Bush v. Rauch
| Decision Date | 26 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 93-2101,93-2291,s. 93-2101 |
| Parties | Charlene BUSH, wife; John Bush, husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David RAUCH; D. Brad Campbell, individually and officially, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Grant W. Parsons (briefed), Dettmer, Thompson & Parsons, Traverse City, MI, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Gretchen L. Olsen (briefed), Steve L. Barney, Michael J. Beale, Plunkett & Cooney, Petoskey, MI, for defendants-appellees.
Before: BROWN, MARTIN, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.
In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Plaintiffs-Appellants John and Charlene Bush appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, D. Brad Campbell, both in his individual and official capacity. With respect to the individual capacity claim, the Bushes contend that Campbell is not entitled to immunity from suit. With respect to the official capacity claim, the Bushes contend that since the caption in the complaint included Campbell in his "official capacity as Charlevoix County Probate Court Administrator," the district court erred in refusing to recognize Charlevoix County as a co-defendant. The Bushes finally contend that the district court wrongfully denied their request for further discovery. We conclude that Campbell is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, that the district court did not err in ruling that Charlevoix County was not a proper co-defendant, and that the Bushes were not entitled to further discovery. 1 We AFFIRM.
John and Charlene Bush operate a non-secure detention home for juvenile offenders in Charlevoix County, Michigan. These facilities provide housing for juveniles as an alternative to the normal jail environment until further judicial proceedings are completed. 2 The Bush detention facility, although located in Charlevoix County, accepts juveniles from both Charlevoix County and the neighboring county of Emmet. Charlevoix and Emmet Counties typically cooperate and collaborate on juvenile detention matters inasmuch as the same probate judge presides in both counties.
David C. Rauch ("Rauch") is an Emmet County Probate Administrator who also serves as Referee of the Juvenile Division of the Emmet County Probate Court. In July 1990, acting as Referee, Rauch presided over a preliminary hearing involving Randy Baker, a 14-year-old juvenile. During the course of the preliminary hearing, Rauch determined that the juvenile should be held over in pre-trial detention. Rauch found, based on the evidence and recommendations presented at the hearing, no indications of assaultive behavior, and therefore ordered that the juvenile be placed in the Bush non-secure detention home.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing, Rauch contacted Defendant-Appellee, D. Brad Campbell, a Charlevoix County Probate Court Administrator, 3 regarding the execution of the placement. In accordance with the guidelines of Charlevoix County, Campbell conducted an initial "assessment" procedure which consisted of completing a checklist of questions to determine primarily the juvenile's level of aggression. The purpose of this inquiry is, among other things, to "classify" whether the juvenile is high risk, aggressive, or assaultive, so that appropriate terms and conditions of placement can be made. Charlevoix County by the guidelines had expressed clear "objectives" that, for example, children classified as aggressive were not to be assigned together, and children classified as assaultive or threatening were to be accompanied by an overnight attendant. Campbell completed this checklist based on the findings made in Rauch's court order, and the representations made in their phone conversation. In accordance with the order, the juvenile was placed in the Bush detention home.
Shortly after the placement, the juvenile physically assaulted and injured Charlene Bush. An investigation conducted after the incident revealed that the juvenile did in fact have a history of violent behavior.
The rather complicated procedural history in this case began on April 14, 1992, when the Bushes initially brought suit against Referee Rauch, in his individual and official capacity, regarding the placement of the juvenile at the Bush non-secure detention facility. The Bushes sought compensatory and punitive damages for 1) gross negligence on state law grounds, and 2) federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. During discovery, Campbell's involvement was brought to light, and with the court's permission, the Bushes amended their complaint to add him as a co-defendant both "individually, and also in his official capacity, as Charlevoix County Probate Court Administrator." The summons and complaint were served only upon Campbell, however, and at the time of service, Campbell no longer served in that capacity in Charlevoix County.
Rauch first moved for summary judgment based upon absolute judicial immunity. The district court agreed, concluding that since Rauch made an adjudicative determination that the youth should be placed at the Bush non-secure detention home, any alleged claim arising from the exercise of that "judicial function" was barred by his absolute judicial immunity. As stated, this decision was not appealed.
Mirroring Rauch, Campbell moved for summary judgment on the basis of absolute quasi-judicial immunity, which the district court granted. The district court held that Campbell acted as an adjunct to Referee Rauch and was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The Bushes responded by filing a Motion for Relief From Judgment seeking reconsideration, or alternatively, permission to amend the pleadings under FED.R.CIV.P. 15(b) to conform to the litigated issues. The court granted the motion, vacating the court order in part and allowing the Bushes to amend their complaint a second time.
In the second amended complaint, the Bushes abandoned all claims against Rauch and instead shifted the focus of their action to Campbell alone. Although it is inconsistent with assertions made by Mrs. Bush in her prior affidavit, the Bushes were no longer challenging the actual placement of the juvenile in the Bush facility, but rather, the terms and conditions of the placement--specifically the failure to provide notice and an overnight attendant. 4
More importantly, however, for the first time, the Bushes expressly mentioned and addressed a "co-defendant Charlevoix County." The second amended complaint alleged that Charlevoix County "adopted a policy of providing insufficient security, insufficient notice of risk, and/or insufficient payment to operators in an attempt to save money." The court, however, now having to address new discovery requests, felt "misled" by the earlier representations of the Bushes' counsel and did not consider the new allegations regarding Charlevoix County. The district court reiterated that the previous order, which permitted the Bushes to amend their complaint, was limited in scope, and in the court's opinion, the assertions made in the second amended complaint went beyond that scope. As a result, the district court vacated its order permitting the Bushes to amend and reinstated its previous order granting summary judgment in full to Campbell. In doing so, the new allegations in the second amended complaint became moot. The Bushes again filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment under FED.R.CIV.P. 60, contending that the district court erred in dismissing the entire claim inasmuch as a colorable claim remained against Charlevoix County. The district court denied the motion, finding that the Bushes' counsel was again attempting to mislead the court regarding the true nature of the action. The district court, therefore, refused to recognize Charlevoix County as a co-defendant.
The Bushes then appealed, raising the following issues:
1. Did the district court err in granting Campbell, in his individual capacity, absolute immunity, finding his acts were "quasi judicial" in nature?
2. Did the district court err in refusing to recognize Charlevoix County as a proper co-defendant?
3. Did the district court err by granting summary judgment without permitting further discovery by the Bushes?
We first address the question whether the district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Campbell in his individual capacity. The district court concluded that Campbell was acting as an adjunct to Rauch, and as an integral part of the judicial process, Campbell was entitled to absolute immunity.
The Bushes contend that Campbell's placement of juveniles and assignment of attendants are not judicial functions and that Campbell did not act as a judge or hold hearings when making determinations regarding the juvenile. The Bushes assert, therefore, that since Campbell was acting in his administrative capacity, the court erred in granting Campbell absolute immunity. The Bushes further assert that, according to the district court's ruling, "virtually every act Campbell could perform is immune ... simply because Campbell is employed by the County Probate Court." Appellant's Brief at 23.
Campbell responds, claiming that although he was not acting in a judicial capacity, his acts should still be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Campbell contends that absolute judicial immunity extends to acts related to executing or enforcing court orders according to their terms.
Review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, utilizing the same test used by the district court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 887 (6th Cir.1993). Moreover, when reviewing a summary judgment decision, an appellate court must confine its review of the evidence to that submitted to the district court. Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1993).
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