Bussell v. Dannenberg Co.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1925
• Docket Number: 16570.
• Citation: 132 S.E. 230,34 Ga.App. 792
• Parties: BUSSELL v. DANNENBERG CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

132 S.E. 230

34 Ga.App. 792

BUSSELL v. DANNENBERG CO. et al.

No. 16570.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

November 17, 1925

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1926.

Syllabus by the Court.

An allegation that a certain person is the general manager of a corporation, when unqualified by anything else appearing amounts to an allegation that such person is the alter ego of the company in the management of its corporate affairs.

A complaint for damages against a corporation for an assault and battery upon the plaintiff by the company's general manager showing that the assault and battery was unlawful and that it occurred in the defendant's office and place of business while the plaintiff was lawfully there as an invitee for the purpose of transacting, with such general manager, business which appertained to his agency and while he was actually engaged in the transaction of such business sets forth a cause of action against the company.

There is no presumption that an employer and an employee are operating under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, where it does not appear that the employer regularly had in service as many as 10 employees in the same business within this state.

Error from Superior Court, Bibb County; Malcolm D. Jones, Judge.

Suit by C. V. Bussell against the Dannenberg Company and another. To review order sustaining demurrer of the named defendant, plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

L. D. Moore, of Macon, for plaintiff in error.

Jones, Park & Johnston, of Macon, for defendants in error.

BELL J.

Under the allegations of the petition the plaintiff's injuries were not occasioned by the act of a fellow servant. It is alleged that Collins was the defendant's general manager and there is nothing to indicate that he did not have the general authority which would ordinarily be implied from such title. As was said by the Supreme Court in Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Pullman Co., 122 Ga. 700 (7), 50 S.E. 1008.

"The terms 'general manager' are words of large meaning. In and of themselves they imply duties and responsibilities which would devolve upon a person having the management and control of the corporate affairs. By giving such a title to this officer the corporation holds him out to the world as its managing agent, its alter ego, as the person having general and supreme authority as the immediate representative of the directors in the conduct of the corporate affairs and in its dealings with the public."

The defendant, by its general manager, invited the plaintiff to its office and place of business and the plaintiff was thus entitled to the protection due to an invitee. Civil Code 1910, § 4420. The defendant's duty of providing such protection was, under the facts alleged, to be discharged through its general manager, Collins, who, instead of complying with such duty, violated it. The assault and battery occurred in the defendant's office and place of business while the plaintiff was lawfully there for the purpose of transacting with its general manager business which appertained to the latter's agency and while the latter was actually engaged in the transaction of such business. As in Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Arrant, 17 Ga.App. 489 (2), 87 S.E. 714, "the difficulty which led to the assault and battery arose out of and in connection with the business of the company which the agent had authority to transact," and if it was not justifiable the defendant company, as well as the actual assailant, would be liable for the wrong so inflicted. In Mason v. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co., 135 Ga. 741(4), 70 S.E. 225, 33 L.R.A. (N. S.) 280, which was an action for damages against a railroad company for an assault and battery committed by its conductor upon a passenger, the Supreme Court said:

"At the outset it is well to remember that, in dealing with the general question of whether a master is liable for a willful tort of his servant, the doctrine of respondeat superior furnishes the basis for decision, if there are no statutory provisions on the

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