Butcher v. Ramsey Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 42942,42942 |
| Citation | 628 S.W.2d 912 |
| Parties | Beverly BUTCHER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RAMSEY CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Mark R. Bahn, Martin, Bahn & Cervantes, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ralph C. Kleinschmidt and Gerre S. Langton, Evans & Dixon, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.
An employee, Beverly Butcher, and her husband appeal from a summary judgment in favor of her employer who was sued by appellants for personal injuries and loss of consortium. The trial court held that appellants' common law action was barred by an earlier adverse decision in a workmen's compensation proceeding arising out of the same set of facts. Appellants contend the trial court's determination was erroneous and that res judicata or collateral estoppel would not preclude appellants' common law action. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
The action which resulted in this appeal was initiated by appellants' two-count petition. The first count alleged that respondent was negligent in maintaining the floor at appellant-employee's place of work by permitting metal piston ring chips to remain on the floor; that appellant-employee was injured when the loaded dolly she was pushing as a part of the duties of her employment stopped suddenly on the metal chips, causing appellant-employee to fall against her dolly; and that appellant-employee suffered certain injuries as a proximate result of respondent's negligence. The second count of appellants' petition alleged a claim by appellant-employee's husband for loss of consortium.
The pleadings, deposition, and admissions on file in appellants' common law action established that appellant-employee had pursued an earlier workmen's compensation claim based upon the same injuries alleged in the common law suit. The workmen's compensation referee denied appellant-employee's claim for benefits. The referee concluded that appellant-employee's claim, if credible, would have supported the finding of an accident entitling her to benefits, but that appellant-employee's evidence was contradicted and not credible and, therefore, appellant-employee had not proved she was injured as a result of an accident so as to be entitled to benefits. The referee's ruling was affirmed upon appeal to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, and appellant-employee did not seek judicial review.
Appellant-employee admitted the evidence she intended to introduce at trial of her common law action would be substantially the same as her testimony at her workmen's compensation hearing. In the workmen's compensation proceedings, appellant-employee testified that she was injured when she was pushing her dolly at work, hit something which she believed was metal chips on the floor, stopped suddenly, and was thrown against the dolly hitting her left shoulder. She felt pain in her left leg. She then tried to dislodge her dolly. She pushed hard with her shoulders and everything, and finally managed to push, pull and straighten the dolly in her work area. Appellant felt another pain as she stepped onto her work platform and decided to see the nurse.
The court agreed with respondent that the factual issues presented by appellants' petition and respondent's answer had been litigated previously before the Division of Workmen's Compensation in a proceeding which resulted in a final determination in favor of respondent, and that the administrative determination constituted a bar in the nature of res judicata or collateral estoppel to appellants' litigation.
The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Appellants contend the trial court's summary judgment is erroneous because the workmen's compensation determination that appellant-employee did not suffer an accident does not bar appellant's common law suit. Appellants' contention is incorrect.
A summary judgment for a defendant is an extreme remedy because it denies a plaintiff his day in court and, hence, is proper only if the court determines from the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file that there are no material issues of fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Gunning v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 598 S.W.2d 479, 481(1) (Mo.App.1980). Thus, appellate review considers, first, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial and, second, whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kaufman v. Bormaster, 599 S.W.2d 35, 37(4) (Mo.App.1980).
A genuine issue of fact exists for the purposes of a summary judgment if there is the slightest doubt as to a material fact, and a material fact is one which has legal probative force relevant to the controlling...
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