Butler v. Chambers

• Decision Date: 11 November 1886
• Citation: 36 Minn. 69,30 N.W. 308
• Parties: BUTLER v CHAMBERS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

36 Minn. 69

30 N.W. 308

BUTLERvCHAMBERS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 11, 1886.

Suit was brought by the plaintiff in the district court of Ramsey county, for the purchase price of certain merchandise. Defendant in his answer alleged that said merchandise was a substance manufactured and designed to take the place of butter; that the same was made from other than unadulterated cream, etc.; that said merchandise was offered for sale, sold, and delivered in violation of and contrary to the provisions of the act of March 5, 1885, relating to the sale and manufacture of unhealthy and adulterated dairy products; and that, by reason thereof, said sale was illegal and void, and defendant never became obliged to pay for said merchandise any sum or amount. Plaintiff demurred to this complaint on the ground that a counter-claim or defense was not established by it. This demurrer was sustained in the district court on the ground that the statute referred to in the answer was unconstitutional. From this decision defendant appeals. Warner, Stevens & Lawrence, for respondent, Butler.

Rogers & Hadley, for appellant, Chambers.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The demurrer to the answers brings up the constitutional validity of section 4, c. 149, Laws 1885. The act is entitled “An act to prohibit and prevent the sale or manufacture of unhealthy or adulterated dairy products.” Section 1 provides a penalty for selling, or exposing for sale, “unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated, or unwholesome milk,” or the product thereof. Section 2 provides that “no person shall keep cows for the production of milk for market, or for sale or exchange, or for manufacturing the same into articles of food, in a crowded or unhealthy condition, or feed cows on food that is unhealthy, or that produces impure, unhealthy, diseased, or unwholesome milk;” and also prohibits the manufacture or sale of the products of such milk. Section 3 prohibits the sale or delivery to any butter or cheese manufactory of “any milk diluted with water, or unclean, impure, or adulterated milk.” Section 5 provides a penalty for exposing for sale butter or cheese branded or labeled with a false brand. Section 6 regulates the sale of condensed milk, and other provisions relate to the appointment and duties of the dairy commissioner.

These provisions of the statute are all unquestionably within the legislative authority; but it is contended that section 4 is unconstitutional especially on the ground that it is an infringement upon the rights, privileges, and liberty of the citizens, without due process of law. The section in question reads as follows: “No person shall manufacture, out of any oleaginous substance or substances, or any compound of the same, or any compound other than that produced from unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese, produced from pure, unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, or shall sell, or offer for sale, the same as an article of food. This shall not apply to pure skim-milk cheese, made from pure skim-milk.”

The defendant contends that these provisions fall within the general police powers of the state, and are therefore valid.

In 1881 the legislature passed an act entitled “An act to regulate the traffic in oleomargarine.” Laws 1881, c. 133. This act provides that any person who shall knowingly sell, or offer for sale, any article or substance in semblance of butter, not the legitimate product of the dairy, made exclusively of milk and cream, but into the composition of which the oil or fat of animals, or melted butter, or any oil thereof, enters as a substitute for cream, in tubs, firkins, or other original packages, not distinctly, legibly, and durably branded, *** shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc. It cannot be doubted that the act of 1881 was a legitimate exercise of police power. The public may be protected by appropriate legislation against imposition in the purchase of articles for consumption; and if, as we may assume, the prevalent compounds resembling butter in appearance and flavor, and put on the market as a substitute for it, and generally known as “oleomargarine,” “butterine,” etc., are liable to deceive and mislead purchasers and consumers as to the real nature of the product, and especially if such preparations are made of unwholesome ingredients, then we think there may be sufficient reasons why the legislature may, in its discretion, meet the evil sought to be remedied by provisions for the suppression of the manufacture and sale of such artificial compounds altogether. State v. Addington, 12 Mo. App. 217;S. C. 77 Mo. 110; People v. McGann, 34 Hun, 361.

It cannot be necessary, at this day, in view of the numerous decisions of the state and federal courts, to enter into any elaborate discussion to show that the legislature may exercise such powers in behalf of the state. As respects the right or liberty of the citizen to engage in business, and conduct industrial pursuits, these privileges are to be enjoyed in subordination to the general public welfare, and all reasonable regulations for the preservation and promotion thereof. “All property,” says the court in Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85, “is held subject to the general regulations which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.” Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 149.

The reasonable limits of the exercise of such power it is not easy to define. It is not a matter of caprice or unlimited discretion on the part of the legislature; but these questions can usually be best determined as cases arise, and, within proper limits, it is for the legislature to judge as to the extent and character of restrictive measures which may be found necessary in any particular class of cases.

In Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 666, the court say: “A state is not sovereign, without the power to regulate all its internal commerce as well as police. It is a bold assertion at this day that there is anything in the state or United States constitutions conflicting with, or setting bounds...