Butler v. St. Paul & D. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1894
• Citation: 59 Minn. 135,60 N.W. 1090
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: BUTLER v. ST. PAUL & D. R. CO.

59 Minn. 135

60 N.W. 1090

BUTLER

v.ST. PAUL & D. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 16, 1894.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Except under peculiar or exceptional circumstances, it is negligence for a passenger to attempt to alight from a moving railway train.

2. Held that, under the facts of this case, it was not error to instruct the jury that plaintiff could not recover if the accident occurred while he was in the act of getting off the car while in motion.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Otis, Judge.

Action by Myron J. Butler against the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company for personal injuries caused by defendant's negligence, in which there was a verdict for defendant. From an order granting a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Bunn & Hadley and James D. Armstrong, for appellant.

Bowe & Woodruff, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant's servants in the management of a train upon which plaintiff was a passenger. The plaintiff entered the train at White Bear station, for the purpose of going to Lake Shore, a half mile distant, which was merely a flag or signal station. The plaintiff's testimony tended to prove that he notified the brakeman that he desired to get off at Lake Shore station; that the brakeman gave him to understand that the train would be stopped to let him off; that, as the train approached the station, it began to slow up as if for the purpose of stopping; that thereupon plaintiff went out upon the platform of the car, and stepped down upon the lower step for the purpose of getting off as soon as the train stopped; that, while he stood in this position, the train came almost to a standstill, and then, without stopping, was started ahead again with a violent jerk, which caused plaintiff to lose his balance, and threw him partially down; that he clung to the railing, with one foot on the step, but seeing that the train was increasing its speed, and being unable to regain his footing on the steps, he let go, and dropped himself upon the ground, and sustained the injuries complained of; that the point at which he was thrown down by the jerk was about 50 feet past the depot; that from that point to where he let go was about 100 feet; that “after he struck the ground he must have gone a rod or such a matter, over a cattle guard.” On the other hand, the evidence on part of the defendant tended to prove that plaintiff never notified any of the employés on the train that he wanted to get off at Lake Shore station; that none of them knew that he desired to do so; that, upon approaching the station, the engineer, as was the custom, slowed up the speed of the train in order to ascertain if any one desired to get on or off; that, receiving no signal to that effect, he let on steam again, and increased the speed of the train; that plaintiff, after he had passed the depot some considerable distance, and without the knowledge of any of the employés on the train, attempted to jump or alight from the car to the ground when the train was going at the rate of from 8 to 12 miles an hour, and in doing so received the injuries complained of. The circumstances tend very strongly to corroborate the contention of the defendant; but of course the question which version of the occurrence was correct was for the jury. Upon this state of the evidence the court instructed the jury “that, if this accident occurred while plaintiff was in the act of getting off the car while it was in motion, then he cannot recover.” It is entirely clear from the record that what the court meant, and what the jury must have understood him as meaning, by “getting off the car,” was, not going upon the steps of the platform, but jumping or alighting from the steps to the ground. After a verdict for defendant, the court, on plaintiff's motion, granted a new trial solely upon the ground that this instruction was erroneous; that the question whether alighting from the car while in motion was a negligent act should have been left to the...