Bushnell v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
| Decision Date | 15 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 8988,8988 |
| Citation | 102 Ariz. 309,428 P.2d 987 |
| Parties | G.A. BUSHNELL and Nellie G. Bushnell, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF MARICOPA COUNTY, State of Arizona, and the Honorable William A. Holohan, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Hill & Savoy by John E. Savoy, Phoenix, for petitioners.
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Gary K. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
This matter arises out of a request by G. A. Bushnell, Director of Insurance of the State of Arizona, to have the Superior Court of Maricopa County in cause No. 194877, interpret Section 20--149 of the Arizona Revised Statutes and enter a declaratory judgment that Bushnell had not violated said statute by securing a mortgage loan from the Charter Oak Life Insurance Company.
The Superior Court denied Bushnell's motion for summary judgment and granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the State of Arizona because he found that Bushnell had violated the provisions of A.R.S. § 20--149, subsec. A, which forbids the Director of Insurance to be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any insurer except as a policy holder or claimant under a policy.
Bushnell thereupon filed in this Court a petition for relief by extraordinary writ, alleging that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment against him because as a matter of law a mortgage loan transaction is not a prohibited financial interest within the meaning of A.R.S. § 20--149, subsec. A. Since on the date of the hearing before us on the matter a final judgment had not been entered by the Superior Court in cause No. 194877, we took Bushnell's petition under advisement and indicated we would entertain the issuance of the appropriate writ if the judgment, when it was entered by the Superior Court, conformed to Bushnell's allegations in his petition. Judgment in conformity therewith was so entered and the matter is now at issue before us.
A.R.S. § 20--149 reads in pertinent part as follows:
* * *'
This case brings into question the trial judge's interpretation of the above statute. Bushnell contends that he could not have violated the provisions of the statute since the trial court made a specific finding of fact that the mortgage transaction was a private, regular business transaction between himself and Charter Oak Life Insurance Company, and was not in any way received by Bushnell for services rendered or to be rendered in his official capacity as the Director of Insurance as prohibited by A.R.S. § 20--149, subsec. B.
We do not agree. The finding of fact that the mortgage transaction did not violate the provisions of § 20--149, subsec. B, hereinafter referred to as part B, in no way precludes the determination that such a transaction is prohibited by the provisions of § 20--149, subsec. A, hereinafter referred to as part A.
Part B quite clearly provides that the director shall not receive any compensation in any form from an insurer or anyone else other than the State of Arizona for services rendered as Director of Insurance. In order to violate part B, the director would have to one, be acting in his official capacity as director while rendering a service and two, in return for such service rendered or to be rendered, receive something of value.
It is manifest to us that the purpose of part B is to prohibit the director from receiving any 'rewards' other than his salary, as set by law and paid by the state, for fulfilling the duties of his office or, to state it another way, to prohibit the director from receiving compensation in the nature of a bribe for rendering any service in his capacity as Director of Insurance.
Part A, on the other hand, is broader in scope than part B. By providing that the director shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any insurer, agency or insurance transaction, the legislature appears to have intended to prohibit the director from placing himself in any position whereby he would have a possible conflict of interests. Thus, part A deals with prohibited 'interests' and that such is a different matter than the prohibited 'rewards' under part B admits of no argument; especially since we have previously held that a conflict of interest is not precluded because of a lack of evil motive or personal gain, State ex rel. Smith v. Bohannan, 101 Ariz. 520, 421 P.2d 877, and whereas a 'reward' does of necessity result in a personal gain in some manner or another.
Hence, the only issue before this Court is whether part A of § 20--149 forbids the Director of Insurance from obtaining a loan from an insurance company engaged in the insurance business in Arizona and regulated by the Director of Insurance.
In construing a statute, it is the primary duty of the Court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
...construing a statute, we must ascertain the legislature's true intent at the time it enacted the statute. Bushnell v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 309, 311, 428 P.2d 987, 989 (1967). That intent is determined by looking at the language of the statute. If that language is plain and unambiguous,......
-
Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 54586
...of a statute indicates that it should apply to all cases not specifically excepted.' See also Bushnell v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 102 Ariz. 309, 311, 428 P.2d 987, 989 (1967); Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 57 Cal.Rptr. 7, 10 (Cal.App.1967). This is nothi......
-
State v. Stone
...In construing statutes, the overriding consideration always is the determination of the true legislative intent. Bushnell v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 309, 428 P.2d 987 (1967). An important consideration in construing a statute is that the court give some meaning to all of the language used......
-
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Rick, s. 1
...duty of the court to attempt to ascertain the true intent of the legislature at the time it enacted the statute. Bushnell v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 309, 428 P.2d 987 (1967). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occa......