Butler v. Cotton

Decision Date16 November 1943
Docket Number46347.
PartiesBUTLER v. COTTON et al., Board of Polk County Sup'rs.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Parrish Guthrie, Colflesh & O'Brien, Sam Abramson, and Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, all of Des Moines for appellant.

Bruce J. Flick, Francis J. Kuble, and James P. Irish, all of Des Moines, for appellees.

GARFIELD, Justice.

Plaintiff's three parcels of realty, which we will call tracts 1, 2 and 3, in the City of Des Moines, Polk County, were assessed for taxation for 1937. Plaintiff did not protest to the local Board of Review from the assessment on tract 1 but paid the 1937 taxes on the original valuation in two installments, in April and October, 1938. Plaintiff did protest his assessment on tracts 2 and 3 to the local Board of Review and appealed from its adverse decision to the district court. On July 8 and September 29, 1938, consent decrees were entered in the district court in the tax appeals reducing the assessments on tracts 2 and 3. The valuation of tract 2 was reduced from $20,455 to $19,000, and on tract 3 from $76,771 to $74,742.

In the meantime, on April 22, 1938, plaintiff had paid the first half of the taxes against tracts 2 and 3 on the original valuations. On October 15, 1938, plaintiff paid the second half of the taxes on the valuations as reduced in the tax appeal cases and was given credit for the overpayment by him on the first half. In other words, the total taxes for 1937 paid on tracts 2 and 3 were on the valuations as reduced upon appeal.

In September 1937, the State Board of Assessment and Review, now the State Tax Commission, ordered the local Board of Review of Des Moines to make certain blanket or percentage changes in the 1937 assessments in various zones or taxing districts in the city, including the districts in which plaintiff's tracts were located. In other words, the local board was ordered to modify the assessed valuation of property in a district or subdistrict by a designated percentage, to be applied throughout such area. The local board refused to comply with the order of the state board until after a decree of mandamus was entered on July 6, 1939, pursuant to our opinion in State v. Local Board, 225 Iowa 855, 283 N.W. 87. On August 1, 1939, the local board finally approved these blanket changes in the various districts in conformity with the order of the state board.

These blanket changes, when applied to the valuations on plaintiff's tracts, lowered the valuation on tract 1 from $345,070 to $327,260, a reduction of $17,810; on tract 2 from $19,000 to $17,836, a difference of $1,164; and on tract 3 from $74,742 to $66,939, a reduction of $7,803. The higher of the two figures given for tracts 2 and 3 is the valuation on that tract as fixed by the district court in the tax appeals.

If plaintiff's taxes had been computed on valuations as finally corrected in 1939, they would have been reduced $978.55 on tract 1, $63.95 on tract 2, and $428.73 on tract 3. To this extent plaintiff claims the 1937 taxes paid by him were "erroneously or illegally exacted or paid" and should be refunded him. Plaintiff filed petitions with defendant board of supervisors asking for such refunds which were "disallowed" on March 11, 1941.

It will be noticed that plaintiff paid his 1937 taxes during the pendency of the case of State v. Local Board, supra. All of plaintiff's tax receipts, at plaintiff's request were stamped by a deputy county treasurer "Paid under protest."

I. Plaintiff's case is bottomed on section 7235, Codes 1935 and 1939: "The board of supervisors shall direct the treasurer to refund to the taxpayer any tax or portion thereof found to have been erroneously or illegally exacted or paid, ***."

In Insurance Exchange Bldg. v. Board, 231 Iowa 133, 300 N.W. 717, and Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Polk County, 231 Iowa 661, 1 N.W.2d 742, we decided the identical question involved here. We there held that taxes paid on the original 1937 assessments in Des Moines before they were amended pursuant to our decision in State v. Local Board, supra, were not erroneously or illegally exacted or paid, and that a taxpayer is not entitled to a refund because of the reduction in valuation in 1939 pursuant to the order of the state board; that the original valuations and taxes computed thereon were merely excessive for which the taxpayer's exclusive remedy, according to numerous of our decisions, was by protest to the local board of review and appeal to the district court.

The...

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