressed the supposed emergency. See Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 115 P. 177 (1911). However, we note that Chapter 648, exclusive of Sections 163 through 168, contains provisions for the election of county officers which ostensibly apply uniformly throughout the state. (See Section 126 of Chapter 648.) Chapter 648 therefore itself constitutes persuasive evidence that a 'general law can be made applicable' as contemplated by Article IV, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution. Thus, there exists no apparent need for special legislation in this field; and in any event, we perceive no emergency here, much less one of sufficient magnitude to justify special legislation so pervasive as sections 163 through 168.

Laws establishing county governments or purporting to regulate internal affairs of such governments must be general in nature and must apply uniformly through the state to all counties similarly situated. Nothing less satisfies the mandate of Article IV, Sections 20 and 21 of the Nevada Constitution. State v. Malone, 68 Nev. 36, 231 P.2d 599 (1951); McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950). In McDonald v. Beemer, this Court noted the evils which attend legislation directed at one locality:

'(Such legislation) is invariably referred to the local members and passed without scrutiny from the other representatives and without any feeling of responsibility on their part, thus often leading to improper combinations among the members and even to vicious legislation that would not be permitted were it to affect the whole state.' 67 Nev. at 426, 220 P.2d at 220.

Therefore, because Sections 163 through 168 apply specifically to Clark County, and to no other county in the state, they must be declared void.

II Malapportionment 'One Man, One Vote' Questions

1. Moreover, as all members of the Nevada Supreme Court agree, Section 163 offends the 'one man, one vote' concept implicit in the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. See: Nevada Constitution, Article I, Section 13; U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14. This is so, we think, because the new commissioner districts were created in 1975 by reference to existing assembly districts, previously established on the basis of 1970 census figures.

Section 163 divides Clark County into commission districts. Two county-city commissioners are to be elected from each of the four commissioner districts, which are each composed of four established assembly districts; one county commissioner is to be elected from each of the remaining three districts, all composed of two established assembly districts. The population of Clark County was apportioned into the various assembly districts on the basis of the 1970 Federal Decennial Census, and all parties agree that changes in population since 1970 have caused significant malapportionment between the various assembly districts. Thus, utilizing the existing assembly districts to form commission districts would immediately occasion significant malapportionment in the latter. ⁷ All parties seemingly further agree that more recent and accurate population estimates are available upon which a districting plan could be based.

Unquestionably, if a basis of apportionment or reapportionment is adopted which does not reasonably assure adequate protection of the integrity of the individual's vote, the 'one man, one vote' concept is violated. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399 (1971). Clearly, the Nevada and United States Constitutions require strict compliance with the 'one man, one vote' concept whenever possible. It has, of course, been held that a periodic reapportionment scheme based on the Federal Decennial Census is a reasonable means of safeguarding the integrity of the individual's vote from degradation resulting from malapportionment, although at times some measure of malapportionment might exist. Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal.2d 452, 62 Cal.Rptr. 424, 432 P.2d 26 (1967). Still, we think, periodic reapportionment must be distinguished from initial apportionment. The authorities appellants cite, approving use of the decennial census, do so in the context of the former. None are cited that approve use of an antiquated census which admittedly would result in significant malapportionment in an initial plan of apportionment.

It may be true that reapportionment every ten years based on population changes is 'reasonable' as that term is necessarily defined by the courts. See Silver v. Reagan, cited above. Still, it does not follow that initial apportionment based on outdated population data is reasonable. In the former situation the data is accurate at the time of apportionment; in the latter, as here, the data may be quite stale. It is recognized that to require reapportionment more frequently than every ten years might impose on government burdens unreasonable in relation to the benefits achieved. See Gaffney v. Cummings, cited above. However, in the context of a plan for initial apportionment, such a burden does not necessarily exist.

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