Burton v. Irwin

• Decision Date: 14 June 1971
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: William L. BURTON, Individually, etc. v. Virginia Dare Burton IRWIN et al.

Page 624

181 S.E.2d 624

212 Va. 104

William L. BURTON, Individually, etc. v. Virginia Dare Burton IRWIN et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 14, 1971.

John W. Edmonds, III, Richmond (David J. Mays, Herndon, P. Jeffreys, Jr., J. Edward Lawler, Mays, Valentine, Davenport & Moore, Jeffreys & Lawler, Richmond, on brief), for appellant.

Eppa Hunton, IV, Richmond (Richard McDearmon, Brockenbrough Lamb, Jr., John H. O'Brion, Jr., Thomas G. Slater, Jr., John B. Ashton, Christian, Barton, Parker, Epps & Brent, Browder, Russell, Little & Morris, Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, on brief), for appellees.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, GORDON, HARRISON, COCHRAN and HARMAN, JJ.

COCHRAN, Justice.

On this appeal we are concerned with the construction of the holographic will of the late Blanche Burton Mallory.

Mrs. Mallory, a widwo 86 years old, died without issue on November 10, 1967, leaving as her heirs at law and distributees two sisters, a brother, various nieces and nephews and great-nieces and great-nephews. Her will, admitted to probate in the clerk's office of the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, reads as follows:

'Richmond Virginia

June 26, 1962

This is my last will & testerment.

I appoint my Brother William L Burton as executor and Trustee of my estate.

To my Brother William L Burton I present herewith & Without recourse the accompaning Bonds, Stocks, Mortage Notes, real estate, and Bank Accounts and valuables of all descriptions in my safty box, at First & Merchants Bank Richmond Va. or at home or any other place in Richmond Va.

My Brother knows my wishes and will carry them out, to the best of his ability.

Blanche Burton Mallory'

Mrs. Mallory's brother, William L. Burton, qualified as Executor and entered into bond in the penalty of $800,000.00, without security.

Thereafter, a sister, the personal representative of a sister who died after Mrs. Mallory's death, five nieces and nephews, two great-nieces and a great-nephew instituted this chancery suit by filing their bill of complaint against the brother, William L. Burton, and two infant heirs as law and distributees of Mrs. Mallory. Complainants therein alleged that Mrs. Mallory's estate was devised and bequeathed to Burton to hold 'for the benefit of her heirs and next of kin'. Burton filed his answer thereto asserting that he was entitled to the entire estate 'to the exclusion of her other heirs and next of kin'. Subsequently, one of the great-nieces withdrew as a complainant.

Evidence was heard Ore tenus by the court which held, in a written opinion, that no intention could be found in the language of the will that the brother take fee simple title to the estate. The court concluded that the testatrix attempted to constitute her brother 'an executor and trustee for the benefit of unknown persons and purposes' and that a 'naked trust was created or implied in favor of the heirs at law and distributees' of the testatrix. We granted Burton an appeal from the final decree entered on September 11, 1969, ordering him as Executor to make distribution of the net estate to the heirs at law and distributees.

The question is whether the testatrix intended to create a trust for undesignated beneficiaries and unspecified purposes which must fail for indefiniteness or whether she intended to leave her entire estate in fee simple to her brother. If she created a void trust then her net estate will be held by Burton as trustee under a resulting trust for the benefit of her heirs at law and distributees. Sims v. Sims, 94 Va. 580, 584, 27 S.E. 436, 437 (1897).

The will must be considered as a whole in order to determine the testamentary intent. It is apparent from her phraseology and errors in spelling and punctuation that Mrs. Mallory had little faculty for expressing herself in writing. Nevertheless, the chancellor concluded that the language of the will was clear and therefore, over objection, he excluded evidence adduced by Burton to show facts and circumstances surrounding the testatrix at the time the will was executed.

Such extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of determining testamentary intent where there is legitimate dispute as to the meaning of words used in the will. Pitman v. Rutledge, 198 Va. 567, 571, 95 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1956); Coffman's Adm'e v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 462--463, 109 S.E. 454, 457 (1921).

We cannot agree that the language of the testatrix was so clear unambiguous as to make extrinsic evidence inadmissible.

Use in a will of the word 'trustee' by a lawyer may clearly indicate that a trust is intended, but the same word written by one not learned in the law, may have an entirely different meaning. A will may be construed to create a trust without use of the words 'trust' or 'trustee'. Conversely, it may be found that a testator did not intend to create a trust although he used such words. Scott, Law of Trusts § 24, p. 192 (3rd ed. 1967); See In Re Dever's Will, 173 Wis. 208, 180 N.W. 839 (1921).

Likewise, a testator may bequeath and devise fee simple title to property without using the precise legal terminology normally employed to do so. See McKinsey V. Cullingsworth, 175 Va. 411, 9 S.E.2d 315 (1940).

Moreover, precatory words in a will may be construed to create a trust depending upon the language used in the light of all the circumstances. Various circumstances to be considered in determining the testator's intent include the imperative character of the words used, the relations between the parties, their financial situation and the motives which may have influenced the testator. Restatement, Trusts § 25, Comment b (2d ed. 1959).

We therefore conclude that the chancellor erred in excluding the proffered extrinsic evidence. We reject the contention of the appellees that they are now entitled to an opportunity to introduce such evidence. They rested their case solely on the language of the will and then successfully objected to the introduction of extrinsic evidence by Burton. Having thus made a deliberate choice in the exercise of trial strategy, they may not now return to take additional evidence.

The record, including the proffered but rejected evidence of facts and circumstances, reveals that there was an unusually close relationship between Mrs. Mallory and her brother William. She was about 24 years older than he. After their father died when William was nine months old, he and his mother lived with the Mallorys and, after his mother's death, he continued to make his home with them until his marriage at the age of 24. The Mallorys gave him a lot about two blocks away upon which he and his wife built their house. He was in daily contact with Mr. Mallory, called on Mrs. Mallory several times a week and acted as general utility man around their house.

Mr. Mallory died in 1940 a few months after the death of Mr. McCulloh, the husband of a sister of Mrs. Mallory's and Burton's. Thereafter, Mrs. Mallory and Mrs. McCulloh lived together, each year spending six months in Florida in a home owned by Mrs. McCulloh and six months in Richmond in Mrs. Mallory's home.

Burton would drive the two sisters to Florida each fall and fly home, returning to Florida each spring to drive them back to Richmond. Commencing about ten years before the hearing, Burton and his wife went to Florida with the sisters each fall and lived with them during the six months they were there.

When Mrs. Mallory and Mrs. McCulloh were in Richmond, Burton went by every day to attend to Mrs. Mallory's needs. He saw to the upkeep of her property, shopped for her, and took her to the bank, the stockbroker's office and wherever she wanted to go.

Mrs. Mallory's property came from her husband. After his death she converted much of his real estate into stocks and bonds and had only three pieces of rental real estate at the time of her death.

Burton had access to Mrs. Mallory's safety deposit box. He had no income of his own but receive some compensation from Mrs. Mallory, who had persuaded him to give up his own business as a manufacturer's representative 'in order to look after he problems.'

The evidence thus shows a relationship approaching that of mother-son between the testatrix and her brother, financial dependence of William upon his sister and a motive for her to leave her estate to him. In light of these circumstances we consider the language of the Mallory will.

Her brother is the only person mentioned by the testatrix, and he is referred to three times in the brief writing. The word 'trustee' is found only once and then in conjunction with 'executor'. No trust...