Busha v. State, Docket No. 15703
Decision Date | 21 January 1974 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 15703,No. 2,2 |
Citation | 215 N.W.2d 567,51 Mich.App. 397 |
Parties | James BUSHA and St. Paul Insurance Companies, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan (Michigan State Highway Department), Defendant-Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Alexander S. Jarosz, Ryan, Boerema, Jarosz, Kail & Gaskin, Grand Rapids, for plaintiffs-appellants; Robert A. Benson, Grand Rapids, of counsel.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Myron A. McMillan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellee.
Before BASHARA, P.J., and McGREGOR and BRONSON, JJ.
The cause of action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which took place on a state highway on July 14, 1970. A notice of intent to file a claim (as required at that time) was timely filed with the Court of Claims. The actual claim or complaint itself was not filed in the Court of Claims until September 8, 1972. On October 27, 1972, the Court of Claims granted defendant's motion for an accelerated judgment because of the plaintiffs' failure to file said claim within two years of the occurrence of the accident, as required by M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111). Plaintiffs appeal to this Court contending that the statute is unconstitutional and in violation of the equal protection provisions of the Federal and state constitutions and further contending that defendant should be subject to the general three-year statute of limitation.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that it was impossible to ascertain which limitational period was applicable to the case at bar. M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111) provides:
'(1) Every claim against any governmental agency shall be subject to the general law respecting limitations of actions except as otherwise provided in this section.
'(2) The period of limitations for claims arising under section 2 of this act shall be 2 years.
'(3) The period of limitations for all claims against the state, except those arising under section 2 of this act, shall be governed by chapter 64 of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961.'
M.C.L.A. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102) provides in substantive part as follows at section 2:
Although there are numerous notice and limitation requirements in the statutes which plaintiff claims cannot be followed easily by even a skilled practitioner, where the language of the statute is plain we are left no room for judicial construction. Hughes v. Detroit, 336 Mich. 457, 459, 58 N.W.2d 144, 145 (1953).
Plaintiffs' second contention on appeal is that the two-year limitational period is arbitrary and an unreasonable classification and therefore violative of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). 1
The 'rational basis' test applies when the law allegedly infringing equal protection creates no fundamental rights. Plaintiffs' claim falls within this class and if a reasonable relation exists between the classification and some legitimate state interest, no denial of equal protection results. Wilkins v. Ann Arbor City Clerk, 385 Mich. 670, 679--680, 189 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1971). As a panel of this Court stated in Kriger v. South Oakland County Mutual Aid Pact, 49 Mich.App. 7, 12, 211 N.W.2d 228, 231 (1973):
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).'
A party who assails a classification on the ground that it is in violation of the equal protection of the law has a heavy burden of showing that the classification has no reasonable basis. In Kriger v. South Oakland County Mutual Aid Pact, Supra, the following rule from Wood v. Jackson County, 463 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Mo.1971), was adopted:
"It is a general rule that equal protection of the laws is not denied by a course of procedure which is applied to legal proceedings in which a particular person is affected, if such a course would also be applied to any other person in the state under similar circumstances and conditions. Equal protection of the laws of a state is extended to persons within its jurisdiction, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, when its courts are open to them on the same condition as to others in like...
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