Butler v. Elwyn Institute

• Decision Date: 29 May 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-1335.
• Citation: 765 F. Supp. 243
• Parties: Daphne BUTLER v. ELWYN INSTITUTE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

765 F. Supp. 243

Daphne BUTLER v. ELWYN INSTITUTE.

Civ. A. No. 91-1335.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

May 29, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lanier E. Williams, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Francis A. Scanlan, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VANARTSDALEN, Senior District Judge.

Defendant, Elwyn Institute (Elwyn) has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, I will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

According to the complaint, plaintiff, Daphne Butler, commenced employment with Elwyn on July 27, 1988. Complaint at ¶ 8. Sometime in December of 1989, Elwyn terminated her employment. It is the circumstances of that termination that are the subject of this lawsuit. On or about November 16, 1989, Butler requested a thirty day leave of absence for personal reasons. Elwyn denied her request. Id. at 13. Butler alleges that "due to reasons beyond her control" she was absent from work during the period of time for which she had requested leave. Id. at ¶ 14. As a result, Elwyn terminated her employment. Id. at ¶ 15. Butler contends that Elwyn denied her request for a leave of absence because of her race (black). Elwyn responds that it denied her request because the reason for her absence was in order to serve a period of incarceration, a reason for which it does not grant leaves of absence.

On March 1, 1991, Butler filed her complaint, purporting to set forth causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat.Ann. § 951 et seq. Elwyn has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative for summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Governing Standards

A case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is clear as a matter of law "that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "must take all the well pleaded allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir.1985) (quoting Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 565 (3d Cir.1977)).

Entry of summary judgment is required where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The threshold inquiry is whether there is the need for a trial — whether in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1313, 113 L.Ed.2d 246 (1991).

B. Title VII Claim

Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any individual with respect to hiring or the terms or conditions of employment "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2118, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989). A claim of employment discrimination under Title VII may be pursued through either a disparate treatment theory, or a disparate impact theory. E.E.O.C. v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341, 346 (3d Cir.1990).

A plaintiff pursuing a disparate treatment claim "must demonstrate purposeful discrimination." Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir.1990). Such intent may be shown either through direct evidence or through the framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has summarized this approach as follows:

Under this framework the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, which if successful raises the inference of unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 250-52 101 S.Ct. at 1092-93. This burden is not onerous. The plaintiff must show that he is a member of a racial minority, qualified for the job from which he was discharged, and that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably.

Weldon at 797. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Weldon, 896 F.2d at 797. If the defendant does so, the inference of discrimination is "dispelled" and the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 1094; Weldon, 896 F.2d at 797.

Butler has clearly stated a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. She has alleged the elements of a prima facie disparate treatment claim: 1) she is a member of a protected class — she is a black female citizen of the United States; 2) she was qualified for her job from which she was discharged; and 3) others who were not in the protected class were treated more favorably. She asserts that white employees were granted leaves of absence for personal reasons while she was denied a leave of absence for personal reasons. She has also alleged that she has met the administrative and statutory prerequisites to bringing a Title VII action. Accepting her allegations as true, as I must for purposes of a motion to dismiss, I find that Butler's assertions regarding disparate treatment adequately state a Title VII claim. See Smith v. Private Industry Council, 622 F.Supp. 160, 166 (E.D.Pa.1985).

Entry of summary judgment on Butler's Title VII claim would also be inappropriate at this time. In a discrimination case, the issue is whether sufficient evidence exists "to create a genuine issue as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated." Weldon, 896 F.2d at 797. A plaintiff need not carry her burden of demonstrating that the employers asserted reasons for discharge are a pretext at this stage. Entry of summary judgment is only proper if the defendant can show that "the plaintiff will be unable to introduce either direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate or indirect evidence by showing that the proffered reason is subject to factual dispute." Hankins v. Temple University, 829 F.2d 437, 440-41 (3d Cir.1987).

Elwyn contends that it did not discharge Butler for discriminatory reasons, but rather because she was absent without leave for more than three consecutive days and thus subject to termination under its absentee policy.¹See Exhibit I to defendant's motion (Elwyn's employee handbook). It further contends that Butler's request for a leave of absence was not denied for discriminatory reasons, but rather because she was to be incarcerated and its policy does not allow for leave under such circumstances. Elwyn has submitted the affidavits of its Executive Director and Vice President of Residential Operations in support of its contentions. See Exhibits A and B to defendant's motion. However, Elwyn's submissions do not entitle it to a grant of summary judgment.

Elwyn's employee handbook provides that leaves of absence may be granted for educational purposes and for special circumstances on an individual basis. Employee Handbook at 15. Marian Baldini, Executive Director of Elwyn, avers that she informed Butler that Elwyn does not provide leaves of absence to serve periods of incarceration. Baldini Affidavit at ¶ 8. Edward M. Hartman, Elwyn's Vice President of Residential Operations, has stated by way of affidavit that Elwyn has never granted an employee a leave of absence in order to serve a period of incarceration. Hartman Affidavit at ¶ 8.

Elwyn seems to misapprehend the nature of summary judgment. The explanations it has offered may well be the true reasons for Butler's termination, but they are factual questions subject to dispute. Moreover, Elwyn's submissions do not amount to a showing that Butler will be unable to introduce evidence demonstrating that Elwyn's proffered reasons for denying her request for a leave of absence and her subsequent discharge are pretexts for discrimination. There is nothing in the evidence submitted by Elwyn explaining why a period of incarceration is not a special circumstance within the meaning of its leave of absence policy. Although Elwyn asserts that it has never granted a leave of absence for a period of incarceration, it does not indicate whether any individual, black or otherwise, has ever requested a leave of absence for such purposes. Finally, and most significantly, Butler has not yet had the opportunity to pursue discovery which may enable her to refute Elwyn's assertions. A grant of summary judgment would therefore be inappropriate at this time.²

Butler has also stated...