Burton v. Prince

• Decision Date: 07 March 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 14-17-00181-CV,14-17-00181-CV
• Citation: 577 S.W.3d 280
• Parties: Robert BURTON, Appellant v. Wayman L. PRINCE, Nafisa Yaqoob, Independent Management & Investment LLC and Leawood Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

577 S.W.3d 280

Robert BURTON, Appellant

v.Wayman L. PRINCE, Nafisa Yaqoob, Independent Management & Investment LLC and Leawood Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellees

NO. 14-17-00181-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed March 7, 2019

Robert Burton, New York, NY, pro se.

Neil Hugh McLaurin IV, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Bourliot.

Frances Bourliot, Justice

This is a wrongful foreclosure case. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered declaratory judgment in favor of Robert Burton and set aside foreclosures on six condominium units (the Property) that Burton owned. But the trial court found against Burton on various other claims he brought against his homeowners' association, Leawood Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association), the Association’s attorney and trustee, Wayman L. Prince, property manager Nafisa Yaqoob, and property management company Independent Management & Investment LLC (collectively, Leawood). Burton appeals the trial court’s judgment against him as to his claims for fraud under Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 12.002, for unfair debt collections practices, and for deceptive trade practices. Burton also challenges the trial court’s findings on "other claims denied in the final judgment." He further contends the trial court should have awarded him prejudgment interest. We affirm.

Background

When Burton fell behind on his Association dues, the Association filed suit against him in justice court.¹ Burton was served with that lawsuit through his property manager, Shannon Havard. The justice court rendered judgment against Burton for the outstanding dues plus court costs, attorney’s fees, and post-judgment interest.

Prince subsequently served Burton with notices of sale for the Property and a demand for delinquent amounts owed. Burton alleged that the notices of sale did not comply with requirements in the Texas Property Code.² Prince purchased the Property at the foreclosure sales on behalf of the Association on credit. No money exchanged hands. Burton contended that the foreclosures were improperly conducted and that the trustee’s deeds to the Property that were executed after foreclosure were void. Despite this, Burton requested information regarding the amount he owed to redeem the Property and received a deficiency letter. Burton asserted that the amount referenced in the deficiency letter was excessive. Burton tendered his estimate of what was owed, which the Association rejected.

Burton brought the following claims against Leawood: (1) fraud in various forms, (2) unfair debt collection practices, (3) deceptive trade practices, (4) removal of cloud on title, (5) trespass to try title, and (6) tortious interference with contract. Burton also sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosures were improper, setting aside the trustee’s deeds as void, and declaring that Leawood "deliberately and fraudulently prevented Burton from exercising his [r]ight of [r]edemption." After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment declaring that (1) the foreclosure sales "were improper and ... a nullity," (2) Prince had no lawful power to sell the Property at the foreclosure sales, and (3) the trustee’s deeds were void. The trial court awarded Burton attorney’s fees and post-judgment interest, ordered that his claims for removal of cloud on title and trespass to try title were denied as moot, and denied relief as to his other claims.

Discussion

On appeal, Burton contends in nine issues that the trial court erred in finding against him on his fraud claims under section 12.002, unfair debt collection practices and deceptive trade practices claims, and "other claims denied in the final judgment." Burton also complains of the trial court’s failure to award him prejudgment interest.

Burton relies on evidence presented at trial to support his arguments that the trial court should have found in his favor. Construing Burton’s appellate brief liberally, we interpret these complaints as legal and factual sufficiency challenges.³ See Tello v. Bank One, N.A. , 218 S.W.3d 109, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (acknowledging that courts of appeals must construe appellate briefs reasonably and liberally).

When, as here, a trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its ruling after a bench trial, we infer all findings necessary to support the judgment. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). The judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence. In re W.E.R. , 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984).

Because the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, the trial court’s ‘implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. See BMC Software Belg. , 83 S.W.3d at 795. We review the trial court’s decision for legal sufficiency of the evidence using the same standards applied in reviewing the evidence supporting a jury’s finding. Catalina v. Blasdel , 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827. A party attacking the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden of proof must demonstrate that the evidence conclusively establishes all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).

In reviewing factual sufficiency, we examine the entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of and contrary to the challenged findings. 2900 Smith, Ltd. v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which he bore the burden of proof, he must establish that the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Parrimore , No. 14-14-00820-CV, 2016 WL 750293, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). We may not pass judgment upon the witnesses' credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder, even if the evidence would support a different result. 2900 Smith , 301 S.W.3d at 746. If we determine the evidence is factually insufficient, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue and state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment; we need not do so when affirming the judgment. Id.

I. Deference to Factfinder Required as to Intent

In five issues, Burton argues the trial court should have awarded him damages against Leawood for filing or presenting the following purportedly fraudulent documents: trustee’s deeds, redemption statements, and notices of sale. Burton contends that such actions violated section 12.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which creates a private cause of action against a person who makes, presents, or uses "a document or other record with ... knowledge that the document or other record is a fraudulent court record or a fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or an interest in real or personal property." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.002 (a)(1). We conclude that Burton did not meet his burden on appeal to establish conclusively that Leawood violated every element of section 12.002 or that the trial court’s findings were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

A. Finding on Intent in Filing Trustee’s Deeds Was Reasonable

In his first through third issues, Burton argues the trial court should have awarded him damages against Leawood for filing fraudulent trustee’s deeds. According to Burton, the trustee’s deeds are fraudulent documents that were filed in violation of section 12.002.

To establish that the trial court’s finding against Burton was not supported by legally sufficient evidence, Burton was required to conclusively establish that Leawood not only made, presented, or used fraudulent trustee’s deeds but also (1) knew they amounted to fraudulent claims against real property or an interest in real property; (2) intended for the fraudulent trustee’s deeds to be given the same legal effect as documents evidencing valid claims against real property or an interest in real property; and (3) intended to cause financial injury, mental anguish, or emotional distress to Burton.⁴ See id. § 12.002(a); Lance v. Robinson , 543 S.W.3d 723, 744 (Tex. 2018). As to his factual sufficiency challenge, Burton was required to establish that the trial court’s finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Burton argues he met these burdens by presenting evidence that Prince "knowingly filed [trustee’s deeds] with false statements in them" that the Association had paid the purchase price at the foreclosure sales. Burton contends these are false statements because no money changed hands. Burton relies on Prince’s admission that he purchased the Property on credit on behalf of the Association. Burton also relies on testimony from the Association’s board president and the property manager that they knew the Association purchased the Property on credit.

We recognize that the trial court as factfinder might conclude this was some circumstantial evidence of intent under the statute because the Association did not pay the purchase price at the foreclosure sales in cash, but we must defer to the factfinder even when the evidence might support a different result. See 2900 Smith , 301 S.W.3d at 746. On appeal, Burton was required to demonstrate he presented the trial court with conclusive...