Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

Decision Date06 June 2016
Docket NumberEP–15–CV–311–PRM
Parties Gloria BUSTILLOS, Plaintiff, v. EL PASO COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, University Medical Center, Frank Mendez, Lynette Telles, Dr. Daniel Solomin, Dr. Michael Parsa, Dr. Jorge Aguila, Dr. Shaked Laks, Medical Student Raizada, and Four Unknown Federal AgentS, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

Ruben Perez Hernandez, Law Office of Ruben P. Hernandez, Hadley A. Huchton, Walter L. Boyaki, Boyaki Law Firm, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.

John L. Ross, Chantel Loren Lee, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, LLP, Jason T. Weber, Gruber Elrod Johansen Hail Shank, Dallas, TX, Richard Andrew Bonner, Kemp Smith LLP, Javier Saenz, Manuel Romero, El Paso, TX, Eric A. Hudson, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PROTECTION

PHILLIP R. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On this day, the Court considered the following:

Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Dr. Shaked Laks's "Amended Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 37), filed on February 9, 2016;
° Plaintiff Gloria Bustillos's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Dr. Shaked Laks' [sic] Amended Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 50), filed on February 22, 2016;
Defendant Dr. Michael Parsa's "Amended Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 38), filed on February 9, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Dr. Michael Parsa's Amended Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 49), filed on February 22, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendant Dr. Michael Parsa's Amended Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 91), filed on April 19, 2016;• Defendant Dr. Daniel Solomin's "Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 76), filed on March 17, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Dr. Daniel Solomin's Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 90), filed on April 19, 2016;
Defendant Dr. Jorge Aguila's "Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 77), filed on March 17, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Dr. Jorge Aguila's Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 92), filed on April 19, 2016;
Defendants Solomin, Parsa, Aguila, and Laks's "Joint Reply in Support of Motions to Dismiss [ECF No. 37, 38, 76, & 77]" (ECF No. 101), filed on April 29, 2016 (alterations in original);
Defendant Frank Mendez's "Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement" (ECF No. 81), filed on March 21, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Frank Mendez' [sic] Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement" (ECF No. 96), filed on April 19, 2016;
Defendant Lynette Telles's "Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement" (ECF No. 82), filed on March 21, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response in Opposition to Defendant Lynette Telles' [sic] Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement" (ECF No. 95), filed on April 19, 2016;
Defendants Mendez and Telles's "Reply ... to Plaintiff's Responses (Docket Nos. 95 and 96) to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 81 and 82)" (ECF No. 98), filed on April 26, 2016;

Motions for Protective Order

Defendant Laks's "Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 42), filed on February 10, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant Laks' [sic] Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 52), filed on February 22, 2016;
Defendant Parsa's "Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 43), filed on February 10, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant Parsa's Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 51), filed on February 22, 2016;
Defendant Solomin's "Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 79), filed on March 17, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant Solomin's Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 93), filed on April 19, 2016;
Defendant Aguila's "Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 80), filed on March 17, 2016;
° Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant Aguila's Opposed Motion for Protection" (ECF No. 94), filed on April 19, 2016;

in the above-captioned cause. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant all the outstanding motions to dismiss and deny as moot the motions for protection.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of an inspection at the United States–Mexico border. On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff was crossing from Mexico into the United States at the Paso del Norte International Bridge in El Paso, Texas. Pl's First Am. Compl. for Violations of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [sic], Punitive Damages, Att'y Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [sic], and Bivens Claims 2, Feb. 8, 2016, ECF No. 36 [hereinafter "Complaint"].

Plaintiff alleges that four U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement agents ("Federal Agents") inspected Plaintiff because they suspected that she was smuggling drugs. Id. Failing to discover drugs, the Federal Agents handcuffed and transported Plaintiff to the Defendant Hospital.1 Id. Once there, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hospital and former defendant Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso ("Former Defendant Texas Tech") and their agents performed x-ray, pelvic, and rectal examinations. Id. After concluding that Plaintiff was not carrying drugs, "Plaintiff was returned to the bridge and released." Id.

In late September 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action in Texas state court. See id. A month later, Defendant Hospital removed the instant action to federal court. Notice of Removal, Oct. 23, 2015, ECF No. 1.2

Plaintiff's lawsuit asserts (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and (2) intentional tort claims.3 Specifically, Plaintiff makes the following factual allegations against each Defendant:

Defendant Parsa ("Dr. Parsa")
° Ordered a series of x-ray examinations of Plaintiff, Compl. 8;
° Conducted a pelvic examination of Plaintiff, id.;
° Subjugated Plaintiff to a rectal examination, id. at 16;
Defendant Solomin ("Dr. Solomin")
° Ordered a series of x-ray examinations of Plaintiff, id. at 8;
° Conducted a pelvic examination of Plaintiff, id.;
° Performed a rectal examination of Plaintiff, id.;
Defendants Aguila ("Dr. Aguila"), Mendez ("Nurse Mendez"), and Telles ("Nurse Telles")
° Subjugated Plaintiff to an x-ray examination, id. at 16;
° Subjugated Plaintiff to a pelvic examination, id. ; and
° Subjugated Plaintiff to a rectal examination, id.4

Drs. Laks, Parsa, Solomin, Aguila—doctors for Former Defendant Texas Tech—and Nurses Mendez, and Telles—nurses for Defendant Hospital—now bring their own respective motions to dismiss invoking qualified immunity and asserting that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Notably, Drs. Laks, Parsa, Solomin, and Aguila contend that they "reli[ed] upon [Federal] [A]gents seeking [Drs. Laks, Parsa, Solomin, and Aguila's] assistance and [were] under no obligation to inquire into the sufficiency of [the Federal Agents'] suspicion or probable cause before participating in an X–ray request or pelvic examination." See Def. Dr. Shaked Laks' [sic] Am. Mot. to Dismiss 13; Def. Dr. Michael Parsa's Am. Mot. to Dismiss 12; Def. Dr. Daniel Solomin's Mot. to Dismiss 12; Def.

Dr. Jorge Aguila's Mot. to Dismiss 12. Similarly, Nurse Mendez argues that he was "entitled to rely upon the [Federal Agents] and physician's determination that the requested procedures were authorized and lawful." See Def. Frank Mendez's Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement 11. Likewise, Nurse Telles contends that she "rel[ied] upon [Federal Agents] and physicians seeking his [sic] assistance [and] was under no obligation to inquire into the sufficiency of the [Federal Agents'] reasonable suspicion." Def. Lynette Telles' [sic] Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Davila v. United States , 713 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, Cuvillier v. Taylor , 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ) (internal quotation marks omitted), it must state "more than labels and conclusions": "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s] devoid of ‘further factual enhancement." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Thus, at this stage, the Court must determine whether the well-pleaded facts in Plaintiff's Complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are sufficient to "move [her] claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ " Leal v. McHugh , 731 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

B. Section 1983

To establish a prima facie case under § 1983 for the deprivation of civil rights a Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by an individual acting under the color of state law. Doe v. Rains Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist ., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995). Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights created under federal law. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).

Plaintiff's lawsuit asserts...

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