Busto v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 18 November 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 1,1 |
Citation | 556 P.2d 96,276 Or. 707 |
Parties | Jose BUSTO, Individually and as personal representative of Jose Maria Busto, also known as Jose Maria Busto Lema, and as personal representative of Carolina Busto, Appellant, v. The MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Canadian Corporation, Respondent. Department |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Howard R. Lonergan, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Vawter Parker, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James C. Dezendorf, James H. Clarke, and Dezendorf, Spears, Lubersky & Campbell, Portland.
Before DENECKE, C.J., and McALLISTER, HOLMAN and HOWELL, JJ.
This is a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the respective rights of the parties under an endowment insurance contract. Plaintiff maintained this action both individually and as the personal representative of his parents' estates. Plaintiff's father, the insured and a Cuban refugee, died in 1967, and plaintiff's mother died in 1974. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant insurance company, a Canadian corporation, owed $2,000, plus interest, under the terms of the policy, but had offered to pay only $699.05. Defendant's answer alleged that the contract had been amended by a supplemental agreement between the parties and that, pursuant to this agreement, it owed plaintiff only 2,000 Cuban pesos, plus interest.
Plaintiff requested a jury trial, contending that the supplemental agreement was ambiguous, that he was therefore entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence relating to the parties' probable intent, and that he was entitled to have the jury decide whether defendant was obligated to pay $2,000 worth of Cuban pesos, or 2,000 Cuban pesos. The court held that the evidence did not create a question of fact and that the interpretation of the supplemental agreement was a question of law to be resolved by the court alone. 1 Thereafter, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for defendant. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to grant him a jury trial on the issue of the proper interpretation of the supplemental agreement.
The record discloses that in 1945 plaintiff's father, while living in Cuba, purchased a 20-year endowment life insurance policy from the defendant insurance company with a face value of $2,000 and at an annual premium of $112. The policy also contained the following provision:
At the time of the agreement, both U.S. dollars and Cuban pesos were legal tender in Cuba and had an equivalent value both in Cuba and elsewhere.
In 1952 both the insured and the defendant entered into a supplemental agreement which amended the policy and provided that:
'It is understood and agreed between the parties to the insurance contract referred to above that all payments to be made by virtue of this contract either to or by the Company are to be made in Pesos, legal currency of the Republic of Cuba.'
Apparently, this was in response to a Cuban law which had become effective one year earlier and which required that thereafter all debts payable to or by Cuban nationals which were previously stated in dollars were to be discharged in Cuba in pesos. At this time, pesos and dollars still had an equivalent monetary value. However, after Castro gained control of Cuba, the value of the peso declined sharply against the dollar in world markets, although the official exchange rate in Cuba has apparently remained one for one.
In 1963, the insured and his family fled Cuba and came to the United States. The insurance policy had been paid up before they left Cuba, and, prior to its maturity date of May 4, 1965, the insured, plaintiff's father, wrote to the defendant to notify it of his election to leave the proceeds on deposit with defendant at 3 per cent interest in accordance with one of the policy's settlement options. Defendant then wrote to the insured and acknowledged his request, but stated that the policy would mature
* * *'
Plaintiff's father apparently never responded to these statements. However, on May 12, 1965, the following endorsement was unilaterally placed on the policy by the defendant:
The insured died in 1967. In 1968, plaintiff's mother, the widow of the insured, wrote to defendant as follows:
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