Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101

Decision Date30 October 1981
Docket NumberNo. 13238,13238
Citation102 Idaho 620,636 P.2d 175
PartiesJerome F. BUSH, Claimant-Appellant, v. BONNERS FERRY SCHOOL DISTRICT #101, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, and State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Nicholas M. Lamanna, Priest River, James F. Lyons, Bonners Ferry, for appellant.

Philip E. Dolan, Coeur d'Alene, Max M. Sheils, Jr., Boise, for appellee. SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission which denied appellant's claim for workmen's compensation benefits. We affirm.

The facts are essentially undisputed. Claimant-appellant Bush had been employed by respondent School District in a janitorial capacity since August, 1976. In April and May of 1977, he experienced three separate incidents of chest, neck, shoulder, arm and jaw pain. The first incident occurred while he was assisting in the lifting of a heavy piano, the second while he was attempting to fold and carry heavy canvas tarpaulins, and the third while he was merely walking up a long incline. Thereafter he consulted Dr. Reisig, a specialist in cardiology, who diagnosed his condition as coronary artery disease. Cardiac catheterization indicated multiple obstructions in all major branches of the coronary vessels and a four vessel coronary vein bypass was performed on May 16, 1977.

Bush applied for workmen's compensation benefits and following a hearing thereon benefits were denied. The Commission found that Bush suffered from coronary artery disease and that such condition pre-existed the three instances of exertion. The Commission found that there was no evidence submitted that the exertion caused violence to the physical structure of claimant's body or that the exertion permanently aggravated the pre-existing arteriosclerotic condition. It concluded that Bush's angina (chest pain) was caused by insufficient blood circulation to the heart and was a manifestation of his pre-existing arteriosclerotic condition. The Commission held that a compensation claimant could not receive benefits absent proof that he has sustained personal injury as defined by I.C. § 72-102(14)(c), i.e., an injury caused by an accident which results in violence to the physical structure of the body, or absent proof that a job related accident has permanently aggravated a pre-existing condition. It held that Bush had failed to establish a compensable industrial accident in that he did not establish that his job responsibilities caused any myocardial infarctions or vascular obstructions, which therefore failed to prove violence to his physical structure, and further held that Bush had failed to prove that the exertion permanently aggravated the diseased condition, i.e., the coronary artery disease. On appeal Bush contends that the evidence established both that he suffered violence to the physical structure of his body and that his diseased condition was aggravated by the three instances of exertion.

An employee is entitled to compensation when he receives personal injuries caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment covered by the workmen's compensation laws. Personal injury is defined as "an injury caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body...." I.C. § 72-102(14)(c). It is also generally accepted that compensation is recoverable where the work of an employee causes an accident which aggravates or accelerates a previous diseased condition of the worker. See, e. g., Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Company, 99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978); Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957); Teater v. Dairymen's Cooperative Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 (1948); Cain v. C. C. Anderson Co., 64 Idaho 389, 133 P.2d 723 (1943); Woodbury v. Arata Fruit Company, 64 Idaho 227, 130 P.2d 870 (1942); Hamlin v. University of Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 104 P.2d 625 (1940). See also I.C. § 72-332(1).

In each instance the burden is upon the claimant to prove by a reasonable degree of medical probability that he has suffered a compensable industrial accident. Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Company, supra. See also George v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 101 Idaho 781, 621 P.2d 397 (1980); Beslanwitch v. Valley Dodge Center, Inc., 98 Idaho 390, 565 P.2d 583 (1977).

This Court has the authority to reverse a decision of the Industrial Commission when that decision is unsupported by "any substantial competent evidence" or is unsupported as a matter of law. Sykes v. C. P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761, 605 P.2d 939 (1980); Idaho Const. art. 5 § 9; I.C. § 72-732(1).

We note that the only medical testimony before the Commission was the deposition of Dr. Reisig. Reisig testified that an EKG was performed on May 12, 1977 which revealed evidence of a mild myocardial infarction which, although it could not be dated with precision, was in excess of three months old, i. e., the infarction pre-existed the three work related incidents. The record contains no other testimony indicating that the three incidents of exertion in any other manner caused any violence to claimant's physical structure.

Bush contends nevertheless that Reisig's testimony established that his diseased condition was aggravated by his job related physical exertion. The testimony of Dr. Reisig would appear to indicate the contrary. Reisig indicated that Bush was "having an accelerating pattern of angina which would be due to coronary artery disease" which angina he defined as a "term used to describe the pain that we associate coming from insufficient blood to the heart, which in the average circumstances is due to hardening of the arteries which supply blood to the heart: coronary artery disease." Reisig indicated that the pain would be due to a disease of the coronary artery and would have no bearing on the level of activity of the individual and that...

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6 cases
  • Grant v. Brownfield's Orthopedic and Prosthetic Co.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 7 September 1983
    ...supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Case of Graham, 103 Idaho 824, 654 P.2d 1377 (1982); Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101, 102 Idaho 620, 636 P.2d 175 (1981); Lampe v. Zamzow's, Inc., 102 Idaho 126, 626 P.2d 782 (1981). Therefore, however popular the cause or grie......
  • Bint v. Creative Forest Products
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 29 January 1985
    ...will not be disturbed on appeal. I.C. § 72-732(1); In re Chavez, 104 Idaho 279, 658 P.2d 950 (1983); Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101, 102 Idaho 620, 636 P.2d 175 (1981). Therefore, we hold that the Commission did not err in determining that, under I.C. § 72-439, appellants' disea......
  • Nelson v. Pumnea
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 7 December 1983
    ...Because that holding of the commission is unsupported as a matter of law, it is hereby reversed. See Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101, 102 Idaho 620, 636 P.2d 175 (1981); Idaho Const. art. 5, § 9; I.C. § 72-732(4). We now turn to the record to determine whether it discloses that i......
  • Bell v. Clear Springs Trout Co.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 23 October 1984
    ...will not be disturbed on appeal. I.C. § 72-732(1); In re Chavez, 104 Idaho 279, 658 P.2d 950 (1983); Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101, 102 Idaho 620, 636 P.2d 175 (1981); Maez v. Thunderbird Market, 101 Idaho 128, 609 P.2d 660 Nielson v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnit......
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