Banister Continental Corp. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.
Decision Date | 10 January 1986 |
Parties | BANISTER CONTINENTAL CORPORATION, Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 81-6-745; CA A28212. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Elizabeth T. Dunning, Salt Lake City, Utah, and James H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for appellant--cross-respondent. With them on the briefs were Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Corey, Byler & Rew, Pendleton, and Spears, Lubersky, Campbell, Bledsoe, Anderson & Young, Portland.
Arden E. Shenker, Portland, and Robert T. Mautz, Pendleton, argued the cause for respondent--cross-appellant. With them on the briefs were Lamar Tooze, Elizabeth A. Trainor and Tooze Kerr Marshall & Shenker, Portland, and Mautz, Hallman & Teicher, Pendleton.
This is an action for damages for breach of two construction contracts. Defendant appeals from a judgment entered after a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor; plaintiff cross-appeals, seeking additional prejudgment interest. We affirm.
A detailed discussion of the facts is not required. In 1980, plaintiff and defendant entered into two contracts under which plaintiff would build 112 miles of natural gas pipeline for defendant in eastern Oregon. Work began in September 1980, and was completed in October 1981. Virtually every fact concerning that period is in dispute. It is sufficient to say that the parties had a falling out, resulting in this lawsuit.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged 25 contract breaches, which defendant denied; defendant also offered several affirmative defenses. The trial lasted three months. The jury returned a verdict, including special written findings of fact, finding for plaintiff on 19 allegations of contract breach; defendant's affirmative defenses were rejected. The jury also awarded plaintiff over $11,000,000 in damages and over $4,000,000 in prejudgment interest. After being instructed to recalculate the prejudgment interest, the jury reduced that award to approximately $800,000. The trial court then accepted the verdict and entered judgment. This appeal followed.
Although defendant raises 54 assignments of error, only a few require discussion. The parties disputed the meaning of several portions of the two contracts. Defendant's first assignment is that the trial court should have interpreted the two contracts in issue as a matter of law and should have decided which, if any, of the contract provisions were ambiguous; the second assignment is that the trial court should not have instructed the jury to construe any ambiguities in the contracts against defendant. We disagree.
The trial court instructed the jury:
The respective functions of the court and jury regarding the construction of contracts are clear. As a general rule, the construction of a contract is a question of law to be decided by the court. If the contract provisions are unambiguous, it is the court's duty to construe the contract and declare its legal effect to the jury. Timberline Equip. v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or. 639, 643, 576 P.2d 1244 (1978); Sunset Coatings Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Trans., 62 Or.App. 53, 56, 660 P.2d 164, rev. den. 294 Or. 792, 662 P.2d 728 (1983). Only if provisions of a contract are ambiguous does its meaning become a question of fact for the jury to decide. Meskimen v. Larry Angell Salvage Co., 286 Or. 87, 92-93, 592 P.2d 1014 (1979); Bartlam v. Tikka, 50 Or.App. 217, 220, 622 P.2d 1133, rev. den. 290 Or. 853, 642 P.2d 307 (1981). However, before submitting the question to the jury, the court must first determine, as a matter of law, that a contract provision is ambiguous. Evenson Masonry, Inc. v. Eldred, 273 Or. 770, 772, 543 P.2d 663 (1975); Sunset Coatings Co., Inv. v. Dept. of Trans., supra, 62 Or.App. at 56, 660 P.2d 164.
Here, about the only thing the parties seemed to agree on was that the contract was ambiguous. The record in this three month trial is replete with efforts by both sides to establish that their version of the meaning of the parties' agreement was the correct one. Counsels' closing arguments reflect the same thing. Under these circumstances, and although the better course might still have been to sort laboriously through the extensive contract documents and separate for the jury's consideration the clear from the ambiguous, we cannot say that the course followed was wrong. The very size of the task defendant claims the trial court should have undertaken would, in all likelihood, have led to instructions so long, meticulous and exhausting in detail that no jury could have emerged from them clear-headed. There was no error.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that any ambiguous contract provisions must be construed against it, because it drafted the contracts. Defendant relies on Weber v. Kamyr, Inc., 269 Or. 617, 525 P.2d 1307 (1974). In Weber, the plaintiff assigned as error the failure of the trial court to give a jury instruction that required the jury " 'to construe the contract most strongly against the party who prepared the documents.' " 269 Or. at 631, 525 P.2d 1307. In affirming the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction, the court held:
"The requested instruction is one which courts use in the interpretation of contracts and one which courts take into consideration when instructing the jury as to what results to reach depending on how the jury decides the facts; however, the rule is not a proper subject of an instruction to a jury." 269 Or. at 631, 525 P.2d 1307. (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff, for its part, relies on a number of cases, decided after Weber, which hold that ambiguous contracts are to be construed against the drafter. See, e.g., Meskimen v. Larry Angell Salvage Company, supra, 286 Or. at 93, 592 P.2d 1014; Russell v. Sealed Power Corp., 278 Or. 243, 247, 563 P.2d 712 (1977); Busto v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 276 Or....
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