Busch v. Austin Co.
Decision Date | 24 June 1971 |
Citation | 37 A.D.2d 648,322 N.Y.S.2d 416 |
Parties | Claim of Altha BUSCH on Behalf of Jack Busch, Jr., Respondent, v. AUSTIN COMPANY et al., Appellants, Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Jones & Kafka, New York City (Anne G. Kafka, New York City, of counsel), for appellants.
Altha Busch, pro se.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. , for respondent Workmen's Compensation Bd.
Before HERLIHY, P.J., and REYNOLDS, GREENBLOTT, COOKE and SIMONS, JJ.
Appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board, filed August 10, 1970, awarding claimant continuing death benefits commencing September 21, 1940.
Claimant's father was killed as a result of an industrial accident on June 28, 1924. An award for death benefits was made to decedent's wife and their children, including claimant, who has been totally disabled since birth. At the time of decedent's death, subdivision 2 of section 16 of the Workmen's Compensation Law provided for death benefits to children of a deceased employee until their eighteenth birthday. Payments to claimant ceased in 1940 when he reached 18. The law was amended in 1929 to provide for death benefits to a child 'of any age dependent, blind or crippled'. Upon reopening, the board ruled that claimant was entitled to the additional benefits granted by the amendment.
The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether a permanently disabled child of a deceased employee is entitled to death benefits after attaining the age of 18 years under an amendment to the statute (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16, subd. 2) which was passed subsequent to the employee's accident and death.
Prior to the 1929 amendment, section 16 arbitrarily conditioned eligibility for benefits upon age alone without reference to such other physical conditions as would also create dependency. The amendment was enacted to rectify this inequity in the law by broadening eligibility to include blind and crippled dependents irrespective of age. Since the workmen's compensation statute is remedial in nature, it requires a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate its intent and purpose (Matter of Schmidt v. Wolf Contr. Co., 269 App.Div. 201, 55 N.Y.S.2d 162, affd. 295 N.Y. 748, 65 N.E.2d 568) and its provisions should constitute a general exception to the rules against retroactivity of statutes (1 McKinney's Consolidated...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Yonkosky v. Town of Hamburg
...should not be imposed in a restrictive fashion given the remedial nature of the Workers' Compensation Law (seeMatter of Busch v. Austin Co., 37 A.D.2d 648, 649, 322 N.Y.S.2d 416 [1971] ; see generally Matter of Scanlan v. Buffalo Pub. School Sys., 90 N.Y.2d 662, 676, 665 N.Y.S.2d 51, 687 N.......
-
Linda I. V. v. Gil R. C.
...those benefits by the original legislation, the amendment is remedial and should be applied retrospectively (Matter of Busch v. Austin Co., 37 A.D.2d 648, 322 N.Y.S.2d 416). We also note that chapter 727 of the Laws of 1980 was made effective immediately, rather than having a postponed effe......
-
Greenough v. Deblinger
...designed to correct what was deemed to be an imperfection in the prior law, there is an exception to the general rule. Busch v. Austin Co., 37 A.D.2d 648, 322 N.Y.S.2d 416. The Workmen's Compensation Law in particular has been regarded as remedial in nature and not subject to the general ru......
-
Gleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, Inc.
...of injured claimants, thereby furthering the legislative objective of compensating injured employees (e.g., Matter of Busch v. Austin Co., 37 A.D.2d 648, 649, 322 N.Y.S.2d 416). In the present case, a prospective application of the statutory amendments is appropriate because the amendments ......