Bush v. James T. Johnson and Co.

Decision Date10 February 1982
Citation411 So.2d 139
PartiesThomas P. BUSH, Jr., Darien Homes, Inc. and Baker Enterprises, Inc. and Conrad W. Rafield, III v. JAMES T. JOHNSON AND COMPANY. Civ. 2893, 2954.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Jack E. Held of Sirote, Permutt, Friend, Friedman, Held & Apolinsky, Birmingham, for appellant Thomas P. Bush, Darien Homes, Inc. & Baker Enterprises, Inc.

James J. Odom, Jr. of Odom & May, Birmingham, for appellant Conrad W. Rafield, III.

No brief for appellee.

BRADLEY, Judge.

This appeal arises out of a suit filed by James T. Johnson and Company against Thomas P. Bush, Jr., Darien Homes, Inc., Baker Enterprises, Inc., and Conrad Rafield, III alleging the breach of a lease agreement.

It appears that the original lessee was Baker Enterprises which later changed its name to Darien Homes, Inc. It also appears that later several of the parties formed Baker Enterprises, Inc. which has also undergone several subsequent name changes.

In March 1977 Baker Enterprises leased office space from James T. Johnson and Company for a period of three years. During the term of the lease, the occupancy of the premises was shared with several of the other corporations. Finally the premises were prematurely vacated in September of 1979. As a result, suit was filed against the corporation involved and individuals who were alleged officers, incorporators, and stockholders of Baker Enterprises, Inc.

The case was called for trial on the morning of May 26, 1981, and the attorneys representing the defendants announced "ready." The attorney for the plaintiff announced that he would not be ready until Wednesday morning, May 27, 1981. At this point the case had not been assigned to a trial judge. The case was marked "ready" for Wednesday at 9:00 a. m. Trial on the merits was commenced on Wednesday morning in the absence of the attorneys for defendants, Thomas P. Bush, Jr., Darien Homes, Inc., and Baker Enterprises, Inc. A judgment was entered against all defendants, including these three defendants, in the amount of $5,402.89 plus court costs.

An A.R.C.P. 59 motion to vacate the judgment as to defendants Thomas P. Bush, Jr., Darien Homes, Inc., and Baker Enterprises, Inc. was filed on the ground that these defendants had no notice that the case was going to be tried on May 27, 1981. This motion was denied. Defendant Conrad Rafield asked for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was also denied. As a result, all defendants appeal to this court.

Two issues are raised in this appeal. The first issue concerns whether the trial court should have vacated the judgment against defendants Thomas A. Bush, Jr., Darien Homes, Inc. and Baker Enterprises, Inc. because it was in effect a default judgment as to them and was thus improperly entered. The second issue is whether the trial court erred in finding the existence of a lease agreement between Rafield and Johnson and Company.

In addressing the first issue, we note that a trial on the merits was held in the absence of defendants Bush, Darien and Baker, Inc. At the conclusion of trial, a judgment was entered against all the defendants. The defendants Bush, Darien and Baker, Inc. contend that the judgment against them was in the nature of a default since they did not appear to defend. In any event, as soon as these defendants learned that a judgment had been entered against them, they filed a motion to vacate the judgment.

Default judgments are not favored by the courts, and the discretion to grant such judgments should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party when there is doubt as to the propriety of the default judgment. Oliver v. Sawyer, 359 So.2d 368 (Ala.1978). The granting or denying of a motion to set aside a default judgment lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be overturned by an appellate court only for an abuse of that discretion. Wade v. Pridmore, 361 So.2d 511 (Ala.1978).

The trial judge in this case was from another county, sitting specially in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. He refused, however, to vacate the judgment even after being apprised of the custom of the Jefferson County Circuit Court. We find this to be error, and thus reverse the judgment.

It is undisputed that the long-established custom is that an attorney will be called by the clerk of Jefferson County's circuit court when a judge becomes available to hear a case. The defendants appeared at the call of the docket and announced that they were ready. The plaintiff, however, stated that he could not be ready for trial until Wednesday at 9:00 a. m. It appears that at 9:00 a. m. on Wednesday a courtroom became available, and the case was assigned to a trial judge for trial and was tried.

The defendants' attorney stated that he waited in his office all day Wednesday for a phone call telling him that a courtroom was available for the case to be heard. He was never called. Immediately upon learning that a judgment was rendered against these defendants, a motion to vacate was filed.

In the present case defendants relied on a long-established custom of the Jefferson County Circuit Court. We find the case of Williams v. Tyler, 14 Ala.App. 591, 71 So. 51 (1916) to be comparable. In that case a printed docket failed to show that a certain case was set for hearing. It was held that where the attorney had relied on a printed docket, as was the general custom, then a default judgment should have been set aside on the ground of mistake without fault.

In the present case we find that the trial court abused its discretion in not vacating the judgment. Clearly, these defendants' failure to appear was due to excusable neglect because of reliance on a long-established custom. As a result, we find it necessary to reverse the judgment in order to give these...

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8 cases
  • King v. State, 1 Div. 456
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • December 8, 1987
    ..."is so intertwined that it would be unjust to affirm the judgment" as to one and reverse as to the other. Bush v. James T. Johnson & Co., 411 So.2d 139, 142 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). "This court has power to order such a limited reversal when the decision affects one appellee to the exclusion of ......
  • Kinsey v. State, 4 Div. 113
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • January 27, 1989
    ...a party who did not file a brief on original submission. See Hobbie v. State, 365 So.2d 685 (Ala.Cr.App.1978); Bush v. James T. Johnson & Co., 411 So.2d 139 (Ala.Civ.App.1982); Muery v. Muery, 46 Ala.App. 617, 247 So.2d 123, cert. denied, 287 Ala. 737, 247 So.2d 128 (Ala.1971). While this s......
  • J.A.P. v. L.W.A.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 8, 2005
    ...McElroy, 288 Ala. 93, 257 So.2d 340 (1972); Alabama Power Co. v. King, 280 Ala. 119, 190 So.2d 674 (1966); and Bush v. James T. Johnson & Co., 411 So.2d 139 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). Our supreme court has determined that the facts of several cases have caused those cases to fall within the except......
  • J.A.P. v. L.W.A., No. 2030244 (AL 7/2/2004), 2030244.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • July 2, 2004
    ...288 Ala. 93, 257 So. 2d 340 (1972); Alabama Power Co. v. King, 280 Ala. 119, 190 So. 2d 674 (1966); and Bush v. James T. Johnson & Co., 411 So. 2d 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). Our supreme court has determined that the facts of several cases has caused those cases to fall within the exception ......
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