Burton v. Plastics Research Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV 99-40386.,CIV 99-40386.
• Citation: 134 F.Supp.2d 881
• Parties: Michael BURTON and Aimee Davis, Plaintiffs, v. PLASTICS RESEARCH CORP., a Michigan corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

134 F.Supp.2d 881

Michael BURTON and Aimee Davis, Plaintiffs, v. PLASTICS RESEARCH CORP., a Michigan corporation, Defendant.

No. CIV 99-40386.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 30, 2001.

Tom R. Pabst, Flint, MI, for plaintiffs.

Jay A. Schwartz, Julie S. Silberg, Schwartz Law Firm, Farmington Hills, MI, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendant Plastics Research Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment. For reasons set forth below, this Court denies in part and grants in part Defendant's motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Michael Burton and Aimee Davis are former employees of Defendant Plastics Research Corporation, which is located in Genesee County. Plaintiff Burton was employed "at-will." Plaintiff Davis was an hourly employee whose employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement between Defendant and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Plaintiff Davis was fired on September 8, 1998, and Plaintiff Burton was fired on September 9, 1998.

Plaintiff Burton is a black male; Plaintiff Davis is a white female. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs "happened to fall in love with each other." (Compl.¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant "did not like a black man having an amorous relationship with a white woman," (Compl.¶ 7), and consequently Defendant discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of race, ultimately resulting in the termination of their employment.

Defendant alleges that, in spite of being a well-liked employee, Plaintiff Burton was discharged "for continually and progressively exercising bad judgment." (Def. Resp. at 1.) Defendant further alleges that Plaintiff Davis was terminated because she violated Defendant's attendance policy. (Id.)

Plaintiffs have produced evidence of racist policies and remarks by Defendant's management and employees. Defendant's Chief Operating Officer at the time of Plaintiff Burton's employment, Bob Kniss, submitted an affidavit in which he stated that Defendant's Chief Executive Officer and Defendant's human resources/personnel supervisors expressly agreed among themselves to "hire fewer black workers and more Russian immigrant Jew workers and Hispanic workers" because "Jewish workers and Hispanic workers were superior to the black workers." (Pls. Ex. 1 (Kniss Aff.) ¶ 3.) Former employee Ralph Knopek stated in his affidavit and testified at his deposition that several of Defendant's supervisors regularly and openly told "nigger jokes," and spoke derogatorily of black people, including referring to them as "niggers" and "lazy blacks." (Pls. Ex. 3 (Knopek Aff.) ¶¶ 3-9; Pls. Ex. 4 (Knopek Dep.).)

Plaintiff Burton, the only black supervisor, stated at his deposition that other supervisors regularly made racist remarks to him, including: referring to him as "nigger," "boy," and the "wrong color" (Pls. Ex. 2 (Burton Dep.) at 62, 73, 77); a supervisor asking "so big black stud supervisor Mike Burton likes white girls, huh?" (id. at 71; see Pls. Ex. 5 (Davis Dep.) at 93); another supervisor telling Plaintiff Burton that he does not like "niggers" (Pls. Ex. 2 at 64); and others telling him "nigger" jokes (id. at 58). When Plaintiff Burton complained to Defendant's Administrative Services Director, Theresa Preniciaro, he was told only, "Oh, Mike, they don't mean it that way." (Id. at 60.) The racial antagonism increased after co-workers discovered that Plaintiffs were dating each other. In spite of being told that Defendant had "zero tolerance" for employees kissing each other, several employees in dating relationships with each other could be seen kissing at work. (See id. at 54.) Soon after Plaintiffs were accused of kissing each other, they were fired. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff Davis stated at her deposition that Plaintiff Burton was the target of racist remarks and that she and he were treated differently than other unmarried couples working for Defendant. (See, e.g., Pls. Ex. 5 (Davis Dep.) at 50-51, 58, 62, 93, 95.)

A memorandum prepared by Administrative Services Director Preniciaro, and dated Monday, August 31, 1998, provides the following justification for Plaintiff Burton's termination:

Mike Burton has had 5 serious warnings in the past 8 months alone (as a Supervisor). Every week it seems something different happens. The last incident on 8-28-98 put PRC in jeopardy. A Supervisor should know better and NOT go to the house of an employee. Especially a female's house and after hours. I recommend we terminate Mike's employment effective immediately or at least take him out of the supervisory capacity as soon as possible.

(Pls.Ex. 11.) The incident on August 28, 1998 is described as follows:

Employee's purse stolen in plant — Mike Burton failed to document the incident (with-holding information), failed to notify management (until management approached him), and then on top of all that — ended up going to a female employee's house, after hours (after midnight) when she called him and asked him to go there, cuz she had to talk to him about the incident). All of which are definitely NOT signs of a leader or supervisor.

(Id.) Plaintiff Burton stated at his deposition that after an employee's purse was stolen during his shift, another employee called him and asked him to come over to her house. (Def. Ex. D (Burton Dep.) at 120-21).) Plaintiff went to that employee's house on the advice of a fellow supervisor, and that employee confessed to stealing the purse and returned it to Plaintiff Burton. (Id. at 121.)

On or about July 2, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a four count Complaint in the State of Michigan Circuit Court for the County of Genesee. Count I alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff Burton's rights under the U.S. Constitution on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1988. Count II alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff Davis' rights under the U.S. Constitution on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1988. Count III alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff Burton's rights under the Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.2101 et seq. Count IV alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff Davis' rights under the Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.2101 et seq.

On October 4, 1999, Defendant removed this civil action to this Court. On November 2, 1999, however, this Court entered an Order of Partial Remand, remanding Counts III and IV to the Circuit Court for the County of Genesee. Thus, only Counts I and II remain before this Court. Plaintiffs are litigating the claims for relief alleged in Counts III and IV in the state court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the nonmoving party's case on which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.1992).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). The court is not required or permitted, however, to judge the evidence or make findings of fact. Id. at 1435-36. The moving party has the burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1435.

A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment where proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, where a reasonable jury could not find that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.; Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 654 (6th Cir.1993).

Once the moving party carries its initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts to prove that there is a genuine issue for trial. To create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must present more than just some evidence of a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court has stated that, "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the [nonmoving party's] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Consequently, the nonmoving party must do more than raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmoving party must produce evidence that would be sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi...