Landefeld v. Marion General Hosp., Inc., 92-3634

• Decision Date: 18 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3634,92-3634
• Citation: 994 F.2d 1178
• Parties: 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,257, 2 A.D. Cases 900, 2 A.D.D. 101, 4 NDLR P 3 Ronald A. LANDEFELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1178

994 F.2d 1178

61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,257, 2 A.D. Cases

900, 2 A.D.D. 101,

4 NDLR P 3

Ronald A. LANDEFELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-3634.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 11, 1993.

Decided May 18, 1993.

Cary Rodman Cooper (argued and briefed), Cooper, Straub, Walinski & Cramer, Toledo, OH, C. Michael Piacentino (briefed), Piacentino & Piacentino, Marion, OH, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles H. Walker, Catherine M. Ballard (argued and briefed), Bricker & Eckler, Columbus, OH, Timothy R. Krugh, Robison, Curphey & O'Connell, Toledo, OH, for defendant-appellee.

Before: KEITH and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Ronald A. Landefeld, M.D., appeals the Order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Marion General Hospital ("Hospital"), which resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff had originally filed his action pursuant to § 504 of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("the Act"), alleging his medical staff privileges were suspended by the Hospital and he was refused reinstatement solely for reasons of his handicap ¹. Plaintiff also brought various state law causes of action involving breach of contract and tort claims. Defendant filed a Motion For Summary Judgment claiming there were no material facts in dispute and defendant was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law ². The matter was referred to a Magistrate who concluded that because the evidence introduced demonstrated plaintiff's suspension was not due solely to his handicap, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendations, the District Court nevertheless ruled that plaintiff had failed to address the decisive issue on which the Magistrate had ruled, viz., whether plaintiff was suspended from staff privileges solely for reasons due to his handicap. Hence, the district court ruled plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case under the Act and granted defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

I.

Landefeld is a board certified internist who worked at the Hospital from October, 1978, until his denial of staff privileges in March, 1988. His suspension resulted from a Hospital investigation of thefts from the internal mailboxes provided by the Hospital for physicians' use. The Hospital, after noting repeated disappearances from the boxes, hired a private investigator who installed hidden video cameras to observe the mailboxes. The video cameras caught plaintiff in the act of going through the mailboxes of other physicians, sometimes stealing or disposing of their mail. The mail in these boxes generally consisted of, among other items, medical reports, laboratory reports, and other patient data. The president of the Hospital, Mr. Mulenthaler, informed the Hospital Chief of Staff who in turn called an emergency meeting of the Medical Staff Executive Committee ("MEC").

On the evening of March 15, 1988, the MEC met and voted to suspend plaintiff effective at noon the following day, pursuant to the Medical Staff Bylaws. Plaintiff responded, under his rights as provided for in the bylaws, by requesting a post-suspension hearing. The post-suspension hearing was held before a Hearing Board which consisted of other physicians who were not members of the MEC. Both plaintiff and the MEC were present and represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the post-suspension hearing, the Hearing Board recommended plaintiff be reinstated subject to an extensive list of probationary conditions. It is important to note that according to the Hospital procedures, the duty of the Hearing Board was to formulate a recommendation for the Board of Directors ("the Board"). This recommendation is not binding on the Board. The Board of Directors is composed of various community leaders serving in a voluntary capacity.

Rejecting the Hearing Board's recommendation, the Board, on June 28, 1988, upheld plaintiff's original suspension. The Board of Directors found that the evidence confirmed that plaintiff had tampered with physician mail which related to patient treatment and care, and that it was possible that he would engage in similar action in the future. The Board, however, outlined certain conditions, which if met by defendant, would allow him to be considered for reinstatement. These included submitting monthly detailed progress reports from his treating physician during his suspension, agreeing to a second opinion from a board certified psychiatrist with experience in treating doctors, conclusions from both psychiatrists that plaintiff could resume his practice without jeopardizing either patients or interfering with the medical staff, and a finding by the MEC that plaintiff had not engaged in any harassing or retaliatory acts while in the re-application process. Though defendant re-applied only two weeks later, his application was denied by the MEC ³.

Eventually, almost four months later, plaintiff applied for and received staff privileges at a different hospital, Med Center Hospital of Marion, Ohio. He has remained there without any incidents since that time.

Neither party to the instant suit disputes that plaintiff's problems have been diagnosed as stemming from a mental illness labeled a Bipolar Mental Disorder. He had been under a psychiatrist's care since shortly before his suspension and continues to be in treatment. Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Harding, testified that plaintiff's conduct was symptomatic of a person suffering from a Bipolar Disorder. Dr. Harding also stated that the illness is treatable.

II.

Succinctly stated, plaintiff essentially contends that the district court erred by accepting the recommendation of the Magistrate granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether he was suspended on the basis of his mental illness in violation of § 504 of the Act. Specifically, plaintiff argues that an issue exists as to whether he is "otherwise qualified" to perform his duties and whether the Hospital had made a "reasonable accommodation" for his handicap.

"Otherwise qualified" is a term that has a precise legal meaning which is an element of proving discrimination under the Act. This court has previously addressed the factors required to be proven for a plaintiff to prevail under the Act as follows:

The elements of a cause of action under section 504 are as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a "handicapped person" under the Act; (2) the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" for participation in the program; (3) the plaintiff is being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by reason of his handicap; and, (4) the relevant program or activity is receiving federal financial assistance. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir.1984); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir.1981). See also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).

Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir.1988).

Now, turning to the case at bar, this court must review the district court's granting of summary judgment de novo. See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.1991). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court must confine its analysis to the evidence which was before the district court. Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475, 481 (6th Cir.1991). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no material issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Supreme Court stated:

As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-9, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Accordingly, the court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, and determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury. Id. at 251, 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, 2513.

Key to this appeal, it must be noted that the district court's ruling was based upon its finding that plaintiff had failed to address the Magistrate's finding that plaintiff had not addressed the third element of the Doherty test, to-wit: plaintiff was not suspended solely on the basis of his handicap. Without proof that plaintiff was suspended solely on the basis of his handicap, plaintiff can not make out a prima facie case of handicap discrimination. In support of his conclusion, the Magistrate determined that defendant had put forth non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's suspension, viz., plaintiff's pilferage of the mailbox and the resulting lack of trust this generated among plaintiff's peers. Hence, it was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the reasons proposed by defendant were pre-textual merely camouflaging its discriminatory basis for the suspension.

In the Magistrate's report, it is noted that pla...