Butler v. Visionair, Inc., No. CIV.A. DKC 2005-0435.

• Decision Date: 01 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. DKC 2005-0435.
• Citation: 385 F.Supp.2d 549
• Parties: Glenn R. BUTLER v. VISIONAIR, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

385 F.Supp.2d 549

Glenn R. BUTLER v. VISIONAIR, INC.

No. CIV.A. DKC 2005-0435.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 1, 2005.

Christopher Curtis Fogleman, Patricia L. Morse, Gleason Flynn Emig and Fogleman Chartered, Rockville, MD, for Glenn R. Butler.

Francis R. Laws, Patrick James Madigan, Thomas and Libowitz PA, Baltimore, MD, for Visionair, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment compensation dispute is the motion of Defendant VisionAIR, Inc. ("Defendant"), to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Paper no. 8. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted because (1) the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and (2) Defendant has paid Plaintiff all of the money he is owed. In the alternative, Defendant asserts there is no genuine issue as to material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the court grants in part Defendant's motion to dismiss and denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

On January 11, 2005, Plaintiff Glenn R. Butler ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging that his former employer, VisionAIR, Inc., owed him commissions for software license sales he made during his employment with Defendant. The complaint asserts that Plaintiff worked for Defendant from March 29, 1999, until March 19, 2001.¹ Plaintiff alleges that he was owed commissions at the time of his separation and that additional sales invoices have been paid to VisionAIR for which he is due commissions.² He asserts claims under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md.Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-502 and 3-505 (1999) and breach of his employment agreement with Defendant.

The dispute primarily arises from a provision in the employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant in which Defendant states that it will not pay sales commissions more than six months after employment terminates. Relying on the contract, Defendant contends that it does not have to pay commissions on sales collected after September 23, 2001. Plaintiff argues that the six-month limit is void as against public policy, and that Defendant is liable for payments collected beyond September 23, 2001. Although not entirely clear, he appears to concede that, due to the statute of limitations, his claims for commissions are based on payments collected on or after November 1, 2001. The parties also disagree on whether Plaintiff actually earned the commission, as defined under Maryland law. However, the latter argument was raised for the first time in Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response, so the court will not address the issue at this time.³

II. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Except in certain specified cases, a plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) demands only "that the pleaded claim afford `the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 390 (4th Cir.1982)); 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1215, at 172-73 (3rd ed.2004).

In its determination, the court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.1999) (citing Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993)). The court may also consider documents referred to in the complaint and relied upon by plaintiff in bringing the action. Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 989 F.Supp. 748, 749 (D.Md.1997) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 46-48 (2nd Cir.1991)). The court must disregard the contrary allegations of the opposing party. See A.S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir.1969). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979).

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that a party typically must raise in a pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) and is not usually an appropriate ground for dismissal. See Eniola v. Leasecomm Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 520, 525 (D.Md.2002); Gray v. Metts, 203 F.Supp.2d 426, 428 (D.Md.2002). However, dismissal is proper "when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense." Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir.1996). See 5B Wright & Miller, supra, § 1357, at 714 ("A complaint showing that the governing statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff's claim for relief is the most common situation in which the affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleading and provides a basis for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)."). The court may consider documents referred to in the complaint and relied upon by plaintiff in bringing the action. Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 989 F.Supp. 748, 749 (D.Md.1997) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 46-48 (2nd Cir.1991)).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Where the parties present matters outside of the pleadings and the court considers those matters, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Gadsby by Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 949 (4th Cir.1997); Paukstis v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 551, 556 (D.Md.2003). It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1979). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. State of S.C., 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972, 113 S.Ct. 1415, 122 L.Ed.2d 785 (1993).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir.1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment." Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 810, 118 S.Ct. 52, 139 L.Ed.2d 17 (1997). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are time barred because he filed his claim more than three years and nine months after his employment with Defendant terminated. Under Maryland law, a civil action "shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time...