Butler v. Cranor, 31712
| Decision Date | 19 April 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31712,31712 |
| Citation | 38 Wn.2d 471,230 P.2d 306 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | BUTLER, v. CRANOR. |
Harvey Butler, per se.
Smith Troy, Jennings P. Felix, Olympia, for respondent.
Petitioner, Harvey Butler, has made application to this court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release from imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
Petitioner was sentenced November 30, 1937, upon his plea of guilty in the superior court for Yakima county, to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than fifteen years on each of two counts charging him with the crime of burglary in the second degree. These sentences were to run concurrently. Shortly thereafter, the board of prison terms and paroles (herein called the Board) fixed petitioner's minimum sentence at seven and one-half years. Petitioner in his affidavit says that he was awarded 'good time' credit of two and one-half years on November 29, 1942. He makes no reference to the various proceedings had before the Board as stated by the attorney general and described in the next succeeding paragraph.
The memorandum submitted by the attorney general on behalf of respondent shows that petitioner was paroled on the last mentioned date, but that this parole was revoked two months later. In July, 1943, the Board, after granting petitioner a hearing, increased his minimum sentence fifteen months. Petitioner escaped from the penitentiary in December, 1943, and was at large for more than two months before he was apprehended. The Board, after again hearing petitioner, in March, 1944, increased his minimum sentence three years and one month. Petitioner was again paroled in November, 1949, and this second parol was revoked in March, 1950. After according petitioner a hearing in July, 1950, the Board increased his minimum sentence to coincide with the maximum sentence of fifteen years fixed by the court in 1937. Thereafter, petitioner again escaped from the penitentiary but was apprehended on the same day. He has been confined continually since his apprehension.
Petitioner does not question the validity of the judgment and sentence imposed in 1937, but contends that his time credits were not revoked until after, by the theory he urges upon us, his entire sentence was served. His complaint is stated in the concluding paragraph of his brief as follows: 'Petitioner respectfully submits that on the basis of the above authorities, he is entitled to discharge from imprisonment as a matter of legal right since he has served the maximum sentence, less good-time, five (5) years of which had been allowed, but due to the fact that the Parole Board raised the petitioner's minimum sentence, petitioner has served the two (2) years loss of good-time and was paroled on December 12, 1949, with no loss of good-time on or beyond that date.'
The theory upon which petitioner claims that he is unlawfully detained is that he was entitled to release as a matter of right at the expiration of his maximum sentence less time credits. To put it in another way, petitioner claims that when he was paroled on December 12, 1949, he had served more than twelve years out of his maximum term of fifteen years and that his time credits must, as a matter of law, be deducted from the maximum sentence. On this basis petitioner states that he has served his sentence (fifteen years less five years of time credits) and is now being illegally detained in the penitentiary.
The only case cited by petitioner,...
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January v. Porter
...v. Smith, 31 Wash.2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948), certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 834, 69 S.Ct. 24, 93 L.Ed. 387 (1948); In re Butler v. Cranor, 38 Wash.2d 471, 230 P.2d 306 (1951); State v. Farmer, 39 Wash.2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951); State ex rel. Alldis v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 56 W......
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Mason v. Cranor
...and case cited. The 1939 amendment did not enlarge the power of the board. It has the same power under that act. Butler v. Cranor, 1951, 38 Wash.2d 471, 473, 230 P.2d 306. The board has no power to affect the maximum term of a sentence in any manner. Scott v. Callahan, supra, 39 Wash.2d at ......
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LaLande, Matter of, 2846-III
...release, or else until his maximum term has expired. Accord, January v. Porter, 75 Wash.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 (1969); Butler v. Cranor, 38 Wash.2d 471, 230 P.2d 306 (1951); Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash.2d 52, 195 P.2d 112 (1948); State ex rel. Linden v. Bunge, 192 Wash. 245, 73 P.2d 516 (1937). ......
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Scott v. Callahan, 31829
...A prisoner in the penitentiary is not entitled to release as a matter of right until he has completed his maximum sentence. Butler v. Cranor, Wash., 230 P.2d 306. The statute authorizes the Board to grant parole in its discretion under such rules, regulations and conditions as it may determ......