Butler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1925
• Citation: 147 N.E. 235,240 N.Y. 23
• Parties: BUTLER v. ROBINS DRY DOCK & REPAIR CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

240 N.Y. 23

147 N.E. 235

BUTLER

v.ROBINS DRY DOCK & REPAIR CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 25, 1925.

Action by William Butler, as administrator of Walter Butler, deceased, against the Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (209 App. Div. 882, 205 N. Y. S. 915), unanimously affirming a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff, by permission, appeals.

Reversed, and new trial granted.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

William S. Butler, James A. Gray, and Sylvester Sabbatino, all of Brooklyn, for appellant.

Paul Koch and A. G. Maul, both of New York City, for respondent.

HISCOCK, C. J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the death of his intestate claimed to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The case presents the question whether or not this negligence constituted a maritime tort which was the subject of admiralty jurisdiction and which, therefore, the state could not bring under our Workmen's Compensation Act (Consol. Laws, c. 67) as affording the appropriate and only means of relief. Thus far the courts have held that it was not a maritime tort, and that the sole remedy must be found under the provisions of the aforesaid statute and that this action cannot be maintained. The action was dismissed solely for that reason. We reach the conclusion that the views which have thus far prevailed are erroneous.

The facts which surrounded and constituted the accident and which present the question are as follows:

[1] An ocean-going vessel for the purposes of repair had been floated into and was then resting in what is called a ‘graven dock’ projecting into navigable waters. A ‘graven dock’ is distinguished from a ‘floating dock’ in that the former is permanently attached to and in that manner a part of the land. When such a dock is to be used for purposes of repairs to a ship, gates are opened and the ship floated into the dock. The gates are then closed and the water pumped out and the ship allowed to settle on blocks at the bottom of the dock and thus made available for purposes of repair. The intestate, standing on the bottom of the dock, had been engaged in fastening plates on the outside of the vessel. Having completed the particullar operation in which he had been engaged, he started to go wholly or in part up the side of the dock for the purpose of getting bolts and a drink of water preparatory, it is assumed, to continuing his repair work. While he was still under the bulge of the upper part of the vessel and a few feet from the place where he had been working, a plate from the side of the vessel dropped upon him and caused his death.

[2] In determining whether this accident constituted or was the result of a maritime tort, it becomes our duty simply to interpret with accuracy, if we may, the controlling views which have been expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States and to follow them. We think they lead to the conclusion that this was a maritime tort, and that therefore a state Legislature could not exercise the power of confining relief therefor to the Compensation Act.

[3][4] It is so well settled that we find on this appeal no dispute of the proposition that the question whether a tort is maritime or not is settled by the test of locality. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 S. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208,51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157. Unquestionably a tort occurring upon a vessel floating in navigable waters is maritime in its nature, and it is also practically conceded that by extension of the reasoning applicable to such a situation, an accident occurring upon a vessel resting in a dock floating in navigable waters would be a maritime tort. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479, 43 S. Ct. 418, 67 L. Ed. 756;Danielsen v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 235 N. Y. 439, 139 N. E. 567.

[5] The contention, however, is that a graven dock such as the one involved in this case is part of the land, and that therefore, when a vessel rests in such a dock from which all of the water has been drawn, it is really on land, and that an accident happening to a person then on the vessel and certainly to one standing on the bottom of the dock itself is not a maritime tort. We think the decisions of the Supreme Court hold the other way. We think that for the purposes of disposition of such a question as this, and also somewhat as a matter of policy lest admiralty law otherwise be robbed too much of its jurisdiction, it is settled that a vessel floated into a dock of this kind is still in navigable waters even though the water has been temporarily withdrawn. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 24 S. Ct. 8, 48 L. Ed. 73; The Steamship Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130, 30 S. Ct. 54, 54 L. Ed. 125, 17 Ann. Cas. 907; So. Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S....