Burton v. State
| Decision Date | 03 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A08A1439.,A08A1439. |
| Citation | 293 Ga. App. 822,668 S.E.2d 306 |
| Parties | BURTON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Barbara B. Claridge, Augusta, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, Dist. Atty., Charles R. Sheppard, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
On November 13, 2003, a Columbia County jury found Keisha Burton guilty of armed robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (in violation of OCGA §§ 16-8-41, 16-7-1, 16-5-40, and 16-11-106, respectively). Burton now appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial, claiming that the trial court erred in (i) denying her motion for directed verdict when the only evidence against her was the uncorroborated testimony of a co-defendant and (ii) admitting into evidence a letter Burton wrote to a co-defendant, thereby improperly putting Burton's character in issue. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Hester v. State, 282 Ga. 239, 240(2), 647 S.E.2d 60 (2007). Under that standard,
[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine if the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citation omitted.) Lee v. State, 281 Ga.App. 479, 479-480(1), 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).
So viewed, the record shows that on January 1, 2002, after celebrating New Year's Eve at several local bars and restaurants, three friends, Bill Anderson, Tony Baughman, and Victor Boyd, returned to Boyd's home in Martinez, where Anderson and Baughman decided to call an escort service. At approximately 1:00 a.m., Anderson placed a call to a service listed in the phone book as "AA Angels." Baughman was in possession of $15,000 that night that he recently collected in a lawsuit. Baughman had paid the way for his friends all evening and intended to pay for the escorts. While his friends were waiting for the escorts to arrive, Boyd went to bed.
Burton's co-defendants, Charlene Thatcher and Kim Rodgers, responded to Anderson's call. Thatcher and Rodgers worked for codefendant Steven Barnes, who, with Burton's assistance, was running a prostitution ring.1 Thatcher and Rodgers lived in the same house with Barnes and Burton. When Thatcher and Rodgers went on calls, they were accompanied either by Barnes or Burton, who would wait outside to collect the money.
Burton rode with Thatcher and Rodgers to Boyd's residence, and Burton waited outside in the car while the women went inside to collect payment. Baughman paid Thatcher and Rodgers $400, and when he did so, the women saw his large stack of cash. Thatcher took the $400 outside to Burton and told Burton to call Barnes "to tell him that we came across a lot of money and to come down because we're going to pull a lick," i.e., rob the customer. Thatcher stated that she and Burton both spoke with Barnes and that Barnes told Thatcher that he would be there in a little while.
While Thatcher was outside, Baughman went to the back bedroom and gave his money to Boyd. Baughman discovered an additional $350 in his back pocket, and he placed that money under a couch cushion.
Thatcher and Rodgers then engaged in sexual intercourse with Baughman and Anderson. A dispute arose between Rodgers and Anderson, however, because Rodgers claimed that Anderson committed a "foul" and owed her an additional $500. When Anderson refused to pay, Rodgers and Thatcher called Barnes. According to Thatcher, Barnes told her "to tell them it's all right, because he was going to rob them anyway."
Shortly thereafter, Barnes rang the doorbell. After entering the house, Barnes pulled a ski mask over his face, drew a gun, and demanded to know, "Where's the cheese?" Barnes forced Anderson to move closer to Baughman, who was sitting on the couch, and continued to threaten the men and demand money. Baughman gave Barnes the $350 that was hidden in the couch. Barnes then demanded that Thatcher and Rodgers search the house. Thatcher and Rodgers began searching the bedrooms and tried to enter the room where Boyd was sleeping, but the door was locked. As they attempted to kick in the door, and as Barnes threatened to shoot the door open, Boyd switched on the light and dialed 911. Barnes, Thatcher, and Rodgers fled the house. Barnes left the scene in the same car he arrived in, a Ford Bronco, and Barnes and Thatcher drove away separately with Burton. The police arrived moments later but did not give chase.
On January 12, 2002, Barnes was arrested while dropping women off at a local hotel. The officers searched Barnes' car incident to his arrest and recovered a black handgun, identified at trial by several witnesses as the gun Barnes used during the robbery at Boyd's house.
On January 17, 2002, the Richmond County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant at Barnes' residence. Officers found a document containing instructions for prostitutes. The officers also searched a Ford Bronco on the premises and found a black ski mask identified at trial by witnesses as the one worn by Barnes when he arrived at Boyd's house.
Burton, Barnes, Thatcher and Rodgers were subsequently indicted on counts of armed robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime.2 Thatcher and Rodgers each entered into a plea agreement prior to trial and testified against Burton and Barnes, who were tried together.3
1. In her first enumeration of error, Burton claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict because the only evidence supporting her conviction was the uncorroborated testimony of her codefendant, Charlene Thatcher. We disagree.
It is well settled under Georgia law that "the testimony of an accomplice, standing alone, is insufficient to convict an accused." Williamson v. State, 285 Ga.App. 779, 781(1), 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007); OCGA § 24-4-8. "[T]here must be independent corroborating evidence, either testimony from another witness or corroborating circumstances, which connects the accused to the crime." (Footnote omitted.) Reynolds v. State, 267 Ga.App. 148, 151(3), 598 S.E.2d 868 (2004). However, "the corroborating evidence need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Givens v. State, 227 Ga.App. 861, 862, 490 S.E.2d 530 (1997). Rather, "[s]light evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.; see also Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 159(1), 611 S.E.2d 15 (2005) (). "[T]he sufficiency of the corroboration evidence is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine." (Citation omitted.) Harrison v. State, 259 Ga. 486, 488(1), 384 S.E.2d 643 (1989). Thatcher's testimony, which implicated Burton as a party to the crimes at Boyd's residence (see OCGA § 16-2-20), was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony and evidence presented at trial.
It is well settled that the "testimony of one accomplice may be used to corroborate that of another." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Navarrete v. State, 283 Ga. 156, 160(2), 656 S.E.2d 814 (2008); accord Carr v. State, 289 Ga.App. 875, 877(2), 658 S.E.2d 419 (2008). For an accomplice's corroborating testimony to authorize a conviction, it need not (...
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